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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
This thesis examines the history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East since 1945. From the 
start of the Cold War immediately following the conclusion of WWII and up to the present day 
(2014), U.S. policy has been subject to many revisions and simultaneously, upheld national 
security measures. As the world heads toward an era where globalization is most prevalent, the 
United States will have to make drastic decisions regarding its foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Its alliance with Israel, oil interests, Islamic fundamentalism, an evolving Muslim society, and 
supporting a national security agenda has forced the United States to reevaluate its role in the 
region and throughout the world.  
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Chapter 1  
…………………………………….. 
Historiography 
  
 The contemporary history between the Middle East and The United States is saturated 
with detail, and presents a series of relationships that extend far beneath the surface of the 
common, yet misleading, course of logic.  To clarify, the current problems that the United States 
faces in the Middle East are not problems that have been generated by a single episode or based 
on religious and cultural factors alone.  These problems are a result of U.S. intermingling with 
Middle Eastern society, and the U.S.-explicit vision of globalization in the Middle East.  The 
current affairs between the United States and Middle Eastern countries involve a complex series 
of historic episodes that have affected U.S. policymakers’ efforts to implement globalization -- 
composed of economic, social, cultural, and political factors.  These factors are interrelated to the 
problems that have plagued American policy objectives and Middle Eastern society for decades, 
dating back to the end of the Second World War.   
 Since the dawn of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, the 
Middle East has been a pivotal region for the first-world in carrying out their respected 
diplomatic means and goals, furthermore, rendering the region’s global importance regarding 
natural resources and community - the major resource being petroleum.  The religious, social, 
and political conflicts between isolated Israel and its surrounding Muslim neighbors that have 
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occurred in the region over the years, were birthed decades ago by much larger, global patterns 
of Cold War diplomatic rigidity, instigated by the two superpowers of the world following World 
War Two. 
 Historians have been consistent and accurate, and for the most part thorough, with the 
evidence collected in detailing the relations between Western powers and the Middle East in 
recent history.  For the case of this research project, the focus will be on the relationship between 
the main historical figures, premises, and episodes between the United States and the Middle 
East -- primarily the Gulf States -- due to the abundance of natural resources in the region 
pursued by the Western powers.  The Gulf States are the several Arab nations bordering the 
southwestern side of the Persian Gulf, which include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, and Qatar.  These nations are pivotal to the global 
economics scene, because they refine and export a major portion of the world’s oil resources to 
other nations, including the United States, who have been a major trade partner since oil was 
discovered there in the early twentieth century.  Other nations the U.S. has had a strong 
relationship with in past years has been Israel, Turkey, and Egypt, and more recently, the U.S. 
has attempted to rekindle a diplomatic peace with Iran.  To understand the history and the 
dynamic of the Gulf States’ importance on a global scale, and for the most part their collective 
relationship with the United States, one must first understand the major factors encompassing 
this dynamic, often redundant, and complex diplomatic relationship with Middle Eastern states.  
Moreover, with a general notion of this relationship and a contextual knowledge of this specific 
area of diplomatic history, one can conclude that the United States has, and had, much at stake 
regarding an impactful, state-founded legacy within a cautious foreign policy with the Gulf 
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States.  Likewise, the Gulf States have had a unique relationship with the United States in terms 
of trade and monetary return from the sale of their most coveted resource -- oil.   
 Since the mid-twentieth century, historians and researchers have written some 
extraordinary work on United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East.  Furthermore, they have 
analyzed a great deal of evidence that would establish the general mind-frame that global 
economics and big business play a leading role in the creation and framework of United States’ 
foreign policy dating back to the first half of the twentieth century.  The global impact of the 
relationship between the United States and the Middle East today could be better understood 
after analyzing the formation and evolution of this relationship within an accurate historical 
context.  For the sake of argument, the beginnings of this specific history can be traced back to 
the era following the conclusion of WWII, and consequently, the outcome that presented the two 
global superpowers, which dawned in the Cold War: The United States and The Soviet Union.   
 
U.S. Foreign Policy in the Early Developments of the Cold War (1945-1991)  
 
 In 1956, the scholar C. Wright Mills published his acclaimed and pioneering work 
entitled The Power Elite.  In his book Mills argued that during the Great Depression, within 
“[President Roosevelt’s] policies, he subsidized the defaults of the capitalist economy, which had 
simply broken down; and by his rhetoric, he balanced its political disgrace, putting ‘economic 
royalists’ in the political dog house.”1  In hindsight, Roosevelt’s New Deal policies allowed big 
businessmen to enter the ranks of federal government and harbor more political power than ever 
                                                 
1
 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 274. 
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before in American history.  The biggest names in the American capitalist system had a major 
influence in Washington and its policymaking from the 1930s onward.  According to Mills, these 
Americans of high military, economic, and political ranking in American society, were all part of 
a power elite, and therefore it seemed only fitting that matters that pertained to foreign 
policymaking fell, “in the hands of the… business and professional men who control[led] 
Congress...”, and, “military men who control[led] defense and, in part, foreign policy….”2 
 Years after Mills published The Power Elite, historian Kim McQuaid tackled the task of 
analyzing the connection between presidential power and big business.  Published in 1982, 
McQuaid’s book examined the United States and its foreign policy-making process from FDR 
until the presidency of Ronald Reagan.  He cited pivotal episodes, influential groups, and entities 
involved in this historic narrative that demonstrated the union between American business 
leaders and American political leaders.  In the text McQuaid explained that in order for U.S. 
leaders to “flex” their international strength to meet the elite’s foreign policy interests, they, 
“expand[ed] the scope of American military and economic power abroad in ways amenable to 
the business politicians of the Business Council and the CED (Committee for Economic 
Development).”3 Kim McQuaid rationalized that as early as the 1960s and into the Nixon 
Administration, new types of committees and groups such as the Business Roundtable, formed to 
spawn a new era of political-economic policies to best fit their interests. “[B]ig business in the 
United States may at last… have come of political age.”4 As the Cold War decades progressed 
into the eras of the Carter and Reagan Administrations, the strategies imposed by groups such as 
the Business Council, Business Roundtable, and CED transpired to political-economic policies 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 243. 
3
 Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power: from FDR to Reagan (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, 1982), 197. 
4
 Ibid., 308. 
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which were novel in the wake of a rapidly expanding global economy.  Instead of remaining with 
a foreign policy designed in a political mind frame pertinent to combating the Soviets in a 
“crusade” against “big government” and “socialism”, economic elites took the task upon 
themselves to pursue a path that allowed them to be, “more prone to play for power” and to, 
“pursue their concrete and collective and individual interests” both domestically and abroad.5 
 After analyzing these scholarly works, one can reason that there exists a powerful bond 
between American government and big business entities.  Thus it is essential to possess this 
knowledge, and relate it to matters concerning United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East, 
which is designed and put into action by these political, economic, and even military elite of the 
United States.  With this knowledge one can theorize that many of the diplomatic episodes or 
actions taken between the United States and the Middle East that have occurred, or will occur for 
that matter, are likely a result of the motives and goals behind these unique and powerful 
relationships that exist within the upper-echelons of American and Middle Eastern society.    
 Beginning in 1973, The United States found itself in the midst of a foreign crisis -- one 
which negatively affected and altered the global-economic scene, and which brought about an 
‘energy crisis’ and a series of recessions involving inflated oil prices from OPEC exports.  
Political tensions between the West and the Gulf States also grew subsequently, because of 
conflicting interests involving an American alliance with the state of Israel.  In the midst of this 
global episode, a scholarly article was published in 1980 by Richard Barnet, David Dellinger, 
and Richard Falk entitled, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East.  Invited by the Institute for 
Palestine Studies, these three intellectuals were asked a series of questions regarding the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the aims of third-world liberation movements, and the United States’ 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. 
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aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union that was implemented during the Carter 
Administration. 
 During the course of these interviews, many valid points of United States’ foreign policy 
were discussed and analyzed regarding the United States’ containment policy dating back to the 
conclusion of World War Two.  Richard Barnet addressed the interviewer by declaring that the 
foreign policy implemented by the Carter Administration was just a continuation of the policy 
put together by Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under 
the Nixon and Ford Administrations.6  Barnet basically criticized the United States for following 
an outdated Cold War policy of containment.  He advocated that third-world nations like Iran (at 
the time this article was published, the Iranian Revolution was reaching its peak, alongside the 
hostage situation at the American embassy in Tehran) continued to resist American attempts to 
liberate those countries, and in a sense, imperialize those economically undeveloped regions of 
the globe.7 
 In their respective criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, all three speakers agreed on three 
main points of emphasis.  The first point mentioned in the article encompassed the need by the 
United States to control the access of the Middle East’s oil supply.  Secondly, the Middle East 
was a global stage where the world’s superpowers confronted each other over diplomatic power 
and resources, which in part is interconnected with the first point of emphasis.  The final point, 
which Falk emphasized, was a favorable American policy toward the Jewish state of Israel that 
“increasingly” isolated the United States diplomatically within the entire world.8 Although this 
                                                 
6
 Richard Barnet, David Dellinger, and Richard Falk, “Symposium: U.S. Foreign Policy in the 
Middle East”, Journal of Palestine Studies 10, no. 1 (1980): 4. 
7
 Ibid., 4-7. 
8
 Ibid., 9. 
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article was created during the height of Cold War tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union, 
many of the factors presented by these three intellectuals remain relevant for decades regarding 
Middle Eastern foreign policy.  American policies established in the Middle East have left a 
foundation of fragile and negative impressions, along with undesired consequences, toward 
Western society.  
 By the end of the bloody Iraqi-Iranian conflict of the 1980s, the Muslim world had 
shifted through a paradox of direction.  A portion of Middle Eastern society became more 
uneased and wary toward the United States’ influence in Middle Eastern political, social, and 
economic affairs.  As a result, an increasing number of Persians, Arabs, Palestinians, and other 
groups of Middle Eastern people fostered their own practice of Islamic faith, which had morphed 
into forms of fundamentalist and extremist worship, to battle what they saw as a foreign invasion 
by the ‘evil’ West.  Meanwhile, The United States maintained their Cold War diplomacy in the 
Gulf States, all while continuing to maintain big business policies and structure between large 
American companies and the Arab entities that controlled the region’s oil reserves.  Renowned 
activist and philosopher, Noam Chomsky, remained highly critical of United States’ foreign 
policy in the Middle East during the final years of the Cold War.  In 1991, Chomsky declared, in 
hindsight, that the goal of American policy in the Middle East was never based on the need for 
oil itself.  Rather the goal was to “dominate the world system,” in order to become the world’s 
sole superpower.9 In his bold and speculative conclusion, Chomsky declared that he saw: 
[L]ittle reason to expect the United States to modify its goals with regard to oil 
production and profits or to abandon its [sic] rejectionism on the Israeli-Arab 
conflict…. There is no reason to expect changes in the principles that guide 
policy.  There are no significant public pressures for policy change.  In polls, 
                                                 
9
 Noam Chomsky, “After the Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, Cultural 
Critique 19 (1991): 19. 
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about two-thirds of the public regularly express support for the international 
consensus on a two-state settlement, but few have the slightest awareness of U.S. 
isolation in blocking the peace process…. The official U.S. position and the 
record of diplomacy are rigidly excluded from the media and public discussion.  
There is, then, little reason to anticipate a shift in U.S. [sic] rejectionism.10 
 
In Chomsky’s cynical and melancholy conclusion of his article on U.S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East, he portrayed the United States as the central catalyst – taking on an intentional and 
unintentional role -- to the violence between the Jews, Arabs, and Palestinians in the Middle 
East.  Moreover, he believed that the relationship which has existed between the Middle East and 
the United States is one that was parasitic in nature, where the only parties that benefited from 
the diplomatic arrangement were the political and economic elite of the United States -- the elite 
which controlled the capital, resources of the region, and the spreading of mainstream public 
knowledge. 
 Researchers Jonathan Nitzan and  Shimshon Bichler displayed that big business, 
specifically in the petroleum and weapons industries, benefited the greatest from U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East.  In effect, political conflicts over resources and control of influence in 
the region had erupted into what the authors claimed as ‘energy conflicts.’  In their 1996 article, 
“Putting the State in its Place,” Nitzan and Bichler conducted a study that exhibited alarming 
consistencies and correlations between large oil companies’ decrease in profits and the wars that 
have erupted on Middle Eastern soil since the late 1960s.  Basically, “oil firms became more 
inclined to accept open hostilities as a means of achieving higher conflict-driven prices and 
better rates of return.”11 Their observations were more than alarming, as they analyzed several 
conflicts including the Iraqi-Iranian War, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Arab-Israeli Wars 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 30. 
11
 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, “Putting the State in its Place: U.S. Foreign Policy and 
Differential Capital Accumulation in Middle East ‘Energy Conflicts,’” Review of International 
Political Economy 3, no. 4 (1996): 612.  
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of 1967 and 1973, and the Gulf War of 1990, as well as a few other major episodes of warfare in 
contemporary Middle Eastern history.  Nitzan and Bichler both declared that although the 
American public overwhelmingly wanted peace in the Middle East since the 1960s, U.S. officials 
under the Clinton Administration and the “Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition” had precise, yet 
conflicting goals, including: the “mutual containment” of Iraq and Iran’s regional hostility 
toward other nations and peoples in the region, the promotion and implementation of democracy 
in the region, and advocating for the Muslim-Israeli peace - all while “undermining” Islamic 
fundamentalism.12 
 Following the Gulf War (1990-91), it seemed apparent that the United States was in the 
Middle East for the long term in order to promote their exclusive political and economic agenda.  
In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the United States becoming the only 
major power in the world, influencing U.S. diplomatic visions throughout the Middle East.  From 
the Reagan to the Clinton presidency, the directive of foreign policy in the Middle East was 
twofold:  American diplomacy was molded to allow big business, in the form of trading weapons 
technology and oil, to maintain the profiteering standards for certain U.S. and Arab economic 
entities and parties.  The second goal was to establish peace between the state of Israel and the 
surrounding Muslim nations, which presented a problem to America’s former objective.  
Although the United States sought to establish peace between the Islamic religious sects and 
Judaic religious factions of Middle Eastern society, too often, Islam was portrayed in a negative 
light by the American public and by the U.S. mainstream media.  Moreover, the rise of 
momentum in Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East has only retarded the ongoing peace 
process. 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 648. 
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 Frank Ninkovich has published several historical works on U.S. foreign policy, including 
The United States and Imperialism in 2001.  Ninkovich believed that during, and following the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the United States altered its foreign policy to reduce its national security 
state attributes.  Although some elements of a national security state are still in existence today, 
the United States had taken on the role of leading the rest of the world into a ‘new world order’ 
in a sense, which can also be depicted as the progression toward globalization.  In his book, The 
United States and Imperialism, Ninkovich rationalized that, “[I]n many quarters globalization 
was seen as the Americanization of the world…. Americans saw little to be ashamed of in their 
ambition to recreate the world in the image of their own nation… [Americans] continued to 
envision themselves as the champions of a universal empire of the spirit and way of life, the 
empire of modernity.”13 Americanization refers to efforts by United States’ diplomats and 
personnel to instill their own cultural, political, social, and economical doctrine onto peoples in 
foreign lands.  This nationalistic attitude possessed by American policymakers had transpired on 
the world stage as American doctrine was poised as a guiding light for the rest of the world.  This 
undertaking eventually led to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States due to Islamic 
backlash against American policymaking.  Once again, American foreign policy in the Middle 
East created resentment by the Muslim extremists toward Americanization.  The effect of Islamic 
extremism toward United States’ foreign policy in the Developing World, especially the Middle 
East, caused the United States to consider altering their entire diplomacy into a new direction.   
 As the United States headed into the new millennium, it remained the only standing 
power that some of its elitist citizens and leaders believed would lead the world into the era of an 
interconnected global society.  According to Ninkovich, the notion of the Americanization of the 
                                                 
13
 Frank Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 
2001), 245-6. 
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world was born years preceding the official collapse of Soviet Russia.  During the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, Iran had nearly 50,000 students studying at universities within the United 
States.  The presence within Iran of an increasingly secular, westernized elite clearly resulted in 
the “explosion of fundamentalist resentment.”14 A book written by Jalal al-e Ahmed and 
published in 1962, Westoxication, captured the animosities Iranians held toward the West.  
Ahmed and his book heavily criticized Western cultural norms and political theories, harboring 
pro-Leftist and pro-Shia clerical sentiments, and provided the underpinnings of the Iranian 
Revolution years prior to its culmination.15 Yet this was just one historic example of a cultural 
backlash against the United States and its attempt to lead the world into a new era.  If the United 
States and its leaders believe it was supposed to lead the world into the future, should it have 
been done with the current power structure in place, which included the political, economic, and 
to an extent, military elite?   
Ninkovich argued this aspect of globalization, and explained that, “[g]lobalization is not a 
temporary occupation of the world that, once lifted, would allow traditional cultural values to 
reassert themselves.  It is, at its most ruthlessly effective, a juggernaut that utterly destroys 
traditional cultures….”16 Emily Rosenberg argued this viewpoint as early as 1983.  In her book, 
Spreading the American Dream, she predicted that foreign cultures would be replaced by 
American influence, through the merging of “lessons” of the United States’ own economic 
development with, “traditional liberal tenets about freedom and the marketplace.”17 Is this what 
                                                 
14
 Frank Ninkovich, U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Foreign 
Policy Association, 1996), 43. 
15
 The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, 15th ed. rev., s.v. “Ahmed, Jalal al-e.” 
16
 Ninkovich, United States and Imperialism, 251. 
17
 William Becker, review of Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural 
Expansion, 1890-1945, by Emily Rosenberg, The Journal of American History 70, no. 3 
(December 1983): 699. 
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the native peoples of the Middle East feared based on this perspective?  This question can be 
answered within the rhetoric of the proponents and opponents of the Western trends toward 
globalization, as well as the recent history between Western policymakers and actors, and the 
peoples of the Middle East. 
 
The Seeds of Globalization in U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
 President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, believed that 
globalization, following the World Trade Center attacks of 2001, was the inevitable goal of 
United States’ foreign policy by the beginning of the twenty-first century.  In his 2004 book, The 
Choice: Global Dominance or Global Leadership, Brzezinski argued that in order to defeat 
modern Middle Eastern terrorism, terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda must “lose their social 
appeal and therefore their recruitment ability,” as well as, “their financial backing.” Moreover, in 
order for globalization to come to its fruition, the United States must “command genuine 
international support,” and the proliferation of terrorism must be, “brought under control when 
suspect national efforts are either subjected to effective international controls” by the use of an 
organized and global coalition spearheaded by the developed nations of the world.18 While 
Brzezinski believed that Middle Eastern inclusion into a global political system would be a 
tedious and uphill battle, the only way to accomplish this objective would be to eliminate the 
sole threat of religious fundamentalism from the mindset of the Muslim peoples across the 
region.19 
                                                 
18
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Dominance or Global Leadership (New York: 
Basic Books, 2004), 33. 
19
 Ibid., 52. 
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 In her 2005 book, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Janice Terry listed four goals 
of United States’ policy, which have remained historically accurate.  These four goals included: 
securing the free flow of oil in the Gulf, improving relations with Muslim regimes on a bilateral 
basis, preventing the region from becoming a sphere of influence to any other developed nation, 
and supporting the continued existence of the state of Israel.20 Terry remained consistently 
objective while criticizing the actions and portrayals that the mainstream media and political elite 
display toward the Israel issue.  In the midst of their overwhelming support for Israel and its 
expansion into Palestinian territories, American Israeli supporters typically foster and believe the 
“exaggerations” and false stereotypes about Muslims and Middle Eastern people by the 
American mainstream.21 She does an admirable job in identifying the underlying conflicts 
between the United States and the Middle East regarding policy-making, generated from myths 
and misunderstandings of their culture and society, which found their way into the American 
legislative process. In essence, Terry declared that U.S. foreign policy regarding the Middle East 
was an unfair and misleading practice.  On the one hand Terry contended that the Jewish lobby 
within the U.S. has been very influential and committed to the State of Israel, while on the other 
the lobby enjoyed the tremendous support it received from federal, state, and local levels of the 
U.S. government.22 
 In 2010, Sean Foley constructed a very detailed narrative on the relations between the 
United States and the Arab Gulf states.  In The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam, Foley 
illustrated that Arab states in the Gulf are challenged with the dual nature of being pressured by 
American foreign policy and simultaneously attempting to evolve their societies into a more 
                                                 
20
 Janice J. Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005), 
23. 
21
 Ibid., 21. 
22
 Ibid., 122.  
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liberal and modern one.  Foley examined the influence of mass media, culture, social norms and 
taboos, foreign and domestic policies, technology and modernity trends, economic concerns, and 
many other factors in his analysis.  A great deal of the animosity toward the United States 
possessed by Arab peoples in the region, argued Foley, resulted from instances such as the Arab-
Israeli War of 1973, where key figures like King Faisal of Saudi Arabia increased the price of oil 
per barrel exponentially out of resentment of the United States’ support for Israel during the war 
-- consequently leading to a global economic crisis.23 The United States’ alliance with Israel has 
been detrimental throughout the years in that it has constantly been dampening positive relations 
between the West and the Islamic nations surrounding Israel.   
Foley concluded that the global recession of 2008 had major impacts on the oil-rich Gulf 
countries, in that although, “[t]he current downturn has yet to devastate the Gulf petroleum 
industry in the same way that the Great Depression decimated pearling and pilgrimage, there are 
signs that it may accelerate social and technological trends that will reduce the importance [of oil 
revenue] to the Gulf and to the world economy in general.”24 Furthermore, as United States’ 
power and influence declines in the Gulf states, so does the global dependence on the region’s 
petroleum resources. Kingdoms like Saudi Arabia will have economic setbacks, yet they still 
have “investments”, such as alternative energy and education, which, according to Foley, “have 
the potential to yield significant economic growth in the future.”25   
In 2012, Stephen Walt, a Harvard University professor who specializes in American 
foreign policy, commented on current U.S. affairs and policies in the Middle East.  He indicated 
in his article, “Balancing Act: Foreign Policy in a New Middle East”, that the United States has 
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 Sean Foley, The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2010), 35. 
24
 Ibid., 275. 
25
 Ibid., 280. 
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been “actively engaged” in the region since World War Two; however, now that the Gulf Wars 
of the previous two decades are history, we are beginning to follow a strategy of “dual 
containment,” meaning we will maintain close relationships with Middle Eastern governments, 
but only “engage” our military in times of “crisis or emergency.”26 Walt concluded that there 
will likely be no power vacuum forming in the Middle Eastern landscape, as we continue to 
decrease our influence and military presence in the region.  In addition, he explained that Israel 
will “continue to be the strongest military power,” in the region while having little political 
influence due to the “obvious” reasons of overwhelming religious differences.27  Walt presented 
his argument that the United States will draw its focus on sharing its foreign policy objectives 
with other powerful nations like China. This will allow the United States to continue to tackle 
global activities such as foreign aid while, in a hopeful presumption, rising powerful states such 
as Russia and China must share a multinational objective in bringing about a unipolar globalized 
planet.   
Forces against globalization, such as various sects of religious fundamentalists and 
nationalists around the world, would surely contest an exclusively Americanized attempt at 
indoctrinating globalization policy throughout the world.  The rising global stature of other 
developed nations, who are integral players in a global economy and political system, must all 
agree on the same concept of globalization if it is to become tangible.  If the United States leads 
this crusade alone, it will face much opposition and resistance from foreign societies for being 
too homogenous, and too dedicated to its own social norms and desires.  Yet, if a global coalition 
of various nations carry out a plan of globalization in their own variations of foreign policy, then 
                                                 
26
 Stephen Walt, “Balancing Act: Foreign Policy in a New Middle East,” Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 19, no. 1 (winter 2012): 9-10. 
27
 Ibid., 14. 
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perhaps globalization will face less opposition and resistance.  A Strong opposition will present 
itself, especially from those foreign cultures unwilling to subject to a seemingly American 
policy, which was established to serve its own national interests.  
 
The United States’ Role in the Middle East: From the Dawn of the Cold War 
to the Present 
 
The material that has been documented and published on United States’ foreign policy in 
the Middle East is extensive to say the least.  With the current social unrest, civil warfare, 
international tensions, and terrorist activities that exist in the region today, it is difficult to 
imagine that the uniform and numerous historical trends on this particular subject matter will 
decline, or change substantially for that matter.  Analyzing United States’ foreign policy in the 
Middle East since the early-middle days of the Cold War was that there has existed several 
obvious factors that have played a crucial part in this U.S. policymaking process.  Beyond the 
militarization by the United States in the region in order to combat the Soviet threat and Islamic 
extremism and aggression toward Israel and the West, a considerable amount of evidence has 
presented the solid argument that the relationship between ‘Big Business’ and government policy 
is a tangible factor that plays a major role in U.S. foreign policy.  Primarily in the form of large 
oil companies and weapons firms, big business and the government entities of the United States 
and certain Middle Eastern states present confirmations that cannot be overlooked or ignored.  
The economic and political relationships formed over the years have been responsible for much 
of the diplomacy, conflict, turmoil, and historical episodes, which have occurred or might occur 
in the present and near future. 
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Historical analysis on this matter must be constantly conducted, since it is one of the 
major episodes currently being played out in contemporary global society - with the United 
States being a key player in this ongoing episode.  Today there is much certainty that the 
diplomatic conflicts between the United States and the Islamic nations of the Middle East, such 
as Iran, will not stop anytime soon, nor does it appear that the United States will abandon its 
current position as a world mediator to the conflicting Middle Eastern nations in the coming 
days.  Therefore, taking historical trends in consideration, a new trend of American diplomacy 
has evolved from within the basis of the former trend, and has existed since the latter half of the 
twentieth century.  The transition into a new age of United States’ foreign policy in the Middle 
East began to surface following the finale of the first Gulf War (1990-91) and first World Trade 
Center bombing in 1993; however the newest foreign policy trend came to full fruition following 
the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001. 
There are many unique, complex, and diverse factors involved in this evolving 
relationship between the United States and Middle Eastern society, as well as novel aspects 
forming out of this historical narrative.  In the ongoing effort to lead the world toward the path of 
globalization, the United States has altered its position in Middle East foreign policy over the 
previous decade or so – transitioning from a conservative and national defensive policy to a 
policy that has sought to find a common ground of social, economic, and cultural understanding 
between the United States and the entire Middle Eastern region.  Moreover, the transformation of 
the Middle East into a more democratic and Western model of society, while maintaining a 
position of benevolent instigators and supporters of liberalization, while attempting to cooperate 
with the insubordinate theocracy in Iran, is a task that will prove easier said than done.  The 
Obama Administration has prolonged the United States’ stance against nations like Syria and 
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Iran, who continue to resist assimilating into the global path toward globalization.  Under 
Obama, the United States has moderated its Middle Eastern foreign policy from an attempt to 
play a neoconservative role in forcing change, to reducing their military presence and making a 
more democratic attempt, using mediating techniques and negotiating peace between hostile and 
agitated groups like the Palestinians and the Israelis.  Numerous failures in transforming the 
sociopolitical landscape of the Middle East, and the rise of Islamic extremism, have forced the 
Obama Administration to seek and analyze new means and measures in order to bring about 
positive change to the Muslim world. 
In The Rise of Islamic Capitalism, author Vali Nasr brilliantly laid out the current 
landscape of Middle Eastern society in the wake of this new path in American foreign policy.  
Nasr argued in his introduction that, “[b]y breaking the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 
2001, toppling Saddam, and then uprooting Baathism in Iraq, the United States removed local 
rivals that had contained Iranian power to its east and west.”28 The following actions committed 
by U.S. forces allowed Iran more freedom to carry out their plans of expansion, along with their 
expansion of anti-Western and Shia rhetoric and ideologies.  These actions, which were carried 
out by the outdated and former foreign policy that had been rebirthed during the George W. Bush 
presidency, had presented a new series of problems for U.S. policymakers.  The problems from 
the previous administration are what the current administration must confront and dissolve.  
Nasr believed that as time persisted, the rise of a global economy will affect the Middle 
East in a positive manner in regards to assimilating it with the global pattern of modernity and 
liberal ideology, which typically accompanies capitalist growth and prosperity.  Iran, with its 
extremist Islamic nature, is one of the few and powerful nations in the Middle East which has 
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tried to halt the momentum of globalization. Nasr added that it is the, “Middle East’s rising 
middle class, and working to bring the economies of the region more fully into the web of 
globalization, can push the status quo to the tipping point where national leaders have no choice 
but to embrace change….”, which, in effect, is “the key first step toward liberalization of the 
political systems.”29 This is Nasr’s vision of a Persian Spring, which is the hope other globalists 
envision and covet as well.   
Rising unemployment among Middle Eastern middle class men also poses as a major 
concern.  This evolution can either hurt or aid the United States’ mission of globalization.  Aside 
from Nasr’s argument, there are many more factors than just the economic aspects, including 
various U.S. religious groups (pro-Israel lobby) that favor a stronger Israeli state, which 
contribute overwhelmingly to United States’ foreign policy decisions in the region.  If stability is 
to come to the Middle East sooner rather than later in the form of a Western-style socio-
economic society, certain barriers must be removed in order to allow this evolution to occur.   
 
What Does the Future Hold? 
 
From an American standpoint, several factors exist that present a barrier for globalization 
and the establishment of permanent peace and stability to the Middle East.  In addition, these 
factors will prevent the United States from abandoning its role as the pivotal actor on the Middle 
Eastern stage of diplomacy and follow a policy of isolationism.  As the United States’ makes 
valiant attempts to reopen cordial relations with Iran, relations between Saudi Arabia and its 
Arab neighbors who oppose Iran’s hostile regional might are weakening.  Iran is a nation ruled 
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by an extreme Islamic fundamentalist elite whose aspirations are to halt the Americanization, or 
globalization for that matter, in the Middle East through the use of political might via nuclear 
technology, promotion of terrorist actions against the West, and the threat of warfare.  If the 
United States wishes to continue in plunging the Middle East into the realm of a new world 
order, so to speak, it must first eliminate the threat Iran poses currently on the secular states of 
the region.  Iran’s aggressive theocracy has held onto the ideals of Islamic fundamentalism, 
which has included the jihad against Western society and the present one against Middle Eastern 
Sunni regimes who have been open to the prospects of modernity.  This war against the West and 
Sunni Muslims, carried out by Islamic extremist organizations like al-Qaeda, have only retarded 
the goals of the modern United States’ foreign policy of globalization.  
The United States has exhaustedly and tediously been pursuing efforts toward some form 
of peaceful and meaningful negotiations with Iran recently.  In effect, relations with Saudi 
Arabia have soured to a slight degree.  As Iran continues to flex its regional muscle, Saudi 
Arabia’s monarchy, ruled by the House of Saud, have grown very uneased by the current stance 
of reconciliation that the United States has taken toward Iran.  The fundamental issue of Sunni 
statist governments such as Saudi Arabia’s, and Shia theocracies such as Iran is deeply rooted in 
ancient Islamic religion – a problem that will not be easy for policymakers to remedy.  In 
October, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal in 
the city of Riyadh in an attempt by the United States to ease Saudi Arabia’s anxieties over 
Iranian advancements toward an effective nuclear program.  Saudi Arabia remained alarmed, as 
nothing was achieved from the talks, as their media portrayed President Obama and his 
administration as, “turn[ing] his right and left cheeks to his opponents in hopes of 
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reconciliation.”30 The United States, on the other hand, has been agitated by the abuse of civil 
rights that the Saudi government has committed on portions of its domestic population.  
The Saudi impatience with the United States has been a persistent theme since the George 
W. Bush Administration left power.  This is likely due to the result of an absence, or lack, of 
business and the sustained conservative diplomatic relationships between Saudi and American 
figures within the Obama Administration, which had previously existed for decades.  In previous 
Republican administrations under George H.W. Bush, and his son George W. Bush, there existed 
an established relationship between Saudi officials, Arab oil sheikhs, the Bush Family and their 
government appointees.  This diplomatic relationship has been reinforced by decades’ old 
involvement in the Gulf oil industry and U.S. national security interests in the Middle East.  
Currently, Obama and his administration have struck a discord with King Abdullah’s monarchy.  
The current unwillingness, or lack of urgency, by the United States to dissolve Iran’s nuclear 
program and its threatening regional stance, in backing the Syrian rebellion against President 
Bashar Assad, and the U.S. inactivity during the 2011 overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt – a longtime ally to the United States -- have raised suspicions within the Saudi 
government regarding the direction of U.S. policy in the Middle East.31 Saudi Arabia openly 
displayed their disappointment toward the United States in late October, 2013, when the Arab 
nation refused a seat on the United Nations’ newly formed Security Council.32 
                                                 
30
 Robert F. Worth, “U.S. and Saudis in Growing Rift as Power Shifts,” New York Times, 
November 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013 /11/26/world/middleeast/us-and-saudis-in-
growing-rift-as-power-shifts.html.  
31
 Christi Parsons, Kathleen Hennessey and Laura King, “President Obama Seeks to Bolster Ties 
with Saudi Arabia,” Los Angeles Times, March 27, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/ 
middleeast/la-fg-obama-saudi-20140328,0,4484108.story#axzz2xZ06T0IT. 
32
 Worth, “U.S. and Saudis in Growing Rift...,” New York Times, November 25, 2013. 
22 
 
Part of this growing rift between the United States and Saudi Arabia can be attributed to 
other unintentional developments as well.  Advancements and innovations in the energy industry, 
including hydro-fracking for natural gas, has been a giant contributor to minimizing the U.S. 
dependency on Saudi oil imports.  On the domestic front, the United States is in the process of 
possibly creating the Keystone Pipeline.  This pipeline will carry crude oil, resulting from hydro-
fracking techniques and innovations, extracted from the earth of the northern-most lands of the 
North American Great Plains and into the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Manitoba.  A recent poll suggested that the majority of Americans and Canadians, to an extent, 
support construction of the Keystone Pipeline project, because of their assumption that the U.S. 
and Canada will depend less on “less reliable” oil exporting nations such as Saudi Arabia.  In a 
turbulent effort, the United States has displayed its public interest in protecting the domestic 
energy market first and foremost.33  This massive pipeline will extend southward toward the Gulf 
of Mexico where it can be shipped off to international markets, creating a giant stimulus for the 
U.S. economy.   
In effect, the United States will become less dependent on foreign oil imports from 
regions such as the Middle East – Saudi Arabia being the largest of the Gulf states in terms of oil 
exporting, which consequently would take on a substantial loss of revenue.  Companies such as 
Exxon have begun to invest heavily in hydro-fracking, and in effect, have had relative success on 
the world economic stage, which has caused other oil companies to follow in Exxon’s 
trailblazing footsteps.  Innovations in oil extraction techniques and refining has been changing 
the dynamic nature of the global oil industry and market presently.  To extract, refine, and 
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manufacture the Keystone oil within the North American territories will prove less costly from 
global economic standards.  Furthermore, global concerns and initiatives over research and 
development over the usage of alternative energy will only damper Saudi Arabia’s economy 
further.  The unfolding of events taking place in the United States and Middle East will be 
significant in regards to the path the United States takes regarding diplomacy in the Middle East 
going forward.   
The tendency to focus on Saudi Arabia during this research, in part, has resulted from the 
tremendous amount of available public information regarding special interests, international 
relationships, and other primary information that has existed between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States.  For example, from 1946 to 1976, the Central Intelligence Agency issued and 
retained more reports on important Saudi figures, Saudi-U.S. business relations and entities, and 
regional events, than the reports on the countries of Qatar, Oman, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen combined.34 Alongside Israel, an established ally with the United States, 
Saudi Arabia has been the one Middle Eastern Arab nation that we have had an overall 
constructive, lasting, and peaceful diplomatic relationship with.  A major catalyst to the Saudi-
U.S. relationship is its continuous big business partnerships and secular acquaintanceships – 
headed by the oil trade between U.S. and Arab leaders, important figures, and multinational 
companies.  One very important Arab-U.S. relationship episode in the context of foreign policy 
that dates back several decades is the relationship between the Bush family and The House of 
Saud, alongside various oil sheikhs of the Persian Gulf.  Kevin Phillips, who has extensively 
studied the Bush dynasty and its reaches of power, indicated that Charles Freeman, former U.S. 
ambassador to Saudi Arabia and president of the Middle East Policy Council, declared that the 
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one Saudi business relationship that is “closely connected to the U.S.” via the Bush family is the 
bin Laden Group – the family of formerly infamous al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.35 An 
opponent of both Bush’s foreign policies in the Middle East, Kevin Phillips displayed partly the 
reason for the Islamic-Arab resentment toward the West was due to the personal ties between the 
Bush family and the power elite of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.36  Since the 1970s, 
historian Janice Terry explained further that the Saudi royal family established personal and 
political relationships with top U.S. officials and presidents since the day Prince Fahd visited 
Washington D.C. to help establish the U.S. Saudi Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation 
in 1979.37 
The nations of Iran and Israel will also play significant roles in this particular research as 
well.  This is due to the fact that these nations remain ever so important to United States’ 
diplomatic goals in the Middle East – Iran playing the antagonist and Israel as the protagonist 
from an American standpoint.  Not without mentioning that nations such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and Israel contain the region’s embodiment of religious conflicts, which have taken precedence 
in the Middle Eastern conflict as the world continues forward on a path toward globalization.  
Religious fundamentalism, however, has played a major factor in dictating this course of 
conflict.  Unfortunately this religious fundamentalism has portrayed and manifested itself as 
Islamic extremism carried out by various political circles and terrorist organizations within the 
region.  Islamic fundamentalism, which inevitably leads to acts of extremism and terrorism, is 
the one and only major obstacle that stands between the violence and turbulence on the one hand, 
and peace and successful efforts to globalize the Middle East on the other. 
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Islamic fundamentalism, which has contributed to the recent uprisings in Syria and 
Egypt, has gained significant momentum, and will indeed halt any attempts by the Middle East 
to position itself into a globalized and unified system of a world order.  This form of 
fundamentalism is composed of political, social, and religious animosities toward Western 
culture.  In part, United States’ foreign policy in the region has contributed to the overall Islamic 
fundamentalists’ hatred of the West – especially in places like Chechnya and Afghanistan, where 
in the past, the U.S. intervened in one way or another to prevent Soviet expansion.  According to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation today, at least 13 of the top 21 global terrorist organizations 
listed on their website are those composed out of an Islamic fundamentalist foundation.38  
However, globalization proponents view their efforts to change the Middle East as one that 
would bring about positive reform and eliminate Islamic extremist rationales and activities.  With 
the coming of modernization and democratic reform, traditional and cultural norms such as 
religious fundamentalism will decrease, leading to less regional violence and global acts of 
terror.  The United States has taken a strong stance against Islamic fundamentalist-based 
terrorism in its diplomacy in both, the current and previous, administrations.  It is the goal of 
U.S. foreign policy to eliminate the threat of Middle Eastern terrorism, or deflect it for that 
matter, until the region organizes some form of peace arrangement between themselves and other 
various nations and groups around the world.  This peace arrangement, as the United States 
would view it, has to begin or end, ultimately, with sustained and improved diplomacy with Iran.  
Whatever course the United States wishes to embark on toward regional peace in the Middle 
East, it will not come in a simple solution, nor will it be easily obtainable through peaceful 
negotiations or mediation processes.  Ultimate peace will have to involve both sides of the 
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parties involved in the conflict taking steps and finding solutions that will eventually establish 
lasting peace, cooperation, and civil stability for future generations.  
In sum, the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East today is an endeavor that has 
been presented new obstacles as the world heads toward an ever-changing and uncertain future.  
These obstacles differ from the obstacles the United States faced during the Cold War – as their 
goal is not to promote democracy in order to protect the region from the spread of communism 
as it was during the Cold War.  Rather, Western goals, currently, are to instill democratic reform 
and contain Islamic fundamentalism throughout the developing world in the name of 
globalization.  Defending American interests, as well as promoting and protecting democracy in 
Western Europe and elsewhere, seemed to be the underlying theme of U.S. foreign policy during 
the years of the Cold War.  In order to protect U.S. interests overseas and establish Western 
ideologies in the Third World during the Cold War years, military and covert operations were 
necessary in engaging communist uprisings and deterring the spread Soviet influence.  Once the 
late 1980s arrived, it seemed evident that Soviet Russia would fall and the West would reign as 
sole champions of the postwar world.  As the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States arose 
as victors, the United States spearheaded as well as continued its Western agenda of cultural, 
economic, and political influence and reign in the Middle East.  Yet, continuing a trend of 
foreign policy that defends national security interests, which was a common United States’ 
theme throughout the second half of the twentieth century, should have ceased once the Soviet 
Union fell.  This trend of foreign policy could not prevail in an evolving front of opposition 
toward the Americanization of the globe by traditionalist and extremist forces of Middle Eastern 
society as a new millennium approached.   
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From the time of the first Gulf War (1990-91), and into the first decade of the new 
millennium, the Middle East remained a hostile environment for which the United States desired 
to implement its globalization diplomacy successfully.  American presence and influence in the 
Middle East, in general, as well as their cultural impact on Middle Eastern peoples, would prove 
to be a tedious and cumbersome venture.  Resentment towards the United States increased and 
manifested itself through Islamic terrorist organizations, which embraced the anti-Western, 
conservative Islam, and pro-Soviet substructures of Islamic fundamentalism.  It seems an 
accepted globalist view that in order to make progress toward a globalized world, the United 
States and other developed powers must reduce or remove the threat of Islamic (or for that matter 
any religious and political fusion of conservative ideals in defense of tradition) fundamentalism, 
as it was viewed as an impediment to social progression.  U.S. policymakers began to realize that 
successful modernization and democratization would not be seen until, “the dogmatic rule 
imposed by Ayatollah Khomeini wears thin and the Iranian secular elite senses that the West 
sees a regionally constructive role for Iran.”39   
In addition to the growing threat terrorism imposed on the United States and its way of 
life, the U.S. was dedicated to protecting Israel from its Islamic neighbors at the highest cost 
through a military, economic, and cultural alliance.  All while committed to preserving the peace 
between Israel and its aggressive neighbors, the U.S. stationed military personnel and established 
bases in Saudi Arabia to contain the turbulent and antagonistic nations of Iran and Iraq beginning 
just prior to the first Gulf War.  This maneuver stimulated animosity towards the United States’ 
presence by the ethnically-based Saudi members of al-Qaeda.  Ever since, further attempts by the 
U.S. in intermingling in Middle Eastern affairs have increased tensions for the United States in 
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confronting this Islamic jihad.  This aspect of U.S. foreign policy was known as “dual-
containment.”40 Following the tragic events of 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iraq in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. government began to realize that its outdated foreign policy, 
which had sustained for decades in the Middle East, had expired.  This realization brought about 
a new era where American foreign policy had to evolve and expand to meet the demands of a 
changing world, especially meeting the demands of a rapidly changing Middle Eastern society. 
Once George W. Bush left office and the Obama Administration took control of the 
United States’ executive branch in 2009, many transformations took precedence regarding 
Middle Eastern policy.  The foreign policy agenda of President Obama and his staff began to 
exhibit its reach once his administration took power, and has continued implementing a more 
sustained and balanced diplomacy between the United States and Middle Eastern powers.  U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East today, however, displays the U.S. government’s lack of 
experience in the big business relationships with the Saudis and has removed itself intentionally 
from conflicts that are currently plaguing the region in order to allow a natural form of 
globalization to become established.  U.S. foreign policy under the Obama Administration could 
be viewed as substantially similar to previous foreign policies under the Carter and Kennedy 
Administrations.  The weakening of U.S. support for Israel’s and Saudi Arabia’s national 
inspirations could be regarded as the United States becoming the international frontrunner in 
bringing the region into a new era free of traditional religious values and extremist thought via 
moderate noninvolvement.  Moreover, future world powers, like China and Russia, would have 
to allocate their opinions, strategies, and their overall concerns regarding the subject of 
globalization and its outlook in the Middle East.  Whether or not the Obama Administration’s 
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strategy for carrying out Middle Eastern policy is an effective and efficient strategy is yet to be 
determined.  Nonetheless, their foreign policy in the Middle East presents a strategy that has 
been transformed to accommodate their exclusive diplomatic goals of globalization and 
democratization – although these diplomatic goals might be in slight or large contrast to the 
goals of Russia, China, and other powerful nations that also coordinate international policy.  
Stephen Walt has even considered that it would prove beneficial for Washington and Beijing to 
consolidate their globalization tasks in the Middle East and South Asia.  If the United States 
allowed China to take the principal position in guiding globalization policy in Asia, then it would 
“make it easier for Washington to maintain strong Asian partnerships, while the persistent 
exercise of Chinese soft power could convince some Asian states the Beijing was the wave of the 
future and that Chinese hegemony would not be all that onerous.”41  
The Obama Administration seems very reluctant to stray from their pioneering and 
resurrected foreign policy of cooperation among various peoples residing in the Middle East.  
New developments and various transformations in Middle Eastern society have been taking place 
at a tremendous pace.  Moreover, the appearance of the Arab Spring in North Africa, beginning 
in 2011, has raised further concerns that advocates of globalization need to consider.  A rise of a 
new Muslim middle class and a rebirth of Muslim intellectualism within the growing pattern of 
global capitalism, an increase in Islamic fundamentalism and extremism, developments in the 
global petroleum industry and market, the BRIC nations’ (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 
global search for resources like oil and their specific quest toward a globalized world has 
presented issues and circumstances that U.S. policymakers need to reckon with. An re-tooled 
U.S. foreign policy that focuses on improving relations with Iran, and in effect, weakening 
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relations with Saudi Arabia, are other factors needed to considered by policymakers as the world 
enters into a new age.  Furthermore, Western Europe, including the European Union (EU), has 
presented an altered model of globalization – one that is more environmentally friendly and 
which presents more of a state-controlled economy than that of U.S. policy.  Globalization will 
continue to be the underlying objective of United States’ foreign policy around the world; but the 
U.S. must come to a solution for either driving, or encouraging, Middle Eastern society into the 
structure of globalization.   
The question is how long it will take, if it ever does materialize, -- considering the 
various Middle Eastern nations, different sects of Muslim peoples, and various secular and 
religious leaders – for globalization to become a replacement of traditional and fundamentalist 
norms of Middle Eastern society?  Moreover, will the United States be the lone power, or will 
there be an international coalition or power, that guides globalization’s direction?  Perhaps the 
rise of capitalism, an Islamic middle class, and Arab intellectualism will play a pivotal role in 
evolving the region into the trends of modernity and out of fundamentalism.  The world is not 
bipolar as it was during the Cold War today, and diplomacy will continue to become more 
complex as time persists.  U.S. leadership will be constantly challenged by its own public, 
private business interests, global organizations, and other nations and their people as they seek to 
bring stability, then change, to the developing world.  The BRIC nations are becoming 
increasingly powerful and have assumed roles as actors on the global stage of political and 
economic affairs.  These nations however, such as Brazil, India, China, and Russia, are becoming 
powerful in pushing their own geopolitical concerns. Globalization efforts will have to 
incorporate the interests of these nations, along with other powerful and developed nations such 
as Britain and others incorporated with the European Union (EU) and the UN.  With the United 
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States leading the charge toward globalization as witnessed by the actions carried out through its 
foreign policy, only time and the willingness by the peoples from the Middle East to conform to 
a new governing system is yet to be seen. 
Chapter Two will focus on the history of United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East 
since the beginning of the Cold War until the end of the first Gulf War in 1991.  The material 
that will be analyzed in the following chapter includes primary and secondary historical 
evidence.  Much of the history on United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East since the end 
of the Second World War has been thoroughly analyzed, yet must be once again reviewed to 
provide the reader with a historical context and basic understanding of the underlying notion that 
this thesis offers.  United States’ foreign policy surrounded the containment of the spread of 
Soviet influence initially that involved important factors still in existence in the current age of 
globalization.   
Chapter Three will include the bulk of the thesis.  It will pertain to the current trends of 
United States’ foreign policy, dating back to the time of the end of the first Gulf War in 1991.  
Understanding the origins of the current trend of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East will aid 
in understanding the complex matter of globalization in its entirety.  The international oil trade of 
yesterday has transformed the direction of the domestic energy needs of the United States today.  
Furthermore, the world stage has become much more diverse regarding the players involved in 
the globalization’s destiny and the ongoing events and global episodes have shaped and altered 
our diplomacy to meet the needs as seen best fit by the U.S. government.  In the conclusion of 
the thesis, options will be presented to the reader concerning globalization and its implications 
and legacy on the Middle East.   
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Chapter 2 
…………………………. 
A History of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East Following WWII 
 
 
 
One of the biggest concerns in the American political atmosphere today has been the 
United States’ entanglement with Middle Eastern society.  American military and various 
occupational personnel, resources, as well as money have been channeled to and from that region 
of the world for decades.  Many Americans want to withdraw its diplomatic presence from the 
region, as well as abandon former United States’ interests and intentions within Middle Eastern 
society.  On the other hand, others tend to agree that the United States should remain in the 
Middle East due to the social and political instability of Muslim culture, and the threat it poses 
on the rest of the world and globalization.  The United States will, in fact, remain a pivotal player 
in the progression of Middle Eastern society for several various reasons.  President Obama was 
elected by the American public in 2009, in part, because he stated on numerous occasions during 
his campaign that he would convene with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and formulate a “phased and 
orderly” plan to withdraw American troops from the Middle East as soon as he was elected.42 
Only parts of his promise have come to fruition.  Although efforts were, and have, been made to 
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withdraw U.S. military forces from the Middle East since he and his staff took office, U.S. 
policymakers continue to construct and pursue a foreign policy that has allowed the United 
States to remain entrenched and involved in the Middle Eastern social landscape, in its economic 
structure, and in its political matters. 
 The fact that the Middle East remains an integral player in United States’ foreign policy-
making presents nothing unfamiliar to U.S. history.  U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East can 
be traced back to the discovery of oil in Persia (modern-day Iran) during the early-1910s.  As the 
years progressed into an era of two disastrous world wars and a global economic depression, the 
Middle East eventually became a region pivotal for fueling the wartime economies of Europe, 
Russia, and the U.S. in the form of petroleum.  In addition, Third-World regions -- such as the 
Middle East – by the mid-twentieth century, “was abundant in land, labor, and natural resource 
potential, but what it desperately lacked was capital.”43 In 1944, one year before Japanese 
surrender, the World Bank was created to coordinate postwar reconstruction in Europe, and 
expanded its role to “investing in the infrastructure of developing countries.”44 The reasons 
behind the creation of Middle Eastern diplomacy in the mid-twentieth century could be traced 
back to important factors surrounding American imperialist interests and motives in the region.  
U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East has involved a very complex and complicated series of 
factors, including: diplomatic and business relationships, international activities on a political-
economic global scale, cultural conflicts, and the global demand for energy resources and the 
access to those resources.  Another factor involved in this historic episode is the 
misunderstanding and misconceptions surrounding the socio-economic and cultural objectives 
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between the various nations and peoples of Western and Middle Eastern society -- spanning the 
majority of the twentieth century and beyond.   
 To conceptualize United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East, one must first 
understand the United States’ global and domestic missions, as well as realize the permanent 
foundations of American expansionist thought.  American Expansionism, as described by 
historian Frederick Merk, contained, “[a] sense of mission to redeem the Old World by high 
example… generated in pioneers of idealistic spirit on their arrival in the New World…. 
[G]enerated by the potentialities of a new earth for building a new heaven.”45 Also known as the 
idea of Manifest Destiny, the birth of the American expansionist rationale could be traced back 
to the foundations of British-colonial America of the seventeenth century.  As soon as European 
settlers landed on the east coast of the present-day United States, the notion of manifest destiny 
preoccupied the rationale of these settlers from England.  Religious motives in the form of 
Christian Protestantism and motives of cultural superiority over the Native Americans, and 
eventually, over British occupation as the American Revolution drew near, helped propel the 
ideal of Manifest Destiny into the future of American philosophy.  By the time around Thomas 
Jefferson’s presidency of the 1790s – the expansion of U.S. land and peoples westward became 
an inevitable event as the newly liberalized Americans attempted to seek new opportunities and 
prosperity elsewhere.   
The dawn of the nineteenth century witnessed the United States’ claim of a newfound 
sense of entitlement to its renowned ideals of freedom and liberty.  This notion became 
manifested in the domestic policies and the mindset of the American public, as they began to 
migrate away from the east coast no more than two decades following the Revolutionary War of 
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1776.  In the aftermath of the Louisiana Purchase from Napoleon’s France in 1803, and 
expanding into the Jacksonian Era and the related federal Indian removal programs, government 
land sales west of the Appalachian Mountains, and later, west of the Mississippi River, 
consequently pioneered the Westward expansion era and instilled the ideals of a seemingly 
endless American expansion.  The fertile lands of the Midwest proved an ideal location for 
planting crops such as corn.  The vast and untapped western land also provided Americans with 
an abundance of natural and raw material, thus, a surplus of American crops were raised, farmed, 
and harvested.  Once the American marketplace became saturated with agricultural production, 
farmers began to seek government assistance to coordinate with overseas markets regarding 
trading.  New economic opportunities for Americans became abundant.  Therefore, the 
opportunity arose for farmers and urban investors to trade America’s crops and other various 
products to European markets and elsewhere in order to generate profits for themselves, which 
consequently supplemented the success of the United States’ economy at home.   
Historian William Appleman Williams, who trail blazed in the study of the United States’ 
expansionist rationale, which has provided an academic basis for the American expansionist 
theory, suggested that the seeds of globalization were planted more than a century and a half ago.  
Following the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln at the end of the Civil War in 1864, 
Williams documented the American-collective mindset of the time, in that “[m]ost of the people 
believed in the principle of self-determination.  [Americans] did not begin as imperialists.  Their 
evolution into advocates of empire is not a story of the triumph of Evil, but rather a tale of 
tragedy caused by the fear of the Future.”46 Therefore, Americans anticipated and assessed their 
own trials and tribulations and viewed them as synonymous to everyone else’s all around the 
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world.  Economic unease and social uncertainty gave way to a unique brand of collective 
American psychology.  Williams added, in criticism of the psychology imposed on Americans 
by the marketplace, that:  
[Americans] increasingly demanded that others exercise the right of self-
determination in ways that furthered the economic expansion of America that they 
deemed essential for their own self-determination.  Their compromise was made 
easier because the great majority of them also believed in their souls that America 
had evolved the best ideas and institutions of freedom.47 
 
 Later events such as the U.S. annexation of Texas in 1845 and the Spanish-American 
War of 1898 proved to be a result of the United States’ expansionist motives as well.  By the turn 
of the twentieth century the United States was in the final process of securing and extracting 
resources from within their borders; working the land, time, and effort that was available to its 
fullest potential.  Officially the United States had become a dominant global power by the 
closing years of the nineteenth century.  The United States sought out foreign territories to 
imperialize and implement their unique doctrine of manifest destiny in an attempt to advance 
foreign societies and peoples’ way of thinking to their own.  Territories in the Pacific, South 
America, the Caribbean, and Central America proved to be valuable locations for American 
imperialism.  The American economy would benefit from the cheaper raw materials and labor of 
these lands, as well as an ideal location for the spread of American interests, culture, and society 
into these so-called primitive societies. Although the United States had no intention of becoming 
malevolent imperialists, it did so subtly in an attempt to civilize foreign and non-modern 
cultures.  President Woodrow Wilson’s biographer, Arthur Link, noted in 1915 that the President 
did not allow for the Mexicans to follow their own course in civil history following their civil 
war in 1910.  Rather, President Wilson “was determined… to teach the South American 
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republics to elect good men!”48 Latin America, the Middle East, and the Pacific Island countries 
that the U.S. had once imperialized, by 1945, became ideal regions in further expanding the 
American Manifest Destiny doctrine to battle a relatively new and foreign threat. “Global 
developments, [such as the Cold War] rather than specific regional interests were decisive in 
shaping American policy….”49  
In the previous chapter, pioneering researchers such as C. Wright Mills and Kim 
McQuaid explained how the players who constructed our nation’s foreign and domestic policies 
were part of a unique group of individuals, who included the likes of elite politicians and 
powerful businessmen.  Primary and secondary research indicated that the upper-echelons of 
American Industry and high-ranked federal government officials within America’s power 
structure seemed to be the two major groups who have formulated and carried out the directions 
and objectives in formally implementing American expansionism through a legitimate foreign 
policy.  This elitist desire transcended into U.S. foreign policymaking for the bulk of the 
twentieth century – even during the two World Wars and the two intermediate decades of the 
1920s and 1930s, which was the era that the U.S. federal government favored national 
isolationism and the bureaucratization of the U.S. political-economic sphere. 
Yet during the isolationist period of the 1920s and 1930s, the United States remained 
active in economic trading with international markets, especially in the Middle Eastern oil 
business.  New innovations in the energy and automobile industry in the United States brought 
about a great need for petroleum imports and supplies.  The United States and Middle East 
remained adequate trading partners until 1938, when the oil trade and business activity 
substantially sped up due to the Allied war effort against the Axis Powers of the Second World 
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War.  Once the United Kingdom acquired mining rights in Iran by the early 1920s, and mining 
and refining techniques became more technologically advanced, world powers such as the 
United States, were able to “reinforce their power over oil wells in the Middle East.”50 Even 
though the United States was in the midst of a political isolationist policy during the Roaring 
Twenties and the Great Depression, American opportunists had looked outside the nation in an 
effort to make money elsewhere and expand the American economic machine.  Once World War 
Two arrived and passed, and the United States found itself in a diplomatic war with the Soviet 
Union, the Middle East and its oil-based relationship with the West became important aspects to 
the United States’ containment policy.  Political partnerships were forged between the United 
States and Middle Eastern governments, such as the shah in Iran, to achieve a strategic position 
against Soviet expansion. 
Today, the notion of Manifest Destiny within our foreign policy-making remains evident; 
however there now exists a more dynamic global landscape. The ever-changing and evolving 
historic episodes, combined with turbulent political and economic climates have caused the 
United States to evolve, adapt, and change its policy in order to reach its overall objective of 
expansionism - and eventually, the goal of globalization.  Globalization, according to U.S. 
historical trends, is a continuation of its former policy of Manifest Destiny.  However, to a 
greater extent and with the same objective of American expansionist theory, globalization 
proponents suggest transforming regions around the globe in an exclusive American system, 
which will bring about positive growth for global society and the planet as a whole.  The United 
States has remained the world’s strongest nation with a dynamic and powerful capitalistic system 
in place.  Previous political and economic leaders of the United States’ have played a gigantic 
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role in policymaking regarding the direction and path toward globalization.  This will persist, and 
has, in affecting both those who live within America’s borders, and foreign peoples as well. 
 The historical evidence gathered seemed to reveal a logical course, or pattern, that the 
United States has followed since the end of the Second World War regarding foreign policy in 
the Middle East.  To be more specific, foreign policy in the Middle East has witnessed two major 
trends since that time, with the transitional phase occurring around the time of the first Gulf War 
(1990-91).  
 The dawn of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union following the 
Axis Powers’ formal surrender in 1945, and the international circumstances surrounding the 
creation of a Jewish homeland of Israel within the existing land of Palestine three years later, 
brought about the first trend of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  This initial trend in 
foreign policy (1945-1991) revolved around the notion of national security and protecting 
American interests abroad – the Cold War Trend.  With the official collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 and, simultaneously, Saddam Hussein’s defeat at the hands of the U.S. led coalition, the 
United States welcomed its second trend in its foreign policy agenda with open arms.  The 
Globalization Trend (1991-present), has presented the United States’ economic, social, and 
political elite with the fragile opportunity to usher in a new global order in the image of 
American society.  Although the global marketplace has existed for centuries and foreign peoples 
and nations might have their own visions of a global society, the undertakings by American 
policymakers to establish an official new world order had begun – which involved the political, 
social, cultural, and economic fabrics of Western society -- once their Soviet adversaries were 
defeated. 
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 Three main factors dictated the direction of this initial trend in the United States’ foreign 
policy in the Middle East, with a fourth factor becoming relevant in the closing decades of the 
Cold War - once it became evident to the West that the Soviet Union would not survive long 
with its communist principles at the helm.  The three early factors included the overwhelming 
American support for a Jewish homeland in Israel, U.S. and Western access to Middle Eastern 
oil alongside its position in the global marketplace established in the late 1920s, containment 
against the spread of Soviet-driven communism, and finally, the initial seeds for the evolving 
goal of U.S.-led globalization during the Carter Administration era.  All factors contributed to 
the overall goal and purpose by United States’ foreign policymaking regarding a containment 
policy (the most important factor of the four according to United States’ diplomacy during the 
bulk of the latter half of the twentieth century) which fought against the spread of communism 
and upheld the protection of the Free World.  The need by the United States and the West for 
Middle Eastern oil, developing those international business relationships, and maintaining the 
support and alliance with the State of Israel were the three factors that played into the overall 
containment directive scheme early on as well. 
In its global battle versus communism, the United States and its Western allies relied 
heavily on the capitalist systems their nations had long fostered, as well as the resources that had 
long powered the West’s economic growth and reach.  The one resource the United States 
needed that the Middle East possessed a lot of was petroleum.  Business relationships between 
Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and the United States dated back to the first couple 
decades of the twentieth century.  It became imperative to U.S. policymaking that the United 
States expanded on and pursued business interests in the Middle East, which only improved upon 
their expansionist visions and deter the Soviet influence further.  Although the benign 
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relationships that the United States had shared with various Muslim governments in the Middle 
East has seemed rather unusual, these relationships materialized, and endured, depending on the 
circumstances surrounding the vital trade of petroleum. 
Oil was first discovered in the Middle East in 1908 underneath the desert land of modern-
day Iran by the Anglo-Persian Company’s Managing Director Charles Greenway.51 Around the 
time preceding the First World War, petroleum resources became the means of measuring global 
power and status.  The United States entered the global oil scene once Charles Teagle’s Standard 
Oil Company begun drilling for oil in the Middle East in 1919, since the U.S. national oil supply 
shortages following World War One became an imperative concern by government officials.52 
But it was not until 1928, when American companies such as Exxon (Standard Oil of New 
Jersey) and Mobil (Standard Oil of New York), were admitted into Iraq to conduct their business 
ventures.53 Exxon and Mobil, two member companies of the Seven Sisters, possessed ultimate 
economic control of the international petroleum market until the emergence of OPEC in 1960, 
and the economic recession of the early 1970s.  From 1928 moving forward, American 
businessmen and politicians viewed the Middle East as a region that proved beneficial to the 
growing need in the U.S. for natural energy in the form of petroleum. Saudi Arabia would later 
prove to be the most important Arab State regarding the oil trade with the United States.   
 The fourth factor in this first trend of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East was the 
pioneering principles toward a globalized society spearheaded by the United States, once it 
became clear during the Bush Senior Administration that the United States had a solid influence 
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in the Middle East and the Soviet threat was just about diminished.  Globalization, as stated 
previously, is the principal doctrine that still reigns as the precedence in U.S. foreign policy 
today.  The United States, once engaged in conflict with the Soviet Union which held opposing 
viewpoints regarding the notion of globalization and/or expansionism, is presently and 
diplomatically more comfortable than it has ever been – yet nations like China are becoming a 
greater presence on the international stage with the capabilities to do so as well.  But the United 
States’ comfort in directing its globalist doctrine will change very soon.  Other nations are 
gaining more international power as well as time persists, and the natural advancements in 
economic, social, and technological means are contributing to the evolution toward globalization.   
 
The Cold War Trend in U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
The emphasis of globalization did not take center stage until the defeat of Saddam’s 
military offensive in Kuwait at the conclusion of the first Gulf War, and more importantly, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  For the purpose of upholding a historical narrative from 1945 
onward, containment against the Eastern, Soviet ideology of government and economy was 
America’s first and most important aspect of its foreign policy entering the conflict between the 
world’s two global superpowers by the mid-late 1940s.  To protect the United States and its 
invested global interests, foreign policymakers had a twofold solution: They needed to develop 
an ideology against communism and socialism, as well as protect pro-capitalist regimes in the 
Third World – such as the prior shah of Iran and the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia.  These 
regimes, often merciless toward their own populations and suppressing in their own 
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methodologies of governing, were supported by the United States nevertheless, since they 
rejected the ideologies of socialism and communism.  
           In a global sense, the United States followed a policy of containment throughout the early 
stages of the Cold War.  Discussed by President Truman in The Truman Doctrine, the policy of 
containment was designed by U.S. policymakers to “support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” and, “assist free peoples to 
work out their own destinies in their own way….”54 In hindsight, as well as ironically, U.S. 
interference in international dilemmas would have its related consequences and backlash by 
peoples of other countries who collectively viewed U.S. presence within their own lands as 
outside pressure and as a foreign invasion.  
 Containment and American expansionism, working synonymously within the structure 
of U.S. diplomacy, proved to be a tedious and conflicting course of action in terms of bringing 
about a peaceful resolution to the Cold War conflict and Middle Eastern society.  This policy 
was designed to contain the spread of communism and keep the Soviet influence away from the 
surrounding, weaker nations of the Third World, as well as provide diplomatic security for 
nations teetering on the brink of social and political revolt.  This meant that the United States, in 
contrast to its global symbolic mission of holding the moral high ground, supported corrupt and 
suppressing foreign dictatorships and regimes at times – such as Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of 
Iran, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, and Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam to name a few – as long as they 
opposed Soviet and communist doctrine.  The majority of time spent during this war of political 
ideologies by the United States was directed toward the Third-World countries of Latin America, 
South America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.  These regions primarily contained the 
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countries who were politically and economically unstable, and possessed vast resources that 
were of great importance to the First World, and geographically close to Soviet Russia and its 
satellite nations.  Amidst the concern of the Soviet Union’s goals, China was the other 
communist giant with which the United States had to contend with.  But due to its own 
nationalistic nature, China was not as much of a global threat, in regards to containing the spread 
of communism, as the Soviet Union was.   
The United States, alongside its Western allies, attempted to align themselves with many 
of, if not all, the governments and rulers they could in the Middle East in order to prevent the 
Soviets from advancing their influence southward.  However and unfortunately for the United 
States, it was during this time – from the mid-1940s onward – in which the Middle East was in 
the midst of a revival of Arab nationalism and Islamic faith.  This episode of nationalism, was 
brought about in part, by a sound Arab rejection of earlier European motives of imperialism and 
former military episodes during and before the First World War in the majority of Arab Middle 
Eastern countries.  In general, Arab nationalism and Islamic ideologies opposed the West’s 
accepted trends of society, culture, and religion.  This trend swept across many of the nations 
within the Middle East and proved to be another obstruction concerning the diplomatic goals of 
U.S. foreign policy by 1945.  When he proclaimed an Islamic State of Egypt in 1949, Hasan al-
Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, advocated that, “[l]uxuries only annihilate nations, 
and her comforts and coveted possessions have only convulsed [the West].”55 It appeared evident 
from an American standpoint that in order to establish a functional presence in the Middle East 
and befriend the leaders and people within these Muslim lands, the United States had an uphill 
battle to fight against -- the renewed and heated animosities toward Western society.  
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These social upheavals, which spanned across national boundaries of the Middle East, 
created preliminary problems for the United States when attempting to implement their presence 
in the region.  In a 1951 congressional hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs (CFA), 
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian and African Affairs, George C. McGhee, was 
convinced that Soviet Russia was stimulating internal divisions and revolt within many of the 
Middle Eastern countries, specifically in the Arab community and the peoples within Iran and 
Turkey, based on feelings of “insecurity” and “nationalism in the light of the cold war 
struggle.”56  Therefore, he added that: 
[Uprisings] will go on and increase until the imbalance of power is redirected, 
until [the United States] gets stronger and Western Europe gets stronger, and 
[Middle Eastern nations] get some idea that Russia will be afraid to declare war 
because of [U.S.] strength, or that we might help them in the event of war and 
help defend them, or that we can assume a leadership in the world which we have 
not either because of our weakness or because we’re not willing to do so.57 
 
Mr. McGhee’s comments were of the fundamental and common belief held by the United 
States’ government officials concerning the Middle East that had affected their foreign 
policymaking decisions of the time.  He reflected the subtle, yet central, notion within U.S. 
foreign policy that without American intervention in Middle Eastern affairs, the Soviet Union 
was believed by U.S. officials to invade the region and inflict their communist doctrine upon it.  
The Soviet plan was to position itself as a barrier between the Western world and the Third 
World in order to restrict and deny the flow of resources, such as oil, to and from the West.  In 
order to remain one step ahead of the Soviet undertaking, U.S. officials attempted to befriend as 
many Third-world nations as they could, emphasizing U.S. economic and social aid as selling 
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points for their agenda.  Chester Bowles, U.S. ambassador to India, advised President Truman to 
implement Western-style community programs within Nehru’s India.  Bowles believed that if 
India fell to communism and Soviet influence, U.S. strategic positions from “Cairo to Tokyo” 
would be in “grave danger,” and the flow of resources and commerce in and out of the region 
would be jeopardized.58 Countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Syria, and Afghanistan proved to be 
buffers to Soviet expansion as long as the United States supported and funded the ruling regimes 
of the abovementioned nations.  Moreover, these countries remained a valuable asset to the 
United States throughout the entirety of the Cold War 
 With a diplomatic double-edged sword to confront between Arab nationalism, Islamic 
idealism, and Soviet containment, the United States had to form and plan their foreign policy 
very carefully and strategically throughout the 1940s and 1950s.  When the U.S. Congress 
convened in the spring of 1954, the legislative body passed the Mutual Security Act.  Essentially 
this legislation provided foreign governments, especially those located in the Middle East, with 
U.S. military personnel and public works contracts that were considered necessary to United 
States’ national security interests.  Upon approval of this act, Secretary of State John Dulles 
stated that the U.S. aid and money given to Turkey and Pakistan brought about, “a greater return 
to the United States in terms of its own security than if it were spent in some other way or if it 
were not spent at all.”59 In order to protect its own policy intentions, the United States had to 
persuade the governments of various Middle Eastern nations with money and assistance through 
the implementations of American personnel and planning to dissuade any Soviet advancements 
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into the area.  This legislation could be seen as a policy similar to the Marshall Plan, which 
provided the powers of Western Europe with American aid in order to deter Soviet advancement 
into the region as well. 
During the ongoing heightened Cold War tensions in its earliest years, U.S. support for 
the creation of a State of Israel in Palestine only intensified problems with the surrounding 
Islamic nations of the Middle East who were key in preventing Soviet expansion.  The United 
States found itself in a cautious and complicated predicament.  Not only did the United States 
have to battle the forces of Arab nationalism and Soviet communism, but they also had to ease 
the tensions of a cultural and religious war between the Jewish Zionists of Israel and the 
surrounding pro-Arab and other Muslim rulers, sentiments, and people.  American support for a 
Jewish homeland in the middle of an Islamic-dominated region struck a discord with the 
surrounding Middle Eastern nations, likewise, in solidifying U.S. attempts to create alliances 
with many of those nations of the Middle East.  It is important to understand that U.S. support 
for Israel played a gigantic role in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East concerning 
containment, and subsequently, forming alliances with the surrounding Arab, Palestinian, and 
other Muslim peoples who opposed the creation of a Jewish state.  A Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) report on the Arab States in 1947 laid out the dilemma which the U.S. was 
entangled in perfectly:  
Arab determination to resist the partition of Palestine is such that any attempt to 
enforce that solution would lead to armed conflict, presenting an opportunity for 
the extension of Soviet influence.  Any firm establishment of Soviet influence in 
the Arab states would not only be dangerous in itself, but would also tend to 
isolate Turkey and Iran.  Furthermore, irrespective of the possibility of Soviet 
penetration of this area, U.S. support of the partition of Palestine might lead the 
48 
 
Arab states, on their own, to take steps which would adversely affect U.S. 
economic and strategic interests in their territories.60 
 
Foreign policy in the Middle East became a policy that the United States had to 
consistently develop, which quickly evolved into a tedious and cumbersome endeavor for U.S. 
policymakers.  On the domestic front, the majority of the United States’ population supported the 
idea of a strong bond with the newly-founded Israel.  The United States contained an influential 
Jewish minority within its borders, as well as the fact that the American public had just 
witnessed the inhumane acts committed by the Nazis and their treatment of European Jews 
during the Holocaust several years earlier.  Those factors created a collective national feeling of 
sympathy toward all Jewish people within the U.S.  In May, 1942, resolutions of the Biltmore 
Conference in New York City strongly supported American and British political support for the 
creation of a Jewish homeland within Palestine.  In the fall of 1946, President Harry Truman 
released a statement that indicated American support for Jewish immigration into Palestine.  In a 
letter to the British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, Truman essentially asked that the British 
government -- which had previously colonized Palestine and were in the process of abandoning 
their control there – to lift its restrictions on Jewish immigration.  In addition, Truman stated that 
his administration would do “everything it could to the end” in an ill-fated attempt to create an 
international agreement amongst various nations to “liberalize” all their immigration laws “with 
a view to the admission of displaced persons.”61   
For the United States, it took careful planning, much direct and diplomatic interaction 
between leaders from the United States and Middle East, support from American and Western 
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business entities in the Middle East, as well as maintaining the standing alliances with Islamic 
nations, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, in order to prevent the Soviets from expanding 
their mission southward.  Yet there remained an apparent understanding between the United 
States and nations like Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. would not push for freedoms of commoners 
as long as the powerful sheikhs and Royal monarchy had continued to foster an American 
alliance.  Thus, this served to protect the United States’ bipolar vision of Western expansionism 
and an effective policy of Containment.  President Eisenhower’s State of the Union address in 
January, 1957, more commonly referred to as the Eisenhower Doctrine, declared that: 
There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United 
States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other 
people. Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other 
hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger 
that stems from International Communism and welcome closer cooperation with 
the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations’ goals of 
independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth.62 
 
Disregarding any element of Western propaganda, Eisenhower’s message seemed to 
reflect that of a containment policy above all else.  Eisenhower’s doctrine, constructed 
immediately following the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, appeared unnerved or uninformed of 
Israel’s militant actions in Palestinian territory during the crisis.  Furthermore, Eisenhower’s 
vision of a “world environment of freedom” seemed to contradict actions taken by U.S. officials 
and forces.  Shortly after being elected president in 1952, Eisenhower approved a plan for the 
CIA to implement a propaganda campaign in Iran to foment protest against the Socialist reformer 
Mohammed Mossadegh.  In consolidating their efforts with Great Britain’s MI6 Intelligence 
Agency, their goal was to dispose of any potential communist threat.  Dubbed “Operation Ajax” 
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(MI6 called this same mission: Operation Boot), the CIA did “all the heavy lifting for the coup” 
that removed Mossadegh from power and reinstating the Shah under control of General Fazlullah 
Zahedi.63 Although the U.S. goal to remove the socialist ruler from power was achieved, the 
United States did so in the name of force, manipulation, and persuasion.  In the wake of this 
nationalist movement, it was monumental that the United States used this type of elusive 
diplomacy in order to obtain its directive in American expansionist thought and denying Soviet 
expansion from occurring.  American diplomacy had been implemented and pursued in the 
Middle East by the 1950s as a plan to discern any socialist expansion first and foremost before 
any plan for true freedom and liberty of Middle Eastern peoples was to be achieved.     
The Western Powers, pertaining to Middle Eastern foreign policy, were in a tedious 
position by the late 1950s.  The U.S. attempted to ally themselves with as many Middle Eastern 
governments, forces, and entities possible as long as Middle Eastern governments sponsored and 
supported the West’s global vision – all while rejecting the Soviet sphere of influence.  Gamal 
Abdel Nasser’s Soviet-backed nationalist regime in Egypt, and its control over the Suez Canal, 
served as a reminder to the West that making alliances with any Third-World leader was 
plausible and, in fact, necessary in protecting their own interests in the region and throughout the 
world.  Western politicians, as well as big business leaders, would do whatever they could to 
make alliances with Middle Eastern governments even if it meant evading or squashing Arab and 
Islamic nationalist movements in the process.   
The rise of social and political unrest in the Middle East in places like Pakistan, Iran, and 
Turkey irked the United States, as it found itself in a costly predicament years later against 
collective Muslim extremism and the intensified hatred by the Middle Eastern peoples toward 
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Israel and Western society.  Despite its failure at Arab unity however, Arab nationalism had 
“succeeded in implanting the desire for inter-Arab cooperation and condominium, and it is not 
unlikely that this will become articulated in the form of increasing bureaucratization and 
institutionalization of inter-Arab economic, technological, and cultural relations.”64 This increase 
in Arab communication and the transnational network of information sharing among various 
nations of the Middle East led to the rise of trade and diplomatic talks between countries rich in 
oil resources and the resource-hungry developed nations like the United States.     
Following World War Two, seven Western dominant oil companies had complete control 
in directing and driving the international market prices of Middle Eastern oil.  Moreover, these 
oil companies had held onto the control of the oil market in the Middle East since the 1920s.  
These companies were known as the Seven Sisters, and included the likes of Shell, Standard Oil 
of California, Mobil, Texaco, British Petroleum, Exxon, and Gulf.  Decades prior to 1973, the 
Seven Sisters completely controlled basically every business aspect on the development and 
distribution of crude oil found in the Middle East.  But by the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the 
monopoly held onto by the companies that composed the Seven Sisters became decimated.  With 
British Petroleum losing its access to petroleum in Iran in January of 1971, the Seven Sisters 
began to gradually lose their control over directing international oil prices.  By the fall of 1973, 
Egypt and Syria invaded Israel to initiate the Yom Kippur War.  OPEC (Organization of 
Petroleum-Exporting Countries) eventually took charge of controlling the energy market in 1973, 
as they wielded their control of the market forces along with oil prices, which sent panic 
throughout the international oil industry and the global market.  
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 Middle Eastern nations who spearheaded the formation of OPEC in 1960 included Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, UAE, and Qatar.  Other member nations included Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Algiers, Indonesia, Libya, Angola, Nigeria, and Gabon. The reason for OPEC’s 
formation and existence was, according to their organization’s PR statement, was “to co-ordinate 
and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices 
for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming 
nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry.”65 OPEC was formed at a 
four-day conference held in Baghdad in September, 1960.  Moreover, OPEC’s underlying 
mission was, and continues to, emphasize “the inalienable right of all countries to exercise 
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the interest of their national 
development.”66   
The United States had lost a considerable degree of influence and power in dictating oil 
prices and its market value on a global scale once OPEC gained international recognition.  
According to economic expert Philip Verleger, Arab states had lost control of their oil reserves in 
the 1960s, but once consumer demand from the West “suddenly caught up with productive 
capacity… producing nations were able to achieve success in their efforts to regain control over 
their reserves.”67 It appeared that the First-World was now at the mercy of Middle Eastern oil-
producing countries.  In their first ten years of existence, OPEC and their related Middle Eastern 
petroleum industrial firms failed to maintain any meaningful bargaining power, or have their 
independent firms compete alongside firms of First-World consuming nations.  And to make 
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matters worse for the international marketplace, consuming governments like the United States 
cut off negotiations with OPEC in October, 1973.  This occurrence was due to the West’s 
“virtually unanimous answer in the negative” over OPEC’s sharp increase in the price of crude 
oil and to the unanimous objection over the Arab-Israeli conflict of the same year.68 
Beginning in 1938 and for the remainder of the twentieth century, the United States had 
to form a policy that would allow the United States to continue drilling for oil in Arab countries 
like Saudi Arabia.  It was not until 1988 that the Saudi government took full control of the oil 
company’s operations, officially entitled Saudi Aramco, once the company was nationalized.  
Today, Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabian Oil Company), originally a subsidiary of Standard Oil 
Company which formally operated in protecting American interests, earns just over an estimated 
$1 billion a day in oil revenue.69 The U.S. government, initially, had to resort to giving gifts to, 
and be granted permission by, the Kingdom’s monarch and the appropriate prince of whose land 
they were drilling for oil on.  For the United States government, this task in negotiating matters 
surrounding Saudi oil reserves eventually evolved into the complex diplomatic relationship that 
the U.S. currently shares with Saudi Arabia.   
Aramco was established in January, 1944 when oil was discovered on the Island of 
Bahrain by a subsidiary company of Standard Oil of California.  A 1948 CIA report on Saudi 
Arabia sent to Washington indicated that, although there was a “loss of cordiality following the 
recognition of Israel,” relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia remained peaceful, 
affirmed by Ibn Saud’s foreign minister.70 From 1948 onward, the survival and growth of the 
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relationship between Aramco and the United States was at the forefront of American concern 
during the Cold War.  The importance of Aramco’s business with the United States was 
demonstrated during altercations between Aramco and the Saudi Government in the late 1940s.  
The United States obliged King Ibn Saud’s demand for “gold sovereigns and nothing else” in 
order to bring peace to the development of hostility between the state and the business entity in 
1948.71 The U.S. could not afford to lose its position in the turbulent social landscape of the 
Middle East. 
For years to come, oil producing nations such as Saudi Arabia viewed Aramco and other 
various petroleum corporations as the appropriate intermediaries through which to communicate 
their views and desires to Washington and to other various Western countries.72 Not only did the 
oil trade between Saudi Arabia and the United States prove beneficial to U.S. diplomacy, but this 
capitalist relationship helped continue to solidify a defense against the spread of communism 
throughout the Middle East.  The Saudi sheikhs and the Saudis who were in positions of power 
benefited immensely from the oil revenues brought in from the United States.  The wealth Saudi 
Arabia has accumulated over the decades from U.S. purchases of their petroleum exports has 
overshadowed Saudi resentment toward Israel.  As long as Saudi Arabia was growing in wealth 
transferred from the West, its diplomacy would remain U.S.-friendly, depending on whether the 
House of Saud remained entrenched in power.73 The anti-Israeli radicalism held by the majority 
of Islamic Arabs within Saudi Arabia had been silenced, to a degree.  Through social welfare 
programs and holding onto supreme power of the state, the House of Saud was able to suppress 
many major and violent altercations against the State of Israel that have risen in the past.  
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Another benefit the United States enjoyed in forming an alliance with Saudi Arabia during the 
Cold War was that both governments suppressed the spread of communism within their national 
populations, which was detrimental to their survival and their clamp on political power. 
The first three decades of the Cold War proved burdensome to American foreign 
policymakers.  Establishing a foreign policy agenda of Americanization and providing aid in the 
form of money, investment, personnel, and supplies for the underdeveloped nations of the 
Middle East, allowed the United States to become a regional force in protecting the Islamic 
countries from the influence of Soviet Russia.  In addition, the alliance between Israel and the 
United States helped strengthen the United States’ position of intermingling and entrenching 
itself in Middle Eastern affairs.  However, this development proved troublesome when the 
United States attempted to implement peace and cooperation among the various Islamic nations 
of the Middle East.  The rise in Arab nationalism and the rise of Muslim hostility due to the 
placement of Israel had become an increasing determent to America’s overall objective of 
containment.   
Yet America was willing to take the risk of supporting Israel. Throughout the 1950s, 
1960s, and into the 1970s, Soviet influence in the Middle East was kept to a minimal degree 
from an American standpoint due to its containment policy.  While American expansionism was 
presented in the form of social, economic, and political aid to Middle Eastern governments who 
assimilated with American goals of containment, American expansionism in the image of 
globalization did not take center stage in United States’ foreign policymaking until the early 
1990s following the end of the Gulf War.  The various recorded rhetoric and documentation of 
government officials and personnel related to United States’ foreign policy throughout the past 
several decades has proved this notion.  The overall objective of American foreign policy from 
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the end of the Second World War through the early 1990s was two-fold.  U.S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East adapted with the intention to capitalize on the United States’ need for oil, and 
the formation of a substantial diplomatic relationship with Israel and the surrounding Muslim 
populations.  The Western crusade against the expansion of communism into the region 
succeeded for the time being, however, Western resentment by Middle Eastern Muslims had 
increased.    
 
The Power of the Oil Economy during the Later Stages of the Cold War 
  
 From the 1960s onward, familiar and new developments to United States’ foreign policy 
in the Middle East had occurred at a rapid pace that consistently changed the complexity of the 
U.S. mission.  Vietnam and Southeast Asia became the dominant concerns in containment and 
the protection of American interests elsewhere heading into the 1970s.  While the Middle East 
continued to be monitored and managed closely, it was a less menacing concern for the United 
States than it was a decade earlier pertaining to the Arab nationalist movements.  Middle Eastern 
oil sources and OPEC persisted, however, in remaining the United States’ primary source for 
imported petroleum imports from 1961 onward – no matter what global economic or political 
condition was rendered.   
The 1960s and 1970s brought about a new and drastically increased demand for oil by the 
U.S. population.  George Parkhurst, former Vice President of Standard Oil of California, 
reported that oil imports, primarily from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, increased from a 
little more than five million barrels a day in 1960 to about fourteen million barrels a day by 
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1970.74 This increased demand for oil brought about a critical change to the international market.  
The formation of OPEC in 1960, and the rise in the global demand for oil brought about a new 
dynamic to international business and the geopolitical community.  The oil producing nations of 
OPEC nationalized their oil drilling and refinery companies by the dawn of the 1960s in an 
attempt to hold a degree of influence and power in global politics and the international economy.  
Parkhurst added that from the evidence gathered, oil producing companies in the Arab states, 
such as Aramco, were earning substantially less than their governments were on sales per barrel 
of oil by 1974.75 According to economic expert John Blair, OPEC and its Arab leaders had 
developed a “casual indifference to belligerent hostility” toward the United States, as Saudi King 
Faisal forwarded a message to Frank Jungers, then the President of Aramco, urging for “a simple 
disavowal of Israeli policies and actions by the U.S. Government.”76 In short, there was no oil 
shortage in 1974.  In fact, in the period of the oil embargo – the fourth quarter of 1973 – “output 
turned out to be virtually the same” as in previous quarters, in which OPEC and other major oil 
companies in the region “had shifted to a potential surplus.”77 It appeared that the Western 
powers had lost considerable control over oil and its impact in the global economy by the early 
1970s.  Moreover, OPEC officials knew that and took advantage of the situation to stimulate 
their own national economies. 
Shortly after OPEC took considerable control of the international oil market in 1973, an 
energy crisis plagued the First World beginning in the mid-1970s.  The Federal Government, 
under the direction of the Richard Nixon Administration, proposed numerous economic controls 
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that the nation had not witnessed since FDR’s New Deal programs.  From 1969 to 1973, Nixon’s 
first term in Office included numerous economic controls, as well as withdrawal of U.S. military 
personnel from Vietnam, détente with the Soviet Union, and education reforms, which 
contributed to his success in winning a second term as president.  However, Nixon’s second term 
was haunted by an energy crisis centered on the international petroleum market.  The energy 
crises, beginning in 1973, was not solely the result of spiteful Arab states versus the United 
States due to its support Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict.  Rather the energy crisis 
was also stimulated by the launching of affirmative action and the establishment of the 
Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in 
1972, and the prolongation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; these programs 
furthered the liberal regulations of the economy that materialized under Nixon’s presidency.78 
The abovementioned government initiatives contributed to the evolving global economic 
patterns.  Economic expert, Philip Verleger, explained to the United States Senate a decade later 
that: 
Intervention by governments of consuming nations also contributed to the price 
increases of the 1970’s[sic] and the artificial shortages.  Imposition of more 
stringent environmental controls at a time of rapid economic growth contributed 
to an unexpected increase in demand.  At the same time, price controls, allocation 
regulations and other programs prevented producers from finding and developing 
needed supplies in the United States and other producing countries.  As a result, 
consumers were forced to turn to a limited number of suppliers, suppliers who 
then exercised their newly found monopoly power to boost prices.79 
 
A combination of animosities held by the Arab-dominated OPEC toward the United 
States for their support of Israel during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, as well as economic 
trends of the American economy played considerable roles in the oil embargo and energy crises 
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of the 1970s.  In a letter to Saudi King Khalid in December, 1976, President Ford demonstrated 
his personal “admiration” for Saudi Arabia’s government in their ability to keep oil prices 
generally reasonable, and increasing oil production in order to have made an, “important 
contribution to the cause of international cooperation” for both nations, alongside a central goal 
of a lasting peace in the Middle East and cooperation in solving the global economic issues.80 
Ford’s wording seemed to indicate that although OPEC’s rise in the oil prices hurt the world 
economy, many other factors domestically and internationally also played an integral role in 
hurting the world economy. Historian Daniel Yergin described the 1970s as a decade of, “poor 
economic performance” by the United States.81 As with many episodes that have occurred over 
the course of history, there were several factors involved in the transfer of power from the West 
to the Middle Eastern powers regarding the control of oil during this era.  The United States’ 
mission of containment in the Middle East became a foreign policy in which the United States 
lost a lot of power in steering the direction of the world economy.  The early 1970s witnessed 
Arab leaders, including OPEC, take advantage of the opportunities the global economy and U.S. 
government actions presented them with.  The West’s influence over Middle Eastern oil’s role in 
the global economy was diminished. 
 Part of the reason that Saudi Arabia and the other Arab nations involved with OPEC 
raised oil prices tremendously, indeed, was due to the United States’ support for Israel during its 
1973 Yom Kippur War against Egyptian and Syrian forces.  Six years earlier, the fourth Arab 
summit was held in the city of Khartoum, where Arab leaders dictated that there would be no 
definite peace between Israel and its Muslim neighbors.  Former Secretary of State, Henry 
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Kissinger, described this summit as another new and strong wave of Arab extremism against 
Western practices and policies.82 Furthermore, Kissinger advised the National Security Council 
upon Israel’s request for U.S. aid on the onset of their war.  He advocated that if, “[T]he Arabs 
[could] swallow military aid decisions, but if [The United States executed] military aid to Israel 
decisions in the context of a stalemate in negotiations,” there would have been a larger political 
and economic consequence regarding the United States’ position in the Middle East.83  
 It was inevitable that the United States needed to display its support for Israel.  It had 
been doing so since Israel’s birth.  Likewise, the United States understood that the Arab states, 
specifically those nations that controlled the oil market as OPEC members, would be angered by 
the U.S. motives and aid to Israel during the Israeli-Arab war.  By the mid-1970s the United 
States had to make the all-important decision to implement solutions that would satisfy both the 
Israelis and Arabs to a degree without upsetting the diplomatic balance too much.  The direct 
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was in its second decade, and the United States needed all 
the oil resources it could get from the Middle East in order to benefit the American cause.  
Around 89 percent of the oil used by the American forces in Southeast Asia by the 1970s had 
been exported from the Persian Gulf.84  
 The United States had attempted somewhat tediously, to coordinate their foreign policy 
in a bipolar effort to satisfy demands, concerns, and desires from both the Israelis and the Arabs.  
And although the tensions were eased between the United States and the Soviet Union, important 
U.S. foreign policymakers such as Kissinger, according to U.S. diplomat Cyrus Vance, “brought 
home the need to look at Third World problems on their own terms and not through the prism of 
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East-West competition.”85 This course of action the United States took would prove more than 
costly in the coming years.  While the U.S. sought for peace in the Middle East between hostile 
parties in the name of Soviet containment, Israelis, Arabs, and Palestinians continued their acts 
of warfare, terrorism, and aggression toward each other.  The altercation in Israel between the 
Jewish and Palestinians has been in existence since Israel’s creation in 1948.  Even today, the 
conflict rages until some peaceful resolution is agreed upon by both Palestinians and Jews.  On 
the eve of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Arab coalition of Egyptian and Syrian forces 
crossed over ceasefire lines and invaded Israeli territory on the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, and Suez 
Canal.  Meanwhile, Syrian forces invaded Golan Heights.  The war lasted only nineteen days and 
ended in a stalemate.  U.N. ceasefire agreements that were brokered during the war unraveled, 
yet both sides eventually agreed to end the altercation.  In the aftermath of the war, Egypt lost its 
Soviet alliance, suffered many casualties, and was unable to recapture the Sinai Peninsula.  
Egypt, in theory, had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel even though the war 
possessed no winner. 
In the 1970s these tensions were at a high level, and to a point where it did not seem the 
violence would stop between Israel and its Muslim neighbors.  Additionally, the American 
alliance with the State of Israel resurrected a heightened sense of Arab bitterness toward the 
United States and the West in general.  Countries such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
Pakistan would continue to receive U.S. aid as long as they defended against the Soviet threat 
from the north, provided the American economy with petroleum, and held no serious 
antagonistic endeavors toward Israel.  In a 1979 letter to President Carter, Illinois Senator Paul 
Findley observed that if the United States failed to force Israel to stop using, “indiscriminate 
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violence,” against their Palestinian occupants, then the United States could be subjected to 
violence from the Palestinians and their Arab supporters as well.86 Findley concluded that, “[i]f 
that tragic time comes, the blood will be upon the hands - and the conscience – of all those who 
have the ability to prevent it.”87 Unfortunately, that hypothesis has stood correct.  Indeed, Arab 
and Muslim animosity toward the United States and the West had survived as a real threat to 
U.S. national security and foreign policy for the past thirty-five years. 
 Throughout this time period, the influence of Jewish lobbyism within America’s political 
landscape was significant.  Propaganda campaigns, political rhetoric, public support -- especially 
from the Jewish-American minority and Christian political-right -- and the agenda of various 
interest groups in support for Israel’s survival and expansion within the Middle East was very 
strong.  Years after his retirement, Illinois Senator and apparent political mainstream opponent 
Paul Findley documented this fact in his book, They Dare to Speak Out.  Several years after the 
fact, Findley declared that his government colleague and former U.S. diplomat, George W. Ball, 
was rejected from a Secretary of State position by President Carter upon taking the Presidential 
Office.  Furthermore, Ball had his advice on foreign policy constantly discarded by other 
presidents such as Lyndon B. Johnson, because of his oppositional views regarding U.S. support 
for Israel.  The Israeli lobby also played a major role in selecting public officials pertaining to 
policymaking in the Middle East.88 Historian Paul Charles Merkley advocated in his 2001 book, 
Christian Attitudes Towards the State of Israel, that since the birth of Israel in 1948, the 
American Friends of the Middle East (AFME) has remained an active anti-Israel lobby.  
However by the 1970s, the AFME lost much credibility with U.S. politicians because the group 
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“accept[ed] subsides from Aramco.”89 Moreover, Palestinians and “Arabs lost the contest for 
public opinion because of their unwillingness to compromise,” and, “their refusal even to talk to 
Israelis” over matters pertaining to lasting Middle Eastern peace.90 
 The Jewish lobby within the United States has had the tremendous privilege over the 
years of influencing public officials and policymakers to overwhelmingly support Israel.  While 
the majority of American people are sympathetic to Israel, they would be willing to withdraw 
American aid if Israel’s actions seem “to be contrary to U.S. interests.”91 Yet many experts on 
U.S. diplomacy, including Stephen Walt, have regarded the special relationship that the United 
States and Israel share as harmful to both nations’ security.  The most influential pro-Israel lobby 
organization since the Cold War era has been the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC), founded in 1963.  Throughout the Cold War, this organization was seen as a strategic 
asset, and liaison, between Israeli and the U.S. officials and policymakers.  Once the Soviet 
Union collapsed however, AIPAC used successful public relations and propaganda campaigns 
against common enemies of both nations, especially targeting Islamic extremism in the form of 
terrorism by the time the millennium approached.92  
 Since the early days of the Cold War, there has been a tremendous support for Israel 
across various sects of the American population.  In 1993, support for Israel by investors and the 
business community in New York City was enough reason for Arab extremists in the first 
bombing of the World Trade Center.  Grassroots support for the Israeli cause included the right-
wing of the Republican Party, individuals who fund academic and media institutions for the 
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Jewish cause, the Kibbutz parties, as well as fundamentalist Christian and Judaic religious 
groups and individuals.  For example, Christian Zionism, which has resided in the theology of 
dispensationalism,93 has caused evangelical Christians in the United States to view the special 
diplomatic alliance between the United States and Israel as being on the “right side [of] the 
Bible’s blueprint for the end times….”94 Moreover, these Christian fundamentalists dangerously 
“support the settler movement and oppose a two-state solution,” with the Palestinians.95      
Influential Jewish lobby groups, especially AIPAC, have had the sole say in the 
abovementioned affairs until 1980, when Senator James AbouRezk established the National 
Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) in an attempt to give the Arab minority of the United 
States a voice in foreign policymaking.96 However, the Jewish lobby has remained entrenched as 
the dominant lobby in persuading American officials in their foreign policy-making process.  
The Jewish lobby has infiltrated foreign policymaking through donations, personal connections, 
and business relationships between lobbyist members and U.S. government officials.  In a 
Cabinet meeting between President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Pennsylvania Senator Hugh 
Scott, Kissinger explained Scott’s question on Jewish Americans’ knowledge of Israel’s 
troubling affairs, while describing the United States’ position on Israel’s security to him as well.  
Kissinger explained that the President was the “best friend” Israel and the Jews had, and added 
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that the American government would be working with the American Jews directly and 
exclusively on issues involved in Middle Eastern diplomacy.97 
 There were, and remain, critics to the unique relationship between the American 
government and pro-Jewish-American lobby and interest groups.  Former Illinois Senator 
Findley remained a critic of the Israeli-United States diplomatic relationship.  He stated in a 
speech in 1989, that he was, “ashamed” that the American government supported an Israeli 
government which forced harsh laws and hardened civil conditions for Palestinians living within 
Israeli’s borders.  Findley, alongside renowned Sheikh Ahmed Deedat, ultimately compared the 
Jewish government in Israel and their harsh treatment of Palestinians within Israel, with Nazi 
treatment of European Jews in the early 1930s.98 U.S. foreign policy experts, including John 
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, have declared that not only has the Jewish lobby hurt America’s 
overall goals of globalization in Middle Eastern diplomacy, but it has also hurt Israel’s national 
security and potential as well.99  Jewish settlements in the West Bank and in Gaza, along with an 
“endless” supply of American money and resources into Israel to fund their wars and expansion, 
has aided the Arab’s overall hatred toward the United States and its Jewish ally.100 
Israel continues to remain a strong ally of the United States today.  According to a recent 
news article, the United States has provided Israel with approximately $3 billion annually since 
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the millennium.101 According to recent patterns in foreign aid, Israel will continue to be 
tremendously aided due to the heavy support it receives from within the American population – 
where pro-Jewish special interest groups have considerable reach and influence with members of 
the U.S. federal government.  As mentioned earlier, the special relationship between the United 
States and Israel will only hurt both countries as time unfolds.  The United States has attempted 
to orchestrate a foreign policy of globalization in the Middle East in recent years and will 
continue to evolve and mold this policy moving forward as they see it best fit.  Since the Obama 
Administration took control of foreign policy in 2009, the favoritism the U.S. formerly shared 
with its Israeli ally in previous administrations has decreased to a degree.  If the Middle East is to 
be included within the wave of globalization, peace and/or cooperation must be demonstrated 
and exhibited by Arabs, Palestinians, Jews, and Americans alike.  This peace must be sought 
with no great animosities held toward each other’s religious, cultural, social, and political 
backgrounds and identities.  Moreover, each group’s exclusive vision of self-determination and 
promotion of their respected traditional and cultural goals must be adaptable or replaceable if 
globalization is to become a reality.  These factors, which can be placed within the context of 
contemporary Middle Eastern policy, will be analyzed further and in greater detail in the 
following chapter. 
In the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, President Nixon addressed Congress and 
the rest of the nation on the United States’ energy policy.  In doing this, Nixon conceptualized 
the main goals of American foreign policy of the day, which survived throughout the 1970s and 
into the following decade.  These goals focused primarily on global economic issues surrounding 
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energy resources in the Middle East.  He indicated that “the strength of self-sufficiency” should 
have been the United States’ only concern moving forward.  Moreover, Nixon addressed the 
energy crisis and economic recession by stating that, “[America’s] ability to meet [its] own 
energy needs is directly limited to [its] continued ability to act decisively and independently at 
home and abroad in the service of peace, not only for America but for all nations in the 
world.”102 
 The 1970s were a decade of turbulent economic discourse for the United States.  It was 
also an era that witnessed a resurrection of Muslim resentment of the Jews within Israel.  These 
two issues proved to be of primary importance to the U.S. cause – especially to those who 
dictated the direction of foreign policy.  The Soviet Union and the related containment of the 
spread of communism remained an American concern.  The 1970s were an era, as indicated by 
President Nixon’s address to the nation, when the United States sought to achieve peace and/or 
cooperation diplomatically by any means necessary.  The Vietnam War was nearing its 
conclusion and the United States and the Soviet Union were in the midst of a policy of détente.  
The SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty between high-ranking political officials of 
the United States and Soviet Union was ratified in 1971.  These long and tedious negotiations of 
SALT I between President Ford and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev resulted in the reduction of 
nuclear weapons by both superpowers.  SALT II and the continuation of this program would 
abruptly end in 1979 due to the Soviet offensive in Afghanistan, causing the United States’ 
Congress to vote against ratifying the treaty in the following year.103  
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 As the 1970s reached its final years and the Carter Administration gained control of the 
federal government, the U.S. diplomatic climate focused on the global economic and social 
condition of Third-World peoples.  It was during the 1970s, as correctly stated by former 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, that the United States, in light of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the 
Arab oil embargo, and rising prices of OPEC oil products, “became acutely aware of the perilous 
dependence of the West on Middle East oil.”104 Furthermore, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and 
overthrow of the shah, including the ensuing hostage situation at the American embassy in 
Tehran, proved to display a whole new set of problems for U.S. policymakers.  As the White 
House Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, related to Carter that, “[i]n many respects, this would 
appear to be the worst of times;” the United States was in the midst of another Middle Eastern oil 
crisis, a lasting legacy of public bitterness toward the government following withdrawal from 
Vietnam, the rigidity of foreign markets, more inflation, and a new wave of Islamic 
fundamentalism raging across the social landscape of the Middle East.105 If the people of the 
United States could find a means to solve the crises that plagued them by the late 1970s, they had 
to alter their foreign policy dramatically, as it appeared the Soviet Union was becoming more 
aggressive toward the West.  The 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan rekindled a new United 
States’ concern toward containment of Soviet influence and forces.  The events of the 1970s 
planted the seeds for globalization, which were beginning to take form, as a new set of 
circumstances, occurrences, and problems surfaced regarding the United States’ foreign policy in 
the Middle East.  But globalization efforts by U.S. policymakers were placed on hold as an 
increase in aggression toward the West by new and familiar enemies had taken form. 
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 The United States eagerly sought international support toward economic understanding 
and prosperity in an attempt to fix the global market.  In the frenzy to establish worldwide peace, 
especially in the Middle East, the Carter Administration was about to face a diplomatic 
nightmare.  This primarily centered on an Islamic-fueled revolution in Iran, and the trade of 
Middle Eastern oil resources and formulating an international agreement on prices.  The United 
States appeared to be working itself out of economic hardship by the end of the decade.  But the 
high hopes did not last long.  With the lingering conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, 
and the economic problems surrounding the global oil market, the United States would have to 
implement quick and effective solutions within their diplomacy to offset these serious problems.   
 
The Final Years of the Cold War and its Effect on Middle Eastern Society 
 
 From the time around Carter’s presidential victory in 1976 to 1980, the United States 
found itself in a diplomatic and an economic crisis.  By the end of his first and only term in 
office, the economy remained in a recession and United States’ foreign policymakers had to face 
a series of new and regenerated animosities aimed at the U.S. and its Western allies.  Not only 
were the issues surrounding the oil trade and Muslim animosity toward Israel and its Western 
alliance a redundant episode in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, but a resurrected 
confrontation with the Soviets and a new enemy in Islamic fundamentalism became more 
problems that the United States had to solve.  A treaty signed between Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and 
Israel’s Manachem Begin at Camp David in March, 1979, softened the bitterness and altercations 
between Israel and its Arab neighbor to the south for the time being.  This event became known 
as the Camp David Accords.  This agreement temporarily solved Israel’s national security and 
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sustainability in the hostile region to a degree.  Unfortunately for the United States however, El-
Sadat was assassinated a year later by members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.  If it was not 
apparent already, there remained an increase in animosity within the Islamic populations across 
the Middle East toward Israel and its Western ally.  Arab hatred and rejection of the agreement 
was widespread, to an extent in which the Palestinian Liberalization Organization’s (PLO) leader 
Yasser Arafat, called the treaty a “false peace” and claimed that their organization would 
eliminate any peace and sympathizers to Israel’s cause.106 Thus, the assassination of Egypt’s 
leader showed the world that Islam and the Arab world would not settle, side, nor negotiate 
peace with the West or Israel, as this conflict would persist. 
Throughout the period of détente in the 1970s, the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and the United States was manageable, somewhat cordial, and not as tense as the diplomatic 
relationship was in previous Cold War decades.  Other than weapon sales that occurred between 
the Soviet Union and a couple of the Arab states, the United States enjoyed relatively open 
negotiations and no threat of military conflict with the communist antagonist.  Even during the 
Israeli-Arab conflict, both superpowers were in diplomatic discussions in order to construct a 
resolution of lasting Middle Eastern peace.  Eventually however, the lingering global economic 
disparity and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 sent the region and the rest of the world into another 
period of diplomatic strife and heightened tensions. 
 The 1979 Iranian Revolution ended the warm diplomacy the former Shah’s government 
shared with the United States.  In the days preceding the overthrow, several actions committed 
by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had contributed to the transformation to an Islamic Republic, 
in which the revolutionaries resented the West – especially the United States. “Political 
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repression, the presence of the SAVAK (the shah’s secret police force),” censorship of the press, 
failed agricultural policies led to the displacement of the rural poor and their migration into the 
cities, were all contributing factors that led to the Iranian revolution.107 In addition, the Shah’s 
“perceived dependence on America and the favoring of American interests,” especially in the 
months of inflation and recession due to the 1973 oil crisis, raised concerns over social justice 
and increased the disingenuous image of the United States in the minds of revolting Iranians.108 
About two months before Khomeini’s succession to power, the U.S. diplomat in Tehran, Victor 
Tomseth, sent a telegram to the State Department.  In his correspondence, Tomseth observed the 
evolving political and social atmosphere of Iranians alike, as well as the surge of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  He declared that, “[Islam] is the only institution familiar to them in their new 
surroundings, and they are thus highly susceptible to the religious emotionalism that surrounds 
the cause such as Khomeini’s.”109 The people of Iran began to view their shah and his ties to 
Western governments and companies as the source of all their civil, social, and economic 
problems.  The United States, alongside its Western allies, became viewed by Iranian 
revolutionaries as enemies to their Islamic and national aspirations.  
 The Iranian hostage situation was another dark moment in U.S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East.  A mob of young Iranian revolutionaries seized the American embassy in Tehran 
and took around sixty Americans hostage in November, 1979.  This event left a haunting legacy 
for the Carter Administration.  By the end of his term in office, the final hostage was released 
minutes after Reagan entered the Oval Office, which added a final element to Carter’s 
humiliation.  Retired foreign service official and former Iranian hostage, Donald Cooke, 
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explained years later that the hostage situation could have been avoided if the United States’ 
government realized the dangers they were facing in Iran with the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism, rather than trying to, “regularize [the] relationship” the U.S. formerly had with 
the shah.110 Whether or not the United States could have avoided the hostage situation, the 
Iranian overthrow of the shah marked an era where the United States had to begin to monitor 
extremist activities more effectively - such as those committed by the Shia111 Muslims in Iran 
and around the Middle East, as this occurrence proved to add a new dimension to the American 
foreign policy problem. 
 Within the overall policy of Cold War containment, the United States had to contend with 
the threat of a resurrection of social and political unrest across the Middle Eastern landscape.  
The international, internal, and economic power of the Soviet Union had decreased considerably 
by 1980.  Although the Soviets were still a force to be reckoned with, they were in dire need of 
oil from the Middle East and were about to encounter their own diplomatic, as well as internal, 
problems with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and Soviet republics.  In the 
midst of economic strife, centered on the search for petroleum resources and problems of 
disunity within their empire, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December, 1979.  This dilemma 
would be one of the several series of conflicts spanning the length of the 1980s between the 
United States and various international forces that would consequently and negatively effect the 
U.S. position in the Middle East years following the Cold War. 
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 The long and gruesome Afghan-Soviet War lasted from the time Russian paratroopers 
landed in the Afghani capital of Kabul in December, 1979, to Gorbachev’s withdrawal from the 
conflict in 1989 due to the war’s crippling effects on Russia’s stagnant economy.  Like in Iran 
months earlier, Afghanistan was in the midst of their own Islamic-fueled revolution.  The rebel 
forces within Afghanistan, the Mujahdeen, sought to overthrow the Soviet-backed communist 
government of Hazifullah Amin amidst an ongoing civil war.  By 1989, after years of bloody and 
tedious guerilla warfare in the mountainous regions around Afghanistan, Gorbachev withdrew 
the Soviet military, which were unable to defeat the Mujahdeen forces.  Much like America’s 
prior experience during its invasion of Vietnam and its military campaign against Ho Chi Minh’s 
Vietcong forces, fighting on Third-World soil and confronting unfamiliar battle styles proved too 
challenging for the military forces of the Soviet Union.  The war became too expensive to fund 
and too unpopular to continue.  What remained, however, were the guerilla militants, including 
members of the Taliban, who eventually would use the U.S. weaponry sold to them by the U.S. 
government to battle Soviet forces, against the West when the United States waged war in 
Afghanistan in late 2001. 
 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution had altered the diplomatic 
course of the United States.  The U.S., alongside its Western European alliances, provided 
financial and military aid to nations such as India, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, in a consolidated 
attempt to “deter further [Soviet and Arab] aggression,” as well as, “finding a solution to the 
Palestinian problem.”112 U.S. political leaders understood that these foreign conflicts would 
prolong and increase problems associated with the oil trade out of the region – creating a 
cautious sense of urgency for the West to resolve these foreign issues efficiently. 
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 The days of survival for the Soviet Union had become numbered.  The United States 
became aware of that fact and attempted to stimulate reform, peace, and stability throughout the 
region.  The rise in trade between the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies and the increase in 
global economic activity helped the U.S. cause in defeating Ronald Reagan’s Evil Empire.  It 
was during the 1980s, under the Reagan Administration, that the United States increased their 
economic and trade activity with Middle Eastern allies such as Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Arabia 
contained a majority population of Sunni Muslims, who were statist above all else, and despised 
the Shia Muslims for their views on pan-Arabism.  Moreover, a majority of Sunni Muslims 
within Saudi Arabia helped maintain and secure the monarchy’s rule.  Yet, there remained a 
minority of Shia Muslims within Saudi Arabia.  Events like the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and 
the terrorist attacks on Mecca’s Grand Mosque that same year by Islamic extremists frightened 
the Saudi regime and national stability.   
Shia Islam jeopardized the Sunni’s powerful hold on their nation’s people, and threatened 
their healthy political and business disposition with the West.  Several years earlier in 1975, 
King Faisal was assassinated by a disgruntled nephew, and Faisal’s successor, King Khalid, 
became the nation’s leader who by a few years into his newly accepted role as king, had to deal 
with the issue of social disorder and unrest within Saudi Arabia.  Although King Khalid died a 
few years later in 1982 due to illness, he initiated domestic social reforms from the oil wealth 
Saudi Arabia accumulated during the oil embargo.  The Saudi monarchy knew that in order to 
calm the tensions of their own minority Shia population and protect their position of power, they 
needed to improve their people’s standard of living.  Most of the reforms initiated by Khalid 
were improvements made to Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure.  The infrastructure improvements that 
were made during the 1970s included the development of a paved highway system, construction 
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of schools, power plants, airports, and hotels.  A decade later, the government spent money on 
social services, education, and on an improved healthcare system.113  
 Moreover, the Saudi government improved upon their international relationships via a 
cooperative foreign policy.  In 1981, Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf States, including 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), formed the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).  This council coordinated political and economic policy regarding 
the modern Gulf-Arab society.  This group was formed in response, as well, to the growing 
influence and aggression of Shia Islam and its threat toward Middle Eastern established 
governments – especially those governments endorsed by the West.  Member states of the GCC, 
especially Saudi Arabia, “sought to sympathize their military forces while providing millions of 
dollars in aid to the Iraqi war effort,” against Iran during the viscous Iraq-Iran War of the 1980s, 
all while, “continuing to invest in modern weapons.”114  
The threat of Iran and its Shia rulers and population horrified Middle Eastern political 
stability and security in the surrounding Middle Eastern nations.  The Saudi government, 
alongside the American government, both pursued to protect their national and diplomatic 
security in the early 1980s.  Since 1979, the United States had earned more than $50 billion off 
of Saudi purchases of modern weaponry and the newest military technology.115 During the 1980s 
however, this arms trade between the United States and Saudi Arabia had been rejected and 
detested by many within the U.S. Congress and by supporters of Israel.  In 1985, Congress 
declined a sales proposal designed by Reagan that included F-15 jet fighters, antiaircraft guns, 
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missiles, and Blackhawk helicopters, in fear that one day these weapons could be used against 
Israel.116 In fact, there was much congressional opposition regarding the arms sales to Saudi 
Arabia since 1979, because it jeopardized Israel’s national security.  Yet, Saudi Arabia’s reason 
for the purchase of American weaponry was directed at Iran and its emergence as a threat to the 
Sunni kingdom, as well as to the entire region.117 
However, the White House, State Department, and Pentagon were not opposed to the idea 
of arms sales to Saudi Arabia.  When Ronald Reagan entered the presidency in 1980, he met 
with the former Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar bin Sultan, regarding a trade 
arrangement involving the purchase of American weaponry.  Reagan stated that he did not 
oppose the notion as long as the Saudi government was in total disfavor of the Soviet Union and 
communism.118 Additionally, the major oil companies favored this exchange since it secured 
their role in the geopolitical economy.119 Eventually by the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia favored 
arms negotiations with Britain to purchase U.S. arms more so since the Arabs found it extremely 
burdensome and “bruising,” when confronting much opposition from members of Congress and 
the pro-Jewish lobby within the United States.120 Nevertheless, Congress’s rejection of arms 
sales to Saudi Arabia had its valid argument.  Senator Carl Levin from Michigan argued in the 
mid-1980s that if the Saudis needed American, “antiaircraft and antiship missiles in order to 
deter an Iranian threat,” then why were the sales of those specific weapons not scheduled until 
1989? In addition, why did, “[Saudi Arabia] refuse to even use their [sic] influence to work 
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toward the cessation of terrorist activities in the Middle East[?]”121 Federal government officials 
argued, however, that weapons were sold to Saudi Arabia and “other moderate states” in an 
attempt to, “augment [American] military power in the region and strengthen [American] 
security ties” with those pro-Western Arab nations.122 
 Alongside the arms sales to Saudi Arabia, oil production increased in the Gulf that 
transformed the Middle East into a more pivotal global region than ever before with the greater 
demand for energy within a rapidly expanding and technologically advanced world.  By the end 
of the 1980s, the United States had witnessed the bloody and exhausted conflict between Iraq 
and Iran come to its conclusion, and Iraq had become a closer trade and diplomatic partner to the 
United States once former Soviet-Iraqi ties began to weaken.  But the newly-formed benevolent 
relationship between the United States and Iraq would not last long.  Iraq earned around $13 
billion dollars from oil revenues, but its postwar debt accumulated to $20 billion by 1989.123 
Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, demanded that the surrounding Arab Gulf governments aid 
Iraq in the form of financial reparations for defending them against the hostility of Iran.  The 
Iraqi dictator quickly became an enemy of the U.S. and the West when he invaded Kuwait in 
1990, once Kuwait refused to share its oil revenue with Iraq.  The GCC, “had few viable options 
for dealing with Iraq in 1990 other than working with Washington.”124  
 By the time the Gulf War was underway in late 1990, the United States was interacting 
with Middle Eastern governments on a constant and consistent basis.  A new series of relations 
began between Saudi Arabia and the United States, as Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. and U.N. 
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forces to establish numerous military bases and command centers on Saudi soil.  The presence of 
U.S. military forces on the Islamic Holy Land stimulated even more resentment by Shia peoples 
who resided on the Arabian Peninsula toward the West.  Approximately fifteen percent of Saudi 
Arabia’s total population practices Shia faith – a threatening minority to the Sunni leadership of 
the Saudi Kingdom.125  In part, Shia resentment of the Western presence on the Holy Land would 
eventually lead to the terrorist attacks on the United States and its Western allies several years 
later.  Surrounding Gulf States who disfavored Hussein’s regime followed suite in aiding the 
West in their best interest.  With personal encounters, interaction, and open communication with 
the United States on all levels, Saudi Arabia’s economic and cultural landscape was becoming 
more sophisticated and modern – for example, ARABSAT (Arab Satellite Communications 
Organization) merged with CNN (Cable News Network) to revolutionize global television; 
which broadcasted the war and provided viewers all over the globe around the clock news 
coverage and footage.126 As the years progressed toward the end of the millennium, a much 
larger and diverse number of business and political relationships formed between various parties 
from the United States and various parties from Saudi Arabia.  United States’ diplomacy with 
Iran, on the other hand, has remained stagnant since the revolution in 1979.   
Other than oil imports received from Iran over the last several decades, it remains to be 
seen whether or not diplomacy will ever return to favorable conditions as it was prior to 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution.  However, as Vali Nasr pointed out -- a current member on the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and native Iranian: 
[f]undamentalism has gained footholds – and won in Iran – due to the failures of 
authoritarian leaders to execute on promises of economic progress for the masses, 
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and crucially, due to the abdication by the state-sponsored middle class of a 
leadership role in bringing about robust economic growth and political 
liberalization.127 
 
As emphasized, the Iranian theocracy has failed economically on a global scale.  Iran’s 
economic instability, brought about by its corruptly managed public policy, will be 
discussed further in the following chapter.   
 In December, 1991 the Soviet Union officially collapsed.  Furthermore, the American-
reinforced offensive against Saddam Hussein’s forces during the Gulf War proved victorious 
earlier in February of that year.  Ultimately, the United States remained the only global 
superpower to emerge a Cold War champion.  The containment policies America held onto 
throughout the decades were no longer relevant, especially in the Middle East.  What remained 
in the Middle East, however, were nations that had succumbed to Islamic extremism toward the 
West and its ‘evil’ mechanisms of modernity, as well as its godless nature.  This Arab-based 
Islamic extremism would manifest itself in various Islamic terrorist organizations that would 
haunt the United States and the West for years to come.  The United States needed to remain in 
the Middle East, however, if it wished to bring about the political, social, economic, and cultural 
reforms needed for its version of globalization to work.  The region was socially and culturally 
diverse, filled with Western and religious animosities, and was politically turbulent.  In its nature 
of harboring expansionist thought, the United States had to modernize and democratize Middle 
Eastern society as well as protect one its biggest investments and assets regarding geopolitics and 
global economics – support for Israel and Gulf oil.   
 In order for foreign policy to work effectively, The United States needed to transform its 
outdated Cold War foreign policy into a more adaptable and modern policy by 1991.  The Soviet 
                                                 
127
 Nasr, The Rise of Islamic Capitalism, 117. 
80 
 
threat was dismissed by the early 1990s, and although Israel continued to receive aid from the 
United States, it consistently sought for foreign protection from its hostile Arab neighbors and 
Palestinian nationals within its borders.  Israel has appeared to be the one nation in the world that 
the United States has shared a special diplomatic relationship with – more so than the 
relationship the United States enjoyed with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan.  Jewish 
Americans have, according to researcher Janice Terry, “a single issue orientation that enjoys 
support from all levels of government from the White House and Congress down to city and state 
levels.”128 Christian Zionists, who make up a large portion of the base of the U.S. Republican 
Party, have made the debate over support for Israel as a central focus to their decision making in 
the American voting system. Moreover, small voter turn outs in American elections and the 
“influence of Jewish Americans far exceeds their proportion of the general population.”129 For 
example, only 56.5 percent of the total American population eligible to vote turned out to the 
polls in the Presidential Election of 2012.130 As long as U.S. policymakers and certain 
instrumental sectors of the American public continue to tremendously support Israel, then the 
U.S. will remain an enemy of the Islamic extremists who viciously attack the West because of 
that reason.  The United States had to continue to support and defend Israel from hostile Islamic 
extremist groups and terrorist cells from various sections around the Middle East as it entered 
into a new era of diplomacy.  The United States’ determination to put an end to Islamic 
fundamentalist activities at home and abroad further aligned with Israel’s diplomacy as well. 
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As globalization became the central doctrine of United States’ foreign policy in the 
Middle East, the decision had to be made whether or not to include Israel in the overall goal of 
global assimilation into a new world order.  Muslim nations, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and 
Egypt, continued to remain allies with the United States, and have appeared to embrace the idea 
of globalization, which can be seen through their modernizing motives and reforms pushed onto 
their national populations.  Those aforementioned Islamic states seem willing to accept the 
American model of modernity as they believe a global community will eventually be achieved.  
Yet, the legacy of states dominated by a strong Shia presence, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan, have remained developmentally stagnant and will continue to oppose any notion of 
globalization unless initiated by a foreign entity like the United Nations, or by a revolutionary 
occurrence within their own national borders.   
 As the world headed toward the millennium, the United States understood that something 
had to be done regarding the chaotic and complicated nature of the Middle Eastern society.  
Globalization seemed like a viable prospect as early as 1991 due to the fall of the Soviet Union 
and its communist system.  American elitists, including businessmen and politicians, began 
speaking ever so eagerly of taking on the incredible task of transforming the Middle East into a 
functional representation of Western society – the blueprint for the prospective global society 
constructed by a nation whose historical track record seemed to indicate an eerily similar trend 
via expansionism.  But a region, so deeply rooted in its religious and cultural foundations, would 
not cooperate or agree to assimilate to an American-made globalist agenda.  The next chapter 
will ultimately address this concern.  Furthermore, there arose a new combination of factors, 
players, aspects, and a new set of circumstances unique to history, which provided a series of 
new complex and dynamic obstacles that U.S. policymakers had to confront. The globalization 
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mission, spearheaded by the United States, would ultimately fail or succeed in the Middle East 
depending on the simple fact of whether or not Middle Eastern society wanted to be assimilated 
into a global system.    
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Chapter 3 
………………………………………… 
Establishing a New Precedence  
 
 
 Globalization is a broad term that is frequently used in the political arena today.  
Traditional globalization, like trading goods and services between peoples from different nations 
or cultures, has occurred over the course of many centuries, and as early as 1200 BC, when 
Mycenaean Greece was trading with populations on the Baltic coasts.131  An official international 
and organized system of globalization, however, has been conversed about frequently by various 
academics, politicians, media outlets, and multinational business people globally.  So what is 
globalization specifically?  It has a broad definition, especially when defined by various nations, 
leaders, and cultures – each one defining globalization according to a basic understanding of 
one’s own culture, ethnicity, national identity, social norms, and traditional norms.  In 2000, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) defined globalization as “the increasing integration of 
economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows… the movement of 
people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across international borders.”132 Other aspects not 
covered by the IMF publication included the cultural, political, and environmental dimensions of 
globalization.  Another aspect, which is especially important for the poor living within 
developing nations, is the establishment of an effective human rights policy.  Basically, as the 
world becomes more interconnected through advanced forms of technology, electronic media, 
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communications, and transportation, the prospects for a unipolar world will become clearer.  The 
flow of resources, in which a capitalist world economy would provide the mechanisms to do so, 
is what many globalists want to happen sooner than later.  But where globalization seems to be a 
probable reality in the developed nations of the world, it is yet to be established in the developing 
nations around the world – including the majority of the nations that make up the Middle East. 
 With globalization on the future’s horizon, many people worldwide will benefit from this 
major development.  There are others, however, who do not see globalization as beneficial to 
their own individual cause, and to the development of their own society.  Proponents for 
globalization, such as Western political leaders and multinational capitalists, view it as a system 
that will increase the standard of living for all under its umbrella.  Globalists advocate that with 
an effective system in place, globalization will increase trading within a world economy, 
therefore, stimulating social reforms, increasing economic progress, increase universal civil and 
human rights, and generating wealth in the poorest and underdeveloped regions of the planet.  
Individuals, including religious fundamentalists, nationalists, and hardline conservatives view 
globalization as a threat to their way of life and to the society in which they live in.  They fear 
that a unified global community will eliminate their cultural, religious, national, and ethnic 
identities.  Moreover, opponents of globalization “regard it with hostility, even fear, believing 
that it increases inequality within and between nations, threatens employment and living 
standards and thwarts social progress.”133 
 Yet one cannot deny that human progress does not exist, no matter what the future holds.  
Therefore, it appears a natural human condition that with the increase in communications 
between peoples of different ethnicities, religions, and nations and a rise in the technological 
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ability to do so, globalization may be an inevitable and permanent episode.  According to 
historians Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, the contemporary form of globalization began 
once the Soviet Union weakened beyond the point of no return (1989-91).  It was on the eve of 
the 1990s that the world had witnessed “the failure of the closed economies and their 
reintegration into the global market economy.”134 Developing countries felt the urge to embrace 
global trade, establish capital markets, and welcomed foreign investment and corporations in 
order to generate global prestige, power, and wealth.  More importantly, these developments, 
which occurred during the demise of the Soviet Union, exemplified that these poorer nations 
longed to be admitted into the universal system of globalization.  Many who resided in these 
developing nations, like Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East for example, came to see this 
incidence as one which harbored Western imperialistic motives on foreign people’s social, 
cultural, ethnic, and religious norms and identity.  With opposing opinions on the consequences 
or rewards of globalization -- many of these viewpoints are based on ignorance, fear, and past 
occurrences of international strife and conflict, with some points justifiable than others based on 
historic evidence -- there began a resistance against the changing world landscape.   
On September 11, 1990, President George H.W. Bush addressed a joint session of 
Congress and the nation on matters concerning the Federal Budget deficit and the Persian Gulf 
crisis, which involved the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  In his speech, the President condemned 
Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait in August, 1990, and regarded the incident as one that was 
opposed to America’s diplomatic goals.  In his speech, President Bush established a new doctrine 
of globalization, one based on the American tradition, to implant within the overall objective of 
United States’ foreign policy.  
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The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to 
move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our 
fifth objective -- a new world order -- can emerge: a new era – [sic] freer from the 
threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for 
peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, 
can prosper and live in harmony…. Today that new world is struggling to be born, 
a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law 
supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared 
responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights 
of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. 
He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that 
how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to 
come.135 
 
 Among other national interests in his State of the Union Address, President George H.W. 
Bush appeared to prioritize a national concern toward foreign policy.  His remarks appeared to 
suggest a unipolar world, led by the U.S., acting to bring about globalization through its 
diplomatic and other foreign actions.  During the latter half of 1990, it appeared evident Soviet 
Russia would succumb to Western influence.  Once the Soviet Empire officially fell one year 
later, the United States was left as the lone world power with the ability to transform its foreign 
policy into one that could potentially affect everyone around the globe.  This allowed the United 
States to orchestrate and spread its doctrine of a unipolar world system to the remainder of the 
globe, without interference from Eastern society.  Containment of Soviet forces in the Middle 
East became irrelevant by the early 1990s, although new and familiar enemies to U.S. policy 
would soon yield their strategies to combat globalization.  The United States’ novel purpose was 
to eliminate the threat of any dictator or foreign leader, or force -- such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism -- standing in the way.  The directive was globalization, 
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which seemed to evolve from the centuries’ old notion of the American Manifest Destiny.  It 
appeared that a hopeful idea had become a U.S. duty.  Instead of sharing its interest and 
responsibility with other nations, the U.S. intended to lead the rest of the world into its version of 
a better future. 
 Globalization, with its U.S.-centered origins, was a notion widely-accepted by political 
leaders of the First World and many other developing nations in Asia, Eastern Europe, South 
America, Central America, and Africa.  It also gained powerful momentum within the highest 
echelons of the Soviet political realm.  Just fourteen months before President Bush’s speech on 
the prospects of an American mission of globalization, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev 
echoed similar sentiments.  Yet, Gorbachev’s remarks seemed to indicate a system of 
globalization that focused on shared international interests and human rights. In a December 7, 
1988 speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Gorbachev remarked on the prospects 
of a globalized world: 
We are witnessing most profound social change. Whether in the East or the South, 
the West or the North, hundreds of millions of people, new nations and states, 
new public movements and ideologies have moved to the forefront of history…. 
The idea of democratizing the entire world order has become a powerful socio-
political force. At the same time, the scientific and technological revolution has 
turned many economic, food, energy, environmental, information and population 
problems, which only recently we treated as national or regional ones, into global 
problems. Thanks to the advances in mass media and means of transportation, the 
world seems to have become more visible and tangible.136  
 
As the Soviet Union breathed its final breath and Gorbachev made his speech before the U.N., 
the foundation for globalization was established.  Yet, the actual blueprints for one global system 
remained a topic of debate.  The dawn of a new age had seemingly come.  However, 
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implementing globalization effectively to the rest of the world would prove to be a much more 
difficult endeavor, especially when its promoters had slightly varied implementations alongside 
different desired outcomes. 
 The idea of American expansionism remained prevalent in the dying days of the Cold 
War.  The United States was more than willing to expand upon this reoccurring central doctrine 
behind the mask of globalization.  The U.S.-traditional emphasis on human rights, individualism, 
individual freedom, and less government regulations became key issues, which transpired onto 
the world stage.  Moreover, the United States had support from the U.N., its former rival in 
Russia, and other developed nations around the globe to defend “common interests,” whereby 
President George H.W. Bush heralded that, “[i]n the pursuit of these goals America will not be 
intimidated.”137 From this point forward, the United States government, its foreign and domestic 
alliances, along with other proponents of globalization, had begun to take on the responsibility of 
developing a policy that would bring about a new world order.  This new world order would send 
shockwaves throughout a Middle Eastern society that was divided between the acceptance of a 
global doctrine and the rigid boundaries and differences between Muslim ethnicities, national 
aspirations, and Islamic fundamentalism.   
 United States foreign policy in the Middle East had altered its course around the time of 
the Gulf War into one that sought to transform, or evolve, the region in the name of modernity 
and liberalization.  A new trend in foreign policy was brought about with the goal to eventually 
instill a technologically advanced society and evolve the culture in developing nations around the 
globe – especially in the Middle East.  The Globalization Trend (1991-current) took priority.  
This trend in United States’ foreign policy has had to change its directive at numerous stages in 
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time due to international conflict, while simultaneously retaining its former international 
relationships.  The United States’ special alliance with Israel and U.S. big business relationships 
linked to the Middle Eastern petroleum trade remained relevant factors within American 
diplomacy.  Moreover, Islamic fundamentalism, with its crusade against Western culture and its 
lasting presence in varying regions around the Middle East, had evolved and presented itself as a 
monumental challenge for American foreign policymakers. 
 With globalization as the goal for most United States policymakers, foreign policy in the 
Middle East had retained its familiar historical themes.  In recent years, new concerns arose that 
U.S. officials had to encounter or accept.   Four factors stand out as integral parts of the dilemma 
involved in United States’ foreign policy in the region.  The first factor for analysis is the special 
diplomatic relationship that existed between the United States and Israel (1).  John Mearsheimer 
and Stephen Walt have argued that the special interests that the United States had possessed for 
Israeli national security and for its overall wellbeing had to change if the course of globalization 
were to be successful.  According to this view, the generous treatment Israel had received over 
the decades by the United States had to cease if the United States was to move forward with a 
more progressive, bold, and unilateral policy.  This does not mean that the United States had to 
break off its alliance with Israel, however, the treatment of Israel as a normal international state 
by the U.S. seemed to be the most logical course of action by advocates of Israeli-Palestinian 
peace.  In addition, “no longer pretending that Israel’s and America’s interests are identical, or 
acting as if Israel deserves steadfast U.S. support no matter what it does,” had to stop 
immediately if globalization in the Middle East was to materialize.138  
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 A second factor to contemporary U.S. policy in the Middle East was that petroleum 
continues to play a major role even as the world becomes more globalized (2).  Big business 
entities and U.S. political leaders understood that Middle Eastern oil reserves and exports 
affected the global market considerably.  For decades, relationships and special interests between 
U.S. and Gulf oil parties involved in the petroleum trade and other big business activities have 
grown into a complex and wealthy network, which has generated much wealth and consists of 
powerful and influential global figures.  These American and Muslim individuals involved in the 
oil business also happened to play an important role in U.S. diplomatic policymaking throughout 
the decades.  For example, upon becoming Vice President under Ronald Reagan in 1981, George 
H.W. Bush possessed about two decades’ worth of experience in the Arab-oil business, in part, 
by efforts made by his business-savvy father, Prescott Bush. The formation of these business 
acquaintances and relationships between his offshore oil-drilling business, Zapata Offshore, and 
“friends along the Gulf Coast” proved to be a monumental strategic advantage for President 
Bush during his position in the federal government during the 1980s.139 Today, innovations in 
the oil industry, such as the hydro-fracking, willingness by the federal government to approve of 
modern fracking techniques, and the proposed construction of the Keystone Pipeline in the 
United States have decreased the dependency the United States has had on Middle Eastern oil 
exports.  This development will be talked about in further detail later in this chapter. 
Yet, big business relationships between the Persian Gulf states -- Saudi Arabia being a 
major player -- and the United States still remains strong and consistent.  In addition, capitalist 
activities such as the world trade for Gulf oil could present the positive global change the U.S. 
seeks out in globalization.  Capitalism and a growth of a modern Arab middle class can serve to 
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decrease fundamentalist social and political ferment as well.  Therefore, globalization and the 
growth of the Middle Eastern peoples’ standard of living promises social change and “telling 
measures of success” to developing nations of the region, which includes clean drinking water, 
electricity, and reliable transportation.140 The push by the West for globalization in the Middle 
East has met very strong resistance.  Islamic fundamentalists have long centered their animosities 
on Western capitalist activities, mainstream Western culture, and Western social behavior, which 
has fueled their damnations of capitalism and its exploitations of the Middle Eastern labor and its 
coveted resource.  The big business relationships between the Middle East and the West are 
tangible and will continue to exist. Time will tell if this factor will either aid or hurt the United 
States’ diplomatic mission in the Middle East. 
The third factor vital to globalization in the Middle East and the United States’ foreign 
policy in that region is the rising intellectualism and Islamic fundamentalism of the Muslim 
people (3).  The larger the effort the United States has made in democratizing the Middle East, 
the more resistance the United States has received by acts of terrorism committed by Islamic 
fundamentalists-turned-extremists.  A Western political leader could forecast that if globalization 
is to be eventually achieved in the Middle East and the overall living conditions for the bulk of 
the Muslim population improves, Islamic fundamentalism will lose its mass appeal and become a 
backwards element of the Muslim peoples’ past.  For example, in 1995 general secretary of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Willem Claes, declared in defense of globalization 
that, “Islamic fundamentalism [was] at least as dangerous as communism was.”141 Forcefully 
instilling a fast-track plan of globalization in the Middle East through the vehicle of United 
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States’ diplomacy, however, would prove not be a wise initiative conducted by U.S. 
policymakers.  The Muslim peoples must accept and desire the modes of modernity that 
globalization is destined to bring.  According to the Iranian intellectual, Vali Nasr:  
The prospect of launching… one’s society out into the competitive, globalized 
economy has increased rather than decreased interest in tradition…. In time, the 
embrace of tradition may give way to a broader and more vigorous movement for 
reform, but Western efforts to promote reformism are unlikely to be the impetus.  
Indeed, they may be even counterproductive, feeding fears that the West wants to 
subvert Islam.142 
 
 If the United States wishes to implement globalization motives within their foreign policy 
in the Middle East, then U.S. policymakers must become aware of the parameters, impact, and 
complex nature in attempting to alter another people’s cultural and social identity.  Curbing 
Islamic extremism and terrorism should be of upmost priority today.  Moreover, ending the 
religious tensions and the violence caused by varying ideals of a righteous lifestyle by Muslims 
will give way to advancements in intellectualism and modernity of their own culture.  Yet, the 
Middle East’s path toward globalization must be accepted naturally by the region’s population, 
rather than instilled upon it by foreign entities and unfamiliar institutions of Western society.  
Additionally, the United States must make a concerted effort to eliminate any element of their 
Middle Eastern diplomacy that would be viewed as undesirable by the Muslim peoples. 
 Other developed and developing nations would have to promote and accept the 
responsibility of globalization as well, since it is to be effectively manifested within the arena of 
a unified international community (4).  This element presents the fourth factor within U.S. 
foreign policy if it seeks to bring about globalization.  Nations with the capabilities to promote 
and work to bring about modernity and peace in the Middle East -- such as the nations of 
Western Europe, Japan, Australia, the BRIC countries, and the other developed nations around 
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the world – must align themselves on a certain path and work to aid developing the nations of the 
Middle East into a global system.  The United States cannot lead the path toward globalization 
alone.  Desired change will not come to fruition if the United States acts as the sole provider of 
this global doctrine. “America has still to give a meaningful definition to its role in the world, 
one that transcends the conflicting pulls of globalization, democracy, and preponderant 
power.”143 The United States will be faced with a challenge in the days ahead.  The U.S. must 
decide whether or not to follow its own engineered course of globalization evolved from 
American expansionism, or to unite in an international coalition (Perhaps allying themselves 
with other U.N. member nations) to establish globalization initiatives in the developing Middle 
Eastern countries. 
 
U.S. Globalization Policy before 9/11 
 
 As the United States entered the decade of the 1990s, the federal government began to 
alter its course in its implementation of foreign policy in the Middle East.  It seemed apparent 
that the Soviet Union would soon crumble and the U.S.-U.N. coalition against Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Kuwait would more than likely end in Iraqi withdrawal or surrender.  It was during 
these sequences of events and in this timeframe that the George H.W. Bush Administration and 
its international alliances formulated a plan of action in carrying out a foreign policy that 
fostered globalization.  A policy that was heralded by the developed nations of the West would 
be met with great resistance from theocratic and secular leaders of the developing Middle 
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Eastern nations however.  Fundamentalist Muslims from varied regions around the Middle East 
would greet globalization with animosity as well.   
 Although many intellectuals and secularists from the Middle East welcomed the Western 
initiative with open arms, many of them were either silenced, fled their home country in exile, or 
were assassinated.  For the most part, their viewpoints of condemning Islamic fundamentalism 
and its crippling effects on Muslim social advancement was more than enough reason for rigid 
political and religious leaders to rid these individuals from Middle Eastern society.  An 
outspoken Egyptian critic and editorialist, Farag Foda, was assassinated in 1992 by al-Jihad for 
his criticisms against Islamic fundamentalism and his support for globalization’s promises of 
bringing about positive change.  For example, Foda claimed that Islamic fundamentalist political 
movements in Egypt during the early 1990s, “compelled the young and inexperienced to drop 
out of university because its modern sciences [were] secular,” yet, according to Foda, Islam had 
always been, “a religion of knowledge and wisdom.”144 Likewise, Iranian reformer Abdul-Karim 
Soroush advocated a “Protestant version of Islam” in his native country, free from the confines 
of strict fundamentalist leadership.  He used modern technology and rationalism to his advantage 
in pioneering a trend of Islam that would submit to democracy, universal social norms, and 
pluralism during the 1990s.  However by end of the decade, Soroush fled in exile to the United 
States once he came under siege by the Iranian theocratic government and Ansar-e-Hizbullah 
vigilante groups who supported the Ayatollah.145       
 Throughout the decade of the 1990s, there were many other Islamic reformers throughout 
the Middle East who supported a more secularist form of government alongside a progressive 
version of Islam.  Simultaneously, Islamic fundamentalism remained strong and had gained 
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momentum within the Middle Eastern populations because of the settlement of Western 
influence in the region.  Muslim populations across the Middle East viewed U.S. foreign policy 
in the region as a threat to their way of life due to ignorance and the condemnation of Western 
society as claimed by influential religious clerics.  The United States continued to channel 
military personnel and resources into the Middle East before, during, and after the First Gulf 
War.  In fact, the U.S. flow of armaments into the region since the early 1970s, which was 
“menaced by religious and resource conflicts,” only created more hardship for the U.S. in 
dealing with its attempt to globalize the Middle East.146 Moreover, the U.S. presence in the 
Muslim Holy Land around Mecca and Medina during the First Cold War stirred tempers even 
more.  This dilemma would manifest into a hatred aimed at the U.S. that was harbored by Islamic 
fundamentalists and ultra-conservative sects of Islam.  The hatred exhibited by these Muslims 
patented itself into acts of terror and violence against Americans at home and abroad by 
fundamentalists-turned extremists in the coming days and years. 
 Animosities between the United States and Middle Eastern Islamic fundamentalists 
increased following the First Gulf War’s conclusion in 1991.  U.S. foreign policymakers began 
to adapt security measures against the growing number of Muslim extremists.  Moreover, Israel 
was under similar circumstances as it began to witness a newfound and resurrected hatred by its 
surrounding and internal Muslim populations.  According to Connecticut Senator Joseph 
Lieberman, just a few months following Saddam Hussein’s defeat, Baghdad reportedly became a 
sanctuary and home for Islamic terrorist organizations, including “members of Abu Abbas’, the 
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Palestine Liberation Front and the Arab Liberation front.”147 The United States’ government, 
alongside the Israeli government, developed a grave concern toward national security interests in 
the Middle East by defending themselves against Islamic radicals.  In light of the supposed 
Iranian-backed terrorist attack on Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the United States government had 
a newfound sense of awareness in managing, battling, and “preventing loss of [American] life 
and limb” due to Islamic terrorist actions against the United States, Israel, and its Western 
allies.148 By 1994, under the direction of the Clinton Administration, the U.S. federal government 
had provided approximately $5.2 billion in economic and military aid to Middle Eastern nations 
– the top three recipients of this aid money included Israel, Egypt, and Jordan in that order -- in 
an attempt to bring about social peace, economic reform, and to curtail Islamic extremist 
activities.149 Additionally in 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel, which in recognition 
to the benign gesture by Jordan’s government, President Clinton asked Congress to forgive 
Jordan’s $702.3 million debt to the United States.150 
 The Israeli government had taken similar actions to deter terrorism.  But Israel’s 
government had received tremendous help from the American government in doing so.  Dating 
back to the 1979 Camp David Accords, where a peace treaty was founded between U.S. 
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President Carter, Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin, Israel and Egypt both initially received $7.3 billion in economic and military grants.  
Those two nations have been steady, and the two pinnacle recipients for that matter, of U.S. aid 
money channeled into the Middle East since the Camp David Peace Treaty.151  In 1994 alone, the 
United States granted Israel an estimated $3 billion dollars in military and economic aid in, 
“reaffirming solid United States’ support for Israel’s security and for Israel’s qualitative edge,” 
as indicated by Neal Sher, executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC).152 U.S. policymakers viewed Israel’s national security and U.S. national security 
against the threat of Islamic-fueled terrorism as one in the same. Yet since the days following 
Israel’s birth -- amplified following the wars of the late 1970s -- U.S. support for, and aid to, 
Israel has steadily increased over the years.  The U.S. backing of Israel has, indeed, done more 
harm than benefit to both nations’ security interests and has only stunted the development of 
globalization in the Middle East.  The U.S. foreign aid policy to Israel has, consequently, led to 
radicalization among the Palestinians and increased Palestinian resentment toward Israeli and 
U.S. efforts to keep Palestine’s national aspirations at bay.153 This fact had presented itself since 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, where Egypt, Palestine, and Syria attempted to capture territories 
believed to be theirs.  Overwhelming United States’ support for Israel over the span of decades 
has adversely affected the globalization process, especially once the Cold War came to its 
conclusion.  The current of bitterness held by the Muslim world and Muslim extremists persisted 
and manifested itself into tangible terrorist activities with an eye toward Western targets.  
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 Alongside the supposed Iranian involvement in the Pan Am Flight 103 tragedy, the 
United States witnessed Islamic-spawned terrorism on its own soil.  On February 26, 1993, 
Ramzi Yousef and fellow members of al-Qaeda planted and detonated a truck bomb underneath 
the northern tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.  Although the ultimate plan in 
collapsing the tower failed, the bomb killed six people and injured thousands of others, and 
would later prove to be a “deadly dress rehearsal” to the more catastrophic attacks at the same 
location on September 11, 2001.154 The United States appeared to have an enemy that was not 
afraid to attack U.S. targets at home or abroad.  Moreover, terrorism in the name of Islamic 
extremist motives continued to haunt and stall the United States’ attempts at waging a globalist 
agenda.  It became apparent to U.S. policymakers that this enemy needed to be eliminated 
completely, or substantially, if globalization was to be established in the Middle East.  Every 
time an American person or object became a victim of Islamic terrorism, the United States 
encountered a setback in their diplomatic aspirations.  Policymakers became reactionary instead 
of proactive in attempting to destroy anti-American extremism in order to accomplish its goal of 
globalization.  The constant targeting of American passenger airlines abroad, combined with the 
first World Trade Center attack in the early 1990s, ignited an uphill battle that needed to be won 
against the waves of Islamic fundamentalism if globalization in the Middle East was to succeed.  
National security became an issue of primary concern for the United States government. 
Developed nations’ pathway to instill democracy in the Middle East encountered a major 
obstacle that needed to be removed. 
 The United States persistently took measures to implant democracy in the Middle East 
during the 1990s.  Democratic values were viewed synonymous with globalization by globalists 
                                                 
154
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, “First Strike: Global Terror in America,” accessed on 
February 22, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/ february/tradebom_022608. 
99 
 
around the globe who pushed for human rights and individual freedom.  In pursuing these 
reforms, a strong resistance formed from within the region’s conservative population sects and 
areas inhabited by Islamic fundamentalists.  In a constant battle against traditional Muslims who 
were uneager to cut ties with their cultural and religious foundations, U.S. officials knew that it 
needed to retain their presence in the Middle East.  The lasting petroleum relationship between 
business and political parties from the U.S. and various Middle Eastern entities seemed to exhibit 
itself as an advantage to U.S. foreign policy goals.  U.S. foreign policymakers believed that as 
long as oil flowed in and out of the Middle East, mainly from Saudi Arabia, Israel remained 
healthy and protected, the United States government maintained its other Middle Eastern 
alliances, continued to import an ever so important energy resource, and upheld civil reform, 
globalization would eventually materialize.  Religious fundamentalism, as U.S. officials began to 
view it, could not stand in the way of the waves of universal big business activities and global 
order.  
 But religious freedom was not tolerated by many Middle Eastern leaders, including 
friends of the United States.  In the early-mid 1990s, the Mutawwa’in (the Monarchy’s secret 
religious police in Saudi Arabia) sought out anti-Sunni activities.  Hidden church services were 
discovered and dismantled, and its members were arrested, and some even executed, for 
practices of religious extremism among the millions of Filipinos, Korean, and other foreign 
workers in Saudi Arabia.  This was done by the Saudi government in order to discourage others 
from taking up other unwanted activities, and prevent these individuals from abandoning their 
position as foreign contractors employed in the Saudi oil industry.155 The abuse of civil and 
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human rights by the Saudi government has only recently, under the Obama Administration, taken 
a position of importance in the layout of U.S.-Saudi relations. 
 For the developed world to enter the age of globalization, the economy and economic 
resources needed to become vast and evolved; a world where international business relationships 
were encouraged and necessary for the advancement of a global marketplace.  If an increase in 
universal free trade occurred more frequently, perhaps vast economic development would prove 
to escalate globalization’s culmination sooner than later.  Therefore, according to U.S. officials 
and policymakers, the encouragement of business activities with Islamic entities in the Middle 
East was seen as a benefactor to globalization’s cause.  As George H.W. Bush exited the Oval 
Office in 1993 and William Clinton entered as the next American president, he too supported an 
international business community.  Unlike the Bush families’ lasting business venture with Gulf 
petroleum and relationship with foreign oil companies, Clinton promoted “free markets” and 
“strategic trade” as an essential objective to American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.156 
The Bush connection to Gulf oil was originally pursued for strictly monetary reasons first, which 
became a political matter once the Bush family grew prominent on the American political stage.  
President Clinton, on the other hand, used this relationship as a political strategy to promote 
globalization.  Worldwide trade and the international business community working in accord was 
necessary if the globalization system was to emerge.  The continuing petroleum trade with Gulf 
nations like Saudi Arabia was an encouraging sign for globalization as seen by U.S. 
policymakers.  Also, working to compliment Israel’s best interests in the name of democracy was 
seen as a benefactor to globalization. 
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 However, in order for globalization to work, and for the free flow of goods and services 
across national boundaries to become established practice, peace and cordial communication 
needed to exist between different cultures and societies.  The Arab League boycott of American 
and Israeli products, which had officially existed since the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
War, posed as an obstacle against globalization and Western efforts to implement free trade in 
the region.  Throughout the Cold War, the Middle Eastern Muslim community, especially the 
Palestinians, kept its stance of not doing business with Israel in an attempt to isolate Israel 
economically; Palestinians and Arab alliances also discouraged other nations around the world 
from adding to Israel’s economic and military strength.  Once globalization came to the forefront 
of American diplomacy in the 1990s, U.S. foreign policymakers made a serious push to end this 
boycott. 
 The economic relationship between the Muslim Middle Eastern states and the United 
States became even more fragile once the Saudi oil giant, Aramco, absorbed the state marketing 
and refining company Samerac, which became the world's largest fully integrated oil company at 
the time.157 U.S. officials understood that if they wished to hold onto a degree of influence in 
Middle Eastern economic matters, they needed to persuade Middle Eastern political and 
economic leaders that distancing itself from international business was detrimental to 
globalization and disadvantageous to the Palestinian and Arab communities engaged in the 
boycott.  By the mid-1990s, government officials in Washington understood that a positive 
resolution to end the Arab League boycott needed to come to fruition.  In November, 1994, a 
resolution was introduced by New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg in Congress, along with 
seven other U.S. senators, to urge President Clinton and his Secretary of State, Warren 
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Christopher, to find a “forceful” end to the boycott and demanded that the, “Arab League… put 
the diplomatic chess board away, take a confidence-building step, and support the peace process 
by dismantling the boycott.”158 Although Lautenberg’s tone had suggested that the United States 
would remain strong alongside its longtime ally in Israel, the United States seemingly 
encouraged the positive flow of international, capitalist trade within and outside of the Middle 
East.   
Capitalism, as it appeared to U.S. policymakers, was a vital tool that the United States 
used in order to bring about globalization to the developing world.  Following victory against 
Iraq in 1991, and later following the 2003 campaign, America eliminated one of the hostile and 
major military powers of the Gulf region (Iran being another major military threat) at the time.  
The U.S. victory “firmly established the United States as the sole external arbiter in the area.”159 
It was to nobody’s surprise that U.S. power globally, and its stationary placement with Middle 
Eastern affairs, proved too much for Muslim leadership to contend against.  The boycott, which 
had existed for about five decades prior, finally ended following the Oslo Peace Accords where 
Arab states within the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)160 withdrew their participation from the 
boycott.  The boycott not only failed at dissolving Israel’s economic strength and cohesion with 
outside markets, but it negatively impacted the Arab states’ economy by limiting trade activities 
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and the diversity of products and competition within their own markets.161 The end of the boycott 
signaled a positive step toward globalization in the Middle East for U.S. officials.  Lebanon and 
Syria remained decisive in prolonging their economic crusade against Israel however.  As for the 
GCC nations, the end of the boycott manifested softening tensions against its Jewish neighbor 
and an increase in economic activity across national borders. 
Ethnic tensions between Muslims and the Jewish inhabitants of Israel played out in the 
background regarding U.S. foreign policy and its quest for international peace and cooperation 
during the bulk of the twentieth century’s final decade.  Hundreds of miles northwest of the 
eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, a serious military crisis unfolded.  From 1992 until 
1999, the Balkan states of southeastern Europe encountered violent political and ethic turmoil 
that the U.S. and its NATO and UN allies intervened in.  Following the fall of the Soviet Union 
and its control over the Eastern Bloc in 1991, Balkan society faced numerous issues over how to 
govern its own ethnic populations while silencing its political dissidents.  When Macedonian, 
Croatian, Bosnian, and Slovenians attempted to declare independence from Yugoslavia, which 
was controlled by communist and Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic, a civil stet 
ignited.  The “ethnic cleansing” committed by Milosevic’s Serbian forces on the Muslim 
populations in Bosnia drew in American, U.N., and NATO forces to the conflict in an attempt to 
settle a peace arrangement five months after the war began.  UN and NATO intervention, 
initially, was weak until much later in the conflict.  In 1996, it was revealed that a Croatian 
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soldier pled guilty in an International Criminal Tribunal to executing more than 1,000 Muslim 
civilians in Bosnia.162  
However, these acts of genocide, and the Serbian individuals who committed these 
atrocities, went unpunished by the international community.  Slobodan Milosevic was eventually 
arrested by Yugoslavian authorities in March, 2001, on charges of embezzlement, political 
corruption, and abuse of power.  He was then tried by the International War Crimes Tribunal in 
The Hague on charges of genocide and other various war crimes.163 He died in a prison cell in 
The Hague during his five year-long trial, which ended with no verdict given.  The United States 
and 40 other nations pledged, at a special summit conference in July, 1999, to work for stability 
and prosperity in the Balkans after a decade marked by unrelenting war.164 The accounts of 
Muslim genocide committed by Yugoslavian soldiers, though, have yet to be confirmed by the 
United Nations and the United States alongside much controversy.  This occurrence, along with 
other historical events that involved violence against Muslim peoples in the Middle East, has 
added to the amplified Islamic resentment toward the West in recent years.  It seemed that if 
Muslims, in general, came under attack and became victims of war and violence, the United 
States and the West became the suspects of blame.   
Middle Eastern Muslims are no strangers to acts of violence, and have been victims of 
war and genocide in previous decades.  But whether the violence is instigated and acted out by 
other Muslim sects and their secular leaders, or by infidels foreign to the Middle East has been 
an ongoing debate; one which has presented numerous accounts of misinformation and biased 
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accounts of these atrocities.  What is reality and what is perception has become the ongoing 
question of this issue.  Phillip Crowley, former spokesperson for ex-Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, stated that since the 1980s, “more and more casualties [have been] inflicted by Muslims 
against Muslims,” but the prevailing narrative held by the Islamic extremists today has been the 
“faithful waging war against crusaders.”165 It seemed evident that throughout the 1990s, 
unfortunate undertakings like the genocide of Muslims in Bosnia by non-Muslims were 
perceived by Islamic fundamentalists as conspired attacks by non-Muslims on Muslims in whole.  
This notion was not taken lightly by Islamic fundamentalists, and caused more harm to the 
perception of the West.  In fact, it spurred future terrorist attacks on Western targets.  Since 
1980, it is a presumed belief held by the West and the U.N. that a little more than four-million 
Muslims have been killed by non-Muslims, including the Soviet forces who murdered millions 
of Muslims during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980.  However, Western forces have 
done very little, in reality, in contributing to the large number of Muslims killed by non-
Muslims.166 Whether this fact is based on real evidence or it is based on speculation, the reality is 
that millions of Muslims have fallen victim to conflicts imposed on them by forces distant from 
Muslim society.  Steven Simon, the former head of the Middle East Desk on the National 
Security Council, stated: “Nonetheless, the perception that non-Muslim global powers are 
targeting Islam has become so widely accepted in the Arab world and beyond that it is now a 
consideration in U.S. foreign policy.”167  
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In the closing years of the twentieth century, the United States and the United Nations 
sustained a policy that encouraged economic growth and activity within the Middle Eastern 
social landscape where Islamic fundamentalism ran amuck, opposing the Western modes of 
change.  Islamic fundamentalism and the juxtaposed religious rift between itself and Judaism, 
however, have remained obstacles for overall economic, social, and political progress.  As long 
as popular conceptions existed that framed the United States and its global alliances as 
perpetrators and enemies of Islam who were more than willing to murder Muslims, the hatred 
would persist toward America and its globalization mission.  Non-Muslims worldwide became 
the potential targets of Islamic radicals – especially those affiliated with the West in some way or 
another.  Prominent Islamic clerics today, such as Egyptian Islamic theologian Yusuf al-
Qaradawi, have consistently preached against Israel, encouraging suicide bombings against 
Israelis, and regularly upholding his fatwas, “urging Muslims to avoid contact with Israel.”168 
The persistent and staunch attitudes of religious fundamentalism will remain an absolute 
deterrent to globalization’s formulation and growth.  The United States has worked tediously to 
end these misconceptions held onto by the fundamentalist Muslim populations of the Middle 
East through the valid media campaigns in the Middle East.  However, these flawed ideas remain 
vibrant in the minds of Islamic fundamentalists.  U.S. policymakers have come to recognize that 
constructing a policy to battle this mislead logic has become a vital component of U.S. foreign 
policy. 
Hope in ending Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East came into existence during 
the final decade of the twentieth century.  This hope came in the form of an emerging Muslim 
middle class, a rise of capitalism, and an increase in global trade within the Middle Eastern 
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marketplace.  Advocates who believe that capitalism and a free market could bring the Middle 
East out of a fundamentalist mind frame include prominent political officials and academic 
theorists, like former President William Clinton, CFR member and academic Vali Nasr, 
economic historian Daniel Yergin, and Edward Djerejian, formerly a key official in the U.S. 
Department of State.169 This encouraging development has grown more prominent upon the 
stage of Middle Eastern affairs today.  But in order for this development to give way to 
globalization and modernity, the founding doctrine of theological authority and secular power 
must be analyzed to determine if secular rulers and Islamic clerics are open to the idea and 
promises of a globalized world brought together by a global marketplace.  Beside the point, 
many Muslim extremists who resided in the poorest regions of the Middle East never 
encountered or experienced these encouraging economic activities.  Islamic fundamentalism 
remained a force to be reckoned with as terrorist cells began to form and conspire raids against 
the West.  
As the year 2000 approached, Islamic fundamentalism remained alive amongst Arab, 
Chechen, Palestinian, Afghan, and Bosnian populations.  The Middle East, as a whole, had a 
small middle class, conflicts within the interpretation of Islam and conflicts between Shia 
Muslims and their secular rulers, which included the conflict between the Saudi royalty and its 
Shia subjects, proved to be factors that fueled Islamic extremist activity.  Only small pockets 
around the Middle East have experienced the waves of globalization.  The city of Dubai, by 2010 
for example, increased its GDP 267 percent since 1995, and has rivaled the splendor of other 
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major world cities such as Shanghai and New York City.170 This encouraging sign could be 
viewed today as a positive sign of globalization and its appearance and expansion into Middle 
Eastern society. Yet, if one travelled just several miles across the Arab deserts or the Persian 
Gulf waters, one could witness the poverty and social disparity of many within the region who 
view Islam as a staple of existence.  Islamic fundamentalists, especially the Shia Muslims, 
viewed, and continue to view globalization as a deep-rooted enemy to their political, social, 
cultural, and religious values.  Moreover, Islamic fundamentalists, and consequently the terrorist 
organizations tied to this brand of religious fundamentalism, would come to interpret 
globalization as an American invasion of Muslim life – a redundant theme pioneered by Iranian 
revolutionaries of the late 1970s who dubbed the United States and its former imperialistic 
motives with Iranian oil as the “Great Satan.”171  It was believed by Islamic fundamentalists, 
such as Osama bin Laden in 1998, that the United States had, “spearheaded the crusade against 
the Islamic nation…. [And offered] support to the Jews in Palestine who are in need of their 
Christian brothers to achieve full control over the Arabian Peninsula.”172 The leader of the 
terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, and eventual mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks on the United 
States, Osama bin Laden and his fellow Shia brethren truly convinced themselves that they were 
fighting a jihad against the evil mechanisms of the West.  They turned to guerilla warfare tactics 
against Western forces and targets to defend Islamic life in the name of Allah.173 Globalization 
filled these Islamic extremists with feelings of paranoia over the future survival of their own 
culture, and spurred them to greet this liberal development with much hostility.  The United 
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States’ government and its foreign policymakers had a revitalized foreign enemy that was 
determined to wage an all-out holy war against the West by the late 1990s. 
The United States suddenly became aware that the global terrorism front was a very 
serious concern regarding national security.  A June, 2000 National Commission on Terrorism174 
report advised members of Congress on combating and countering the changing threat Islamic 
radicals posed on the United States at home and abroad.  Following the arrest by a Customs 
Agent at the U.S.-Canadian border of Ahmed Ressam, an Islamic radical who had conspired to 
perform a terrorist bombing of a millennial celebration in the United States, the commission 
created a report to advise U.S. government officials on the evolutionary motives, techniques, 
ideologies, and adaptions used by international terrorists.175 With al-Qaeda highlighted as the 
prominent threat to U.S. national security, members of the commission evaluated and warned 
U.S. officials that terrorism had become more dynamic at home and abroad.  Terrorists had 
adapted to the modern times, and had become, “less dependent on state sponsors, were harder to 
disrupt with economic sanctions, objectives more deadly,” and made effective “use of widely 
available technologies to communicate quickly and securely.”176  
What appeared evident was that the United States had a gigantic problem that needed to 
be confronted immediately.  As long as leaders of the United States were committed to carrying 
on their agenda of globalization, terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists needed to be silenced and 
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destroyed in the process.  But how were U.S. leaders going to carry out their plan to combat this 
evasive and covert enemy?  Efforts by U.S. intelligence agencies to combat international terrorist 
organizations begun immediately in 2000, but it was too little, too late for government officials 
once September 11, 2001 approached, arrived, and passed.  The massive terrorist attacks 
spearheaded by Osama bin Laden and his group of jihad extremists, al-Qaeda, wreaked havoc on 
United States’ society.  It became quickly clear to newly elected President George W. Bush, his 
administration, and other government officials of the day that 9/11 was a game-changer to 
foreign policy in the Middle East.  Al-Qaeda, its Islamic jihad against the West, and Osama bin 
Laden became a household name in the United States.  Foreign policy was altered to fight a 
foreign enemy, rather than encourage globalization’s growth in the Middle East. 
Al-Qaeda’s origins could be traced back to a meeting between the wealthy Arab bin 
Laden, Egyptian militant Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Cairo intellectual Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif, 
held in Peshawar, Pakistan.177 Al-Qaeda’s history, however, could be traced back to the Carter 
Administration’s anti-Soviet policies in the Middle East during the late 1970s.  Once the first 
Gulf War begun, bin Laden offered his Mujahideen forces to the Saudi monarchy to help defend 
the kingdom against Saddam Hussein’s potentially dangerous military forces.  However, the 
House of Saud declined bin Laden’s offer, and invited U.S. forces, instead, on the Muslim Holy 
Land, which deeply angered the al-Qaeda founder.178 From that point forward, al-Qaeda began to 
attack Western targets and any target that was Sunni or secular for example, which affiliated or 
befriended itself with the West.   
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Once 9/11 became a reality, al-Qaeda appeared to have upped the ante by taking the 
battle to the American homeland.  The collapse of the World Trade Center, the attack on the 
Pentagon, and the scores of Americans killed on domestic soil, had altered the course of foreign 
policy in the Middle East which the United States had abided by since 1991.  In response to this 
tragedy, President Bush would wage a war against the terrorists and any Middle Eastern nation 
that harbored members of al-Qaeda, weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, or any 
other related terrorist organizations for that matter.  Americans at home would experience a 
trade-off between their personal freedoms for security, and the Middle Eastern landscape would 
come to experience drastic violence, warfare, and social and political upheaval.   
The direction of U.S. foreign policy altered its course, initiated by the George W. Bush 
Administration, following 9/11 to a resurgence of American interest, military forces, resources, 
and aid into and with the Middle East.  A pro-Israeli policy surfaced once again between the 
United States and Israel – begrudgingly by George W. Bush who came under attack by pro-Israel 
lobbyists, the mainstream media, and other government officials initially for his withdrawal of 
foreign investment and minimal support for America’s longtime ally.  In the aftermath of the 
2001 tragedy, the U.S.-Israeli diplomatic relationship became very erratic, as President George 
W. Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon either totally disagreed or strongly agreed with each 
other on issues concerning the “Arab-Islamic world” -- in spite of the fact that the United States 
had longed “adopted many of Israel’s justifications for these [anti-Palestinian, anti-Iranian, anti-
Arab, and anti-Shia] policies.”179 The Sunni and secular governments of the Middle East, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, once again became an important ally to the United States beginning in 
2001 as they had been during the First Gulf War.  The United States, involved in a military 
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conflict following the catastrophic terrorist attack on their own soil, renewed its view that the 
petroleum resources and political assistance of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were vital in 
fighting Islamic terrorism in the Middle East.  Surely, the Bush family found its oil-based 
relationship with the Royal al-Saud family helpful to U.S. diplomatic objectives, uniting to 
defeat the extremist Muslim populations of the region.   
As mentioned previously, the rise of the Islamic middle class, Arab intellectualism, and 
the increase in capitalism within Middle Eastern society held the key to defeating Islamic 
extremism.  Once the Muslim world came to view economic progress as an improvement to their 
own selves, culture, and society, they would come to view Islamic fundamentalists as backwards 
and corrupt element of their society.  Globalization, and the prospects of its regional reforms on 
Muslim society, promised to cement a legacy of global harmony through an integrated 
marketplace and bring an end to the ultra-conservative and outdated customs and beliefs that 
Islamic fundamentalism encompassed.  However, “[r]eform is more likely to come when 
Muslims by and large begin to believe that it would play a role in solving the problems they want 
solved.”180  
 
Globalization Policy Following the September 11th Attacks: Old Habits in a 
New Era 
 
 The infamy of the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States proved to 
alter the entire dynamic of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  With thousands of American 
citizens killed in the terrorist attacks that wreaked havoc in New York City, Washington D.C., 
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and rural Pennsylvania, perceptions of Arab Muslims would forever be altered by the millions of 
people who lived outside of the Middle East.  Not only had the United States underestimated 
their vulnerability to the serious violence and disorder caused by Islamic extremists, but the 
economic and political elite of the United States were forced to revise their strategy of 
engagement and diplomacy with entities from the Islamic society as well.  The Bush 
Administration’s globalization policy, as it would come to be following the 9/11 catastrophe, 
contained elements of an exclusively American-Christian crusade against Islamic 
fundamentalism, while undermining the natural social growth of Middle Eastern society.  If 
many Middle Eastern peoples viewed the U.S. in an unfavorable light before September 11th, this 
perception was only magnified through the measures of a revised U.S. policy.  The United States 
embarked on a mission against the malevolent Islamic radicals and the regimes that fostered 
these terrorist organizations responsible for 9/11. In later months, the U.S. would confront any 
Middle Eastern entity that opposed U.S. policy – including Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the PLO. 
 Just two months following the 9/11 attacks, the World Trade Organization (WTO) held a 
summit in Doha, the capital city of Qatar.  The World Trade Organization “is the international 
organization whose primary purpose is to open trade for the benefit of all.”181 This organization’s 
member body, made up mostly of political leaders and economists, includes 159 nations, in 
which “117 are developing countries or separate customs territories.”182 With tight security 
measures and protestors running amuck in the streets of Doha - condemning the trade ministers, 
their delegation, and representatives of various international organizations of the WTO of selling 
out individual freedoms and liberties of people around the world – the socio-economic aspect of 
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globalization became the primary topic of debate at the conference.183 In light of the newfound 
anxiety over international terrorism, the members of the WTO agreed that if globalization was to 
proceed as originally planned, failure in implementing its security and survival measures was not 
an option.  The delegates of the WTO summit in Doha, moreover, needed to rebuild the 
confidence of the global marketplace during the final quarter of 2001, when it “was essential to 
heading off a deep and protracted global recession.”184 
 For the United States, it was necessary for the political and economic elite to consider an 
innovative and updated foreign policy to deal with the abrupt changes it faced.  The special U.S. 
alliance with Israel, the economic investment the United States had with the Middle East – 
specifically regarding the Gulf States’ petroleum resources - were important aspects considered 
in the ever-changing dynamic of the world’s political climate and U.S. diplomacy in the Middle 
East.  The rapid current of Islamic fundamentalism, and relatedly, extremism – as well as the 
Islamic extremists’ agenda to halt efforts of globalization - were obstacles that U.S. 
policymakers had to manage in their revision of foreign policy.  The end of the Cold War 
brought about the mission to involve the Middle East within the structure of globalization.  
Efforts were made throughout the 1990s and up through the millennium and beyond to 
implement a system of global assimilation.  However, 9/11 had caused a serious setback to U.S. 
foreign policy goals.  It became quickly apparent that United States’ foreign policy in the Middle 
East was about to undergo some minor and major adjustments to its longtime and existing 
relationships, and to its overall objective of globalization in the Middle East. 
 The September 11th attacks by Islamic radicals did little overall in changing the special 
relationship shared by Israel and the United States.  In fact, once the United States declared war 
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against Afghanistan and global terrorism in late 2001, the U.S.-Israel bond became much 
stronger because of an increased and synchronized need to diminish Islamic extremist forces in 
the name of national security.  If the alliance between the two nations was ever so strong before 
the tragedy, it became even more solidified soon thereafter.  Israel had always been a strategic 
asset to the U.S. in the Middle East since its birth in 1948.  In the age of globalization, the United 
States could not afford to favor one ethnic group or culture over another – which included the 
contrast between Jewish and Arab cultures – especially in the socially turbulent Middle East.  
Zbgigniew Brzezinski, the former U.S. National Security Advisor, advocated that as time 
progresses toward global hegemony, “the American mosaic could become a contest among 
groups, each of which will claim (and try to assert) its special expertise, as well as its right, to 
define policy in a universe of conflicting foreign interests.”185 Globalization will, in fact, break 
down cultural favoritism and ethnic barriers in return for global hegemony.  If globalization is to 
breach Middle Eastern society, containing a variety of Muslim and Jewish ethnicities, the United 
States cannot favor Israeli interests over the interests of, per se, Sunni Arabs.  Globalization not 
only tested the United States’ ability to develop a policy that is bilateral and universal, but one 
that was fair and balanced across national boundaries as well. 
 However, numerous sources and primary evidence indicated that the United States 
heavily favored the Israeli position on political matters in the Middle East following 9/11.  Even 
when policy was directed toward an issue involving the Arab world, Israel remained an integral 
player in determining solutions and outcomes of those Middle Eastern diplomatic issues.  
Tremendous support for Israel’s prominence by large portions of the American domestic 
population and special interest groups continued to play a major role in persuading policymaking 
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and decisions directed toward Middle Eastern diplomacy.  This development remained a 
prominent and deciding factor in recent years during the George W. Bush and Barrack Obama 
presidencies regarding Middle Eastern policy.  It could be argued that since Israel’s creation 
following the Second World War, the United States always aligned itself with Israel’s goals and 
purpose, no matter at what diplomatic cost or price.  The question moving forward was to decide 
on what stance the United States took toward Israel’s national interests in the ongoing efforts for 
Middle Eastern peace and globalization.  
 Upon oil’s discovery in the earliest years of the twentieth century by imperialist nations 
and companies from those nations – including the United States, the Middle East had quickly 
developed into a region of utmost economic importance to global society.  The petroleum trade 
between the producing Arab states and consumer markets, such as the United States, had been a 
pivotal episode in global affairs ever since.  As recently as 2013, 13 percent of U.S. total gross 
oil imports came from Saudi Arabia.  In addition, “net imports from OPEC countries accounted 
for 55% of U.S. total net imports” that year.186 After 9/11, this oil trade, in order to meet global 
demands, had to remain in existence between the U.S. and the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia.  
Big business and the political elite had a major stake in this economic development, and Islamic 
extremism was certainly not going to pose a threat to this decades-old relationship.  Plus, Saudi 
assistance and help from the surrounding Gulf states became essential for the United States in 
managing its war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 In the light of globalization, the petroleum trade remained a vital topic of debate.  The 
extraction of resources from the sands of countries like Saudi Arabia, and the injection of those 
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resources into the global marketplace, fueled the Islamic fundamentalist anger toward the West.  
Yet, Gulf oil was so vital to the livelihood of all developed and developing nations of the Gulf 
and other parts of the globe, as well as to the overall well-being of the global capitalist system.  
For example, in 2009, Chinese imports of Saudi Arabian petroleum exceeded those of the United 
States for the first time in history.187  Globalization had forced Middle Eastern nations, “to 
address aspects of their past that had long been ignored or hidden…. Such problems will 
continue to vex scholars for years to come as the Gulf diversifies economically and becomes a 
region in which oil will play a significant but less vital role over time.”188 Saudi Arabia, more 
specifically, will have to consider its own national security measures in the midst of the flexing 
of Iranian power and the momentous Arab Spring revolutions which have now found a place in 
plunging Syria into civil chaos.  Will Middle Eastern society accept its new responsibilities 
within the scheme of globalization in return for modernity and democratic values, or will the 
animosities held by Islamic peoples toward the West’s petroleum needs plunge the region further 
into an arena of conflict and chaos? 
 
George W. Bush’s Policy Surrounding Gulf Oil and Israel 
 
 Just a few months following George W. Bush’s ascent to the Oval Office, newly 
appointed Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC).  In his speech, he detailed the new administration’s foreign policy in the 
Middle East and its dedication to globalization.  Powell was adamant about reducing the hostility 
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exerted by regimes in places like Iraq and Iran – the reinstatement of a dual-containment policy, 
and additionally, weakening Russia’s aggressive push on the region’s political structure.  The 
central goal of the administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East was, “the need to consult 
and work closely with friends and allies…” such as Israel.189 Furthermore, the ties between the 
Bush Administration and Gulf Oil became a central and viable factor of U.S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11, as well as before and during the American crusade 
against the Islamic jihadists.   
It appeared that the foreign policy agenda of the early Bush Administration centered on 
existing diplomatic relationships, while attempting to seek out new and broader alliances with 
other nations and international organizations.  Yet, the alliance between Israel and the United 
States remained a complicating factor for the West’s globalization effort.  Because Israel and the 
United States shared a common interest for democratic values as well as “vital economic and 
strategic interests at stake in the region,” Powell, as stated in his March, 2001 speech, believed 
that, “these interests and concerns will be served best by a peace that both Israelis and 
Palestinians can embrace.”190 With a new sense of urgency in curbing Islamic extremism in the 
Muslim world following 9/11, Washington and the American business elite relied heavily on 
their former relationships with entities in the Middle East to assist the U.S. in the crusade against 
terrorism.  The Bush Administration came to the conclusion early on that in order to bring about 
the fruits of globalization and offer peace to the peoples of the Middle East, the special alliance 
with Israel was absolutely essential.  Also essential was the continuation of big business in 
regards to the oil trade between the West and Middle East.  
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 The Bush Administration attempted to persuade the Israeli leader Ariel Sharon to “show 
restraint in the occupied [Palestinian] territories” and dissuade the Palestinian population via 
political policy of committing further acts of terror against the West in the months following 
9/11.  In response to Washington’s desires, Sharon became angered with Washington, and 
claimed that the U.S. wished to “sell out” the Jewish state in order to win favor with the Muslims 
in late 2001.191 After Israel’s leaders refused to work with PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, while 
engaged in constant communication with the United States, alongside tremendous attempts by 
the Jewish Lobby to win favor in the eyes of U.S. citizens and officials in Washington, the Israeli 
position won its case.192 They had pressured the United States’ government enough to reverse its 
post-9/11 policy from one that sought reconciliation with the Muslim world, to one that remained 
more favorable to Israel’s position toward Muslims.  Although Bush initially attempted to 
normalize the U.S.-Israel alliance after 9/11, propaganda campaigns and public pressure 
persuaded the American president to regress back to the internationally unpopular special 
alliance with Israel.   
 President Bush and his administration would fail to reconcile with the Muslim 
populations and nations within the Middle East from 9/11 moving forward.  Years later in 2005, 
Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal voiced his complaints to the [Council on Foreign 
Relations] (CFR), – an American non-profit, nonpartisan membership organization that 
specializes in U.S. foreign policy and international affairs – and declared that the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was the root cause of Middle Eastern extremism and terrorism, as well as the “chief 
factor dividing the Muslim world from the United States.”193 Failing to gain support from Israel 
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in creating a unipolar policy in the Middle East between Israel and its Muslim neighbors, the 
Bush Administration had to follow through with its intentions alone.  U.S. officials had no choice 
but to flex its diplomatic muscle and to lead a crusade against al-Qaeda and other perpetrators 
and threats to U.S. national security.  Thus, Bush’s global War on Terror began on September 
20, 2001.  By December, 2001, Yasser Arafat had bowed to pressure from the U.S. and Israel to 
arrest and dismember Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  Meanwhile, 
Ariel Sharon and his government took a hard-lined militaristic stance against Palestinians 
residing in Gaza and West Bank.194 The United States, remaining true to its traditional 
diplomatic tendencies in the Middle East, began a series of military campaigns against Islamic 
terrorists and antagonistic Middle Eastern regimes: Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, and intervening in the affairs of the decade long NATO-American 
intervention in the war between Israel and Palestinian forces within Israel.  Although no weapons 
of mass destruction were ever found, nor was Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, the ongoing 
damage to American reputation, its global image, and the battle lines between the West and 
Middle East had been established.  
 It is not a secret that the Bush family had decades-long personal connections with Middle 
Eastern petroleum.  Although the Bush family had developed strong connections with the Gulf 
States, George W. Bush now balanced these alliances with a public campaign against hostile 
Islamists.  Since the Great Depression era of the 1930s, oil men like Prescott Bush worked 
closely than ever before with the Roosevelt Administration through the Second World War, in 
which Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia became “vital to the defense of the United States.”195 By 
                                                 
194
 Derek Brown, “Middle East Timeline: Part Two,” The Guardian, November 28, 2001, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/28/israel. 
195
 Phillips, American Dynasty, 152-3. 
121 
 
the turn of the millennium, the Bush family maintained their affluence in the economic sphere 
and in the American upper-political sphere as well.  Their involvement in the global energy 
industry for decades prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001, and inclusion into the realm of the 
American political elite allowed the Bush’s to direct foreign policy as they saw best fit once they 
took positions in the executive branch.  A CIA report published in 2000 indicated that 
Washington had much at stake regarding Middle Eastern oil supplies.  With the Bush 
Administration’s sight on geopolitical power and overt concerns over U.S. imported oil supplies, 
its ambitions became centered on U.S. hegemony in a globalizing world.196 Therefore, in gaining 
major support from American Christian fundamentalists and evangelists, right-wing groups, and 
the Jewish lobby, George W. Bush invaded the Middle East in an effort to defeat hostile 
Islamists who threatened the American establishment.  Nevertheless, Bush began to, unwittingly, 
jeopardize his families’ history in the Middle Eastern oil trade while publically aligning himself 
with the abovementioned domestic groups – unlike his father, who “tailor[ed] his war coalition 
building to include many Islamic nations in addition to the oil sheikhdoms.”197  
  The outrage by the American people over their nation’s Arab alliance who supplied the 
U.S. with oil over the decades seemed to manifest itself in an ill-fated legacy.  The oil trade and 
the diplomatic relationships between the United States and countries like Saudi Arabia continued 
to live on.  Yet, the Bush Administration’s ties to the Saudi royal family was a relationship that 
the American public remained uneased about.  Out of the 19 September 11 hijackers, 15 of them 
were of Saudi descent, which was also the homeland to the 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden.  
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia possessed a large minority of Shia Muslims hostile to U.S. influence.  
As mentioned earlier, Arab society had actually benefited economically from an oil boom as 
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partly resulting following the events of 9/11.  During a 2007 Congressional testimony on U.S. 
diplomacy in Saudi Arabia, University of Vermont professor F. Gregory Gause declared that, 
“Washington still value[d] the relationship with the Saudis, for oil and security reasons.”198 
Moreover, the diplomatic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States, since its 
origins, “operated most smoothly at the elite level.”199  
 George W. Bush had numerous connections with Middle Eastern petroleum.  Not only 
had he and his family done business with oil sheikhs and businessmen in the Gulf region for 
decades, but much of his executive staff also had prior experience in this undertaking as well.  In 
addition, there was little doubt that much of the U.S. occupancy in the Middle East following 
9/11 had much to do with the U.S.-Arab oil trade.  A number of government officials have 
stepped forward since in revealing a part of George W. Bush’s foreign policy agenda in the 
Middle East.  Former Federal Reserve Chairman during Bush’s presidency, Alan Greenspan, 
General John Abizaid, former head of Military Operations in the 2003 war against Iraq, and 
Defense Secretary Charles Hagel (who was a Senator from Nebraska during the bulk of the Bush 
presidency), have all unanimously declared that the U.S. takeover in Iraq and occupancy in the 
Middle East were largely attempts to control oil.200 During George W. Bush’s two terms as 
president of the United States, he provided executive branch positions and appointments to elite 
individuals heavily involved in the Middle Eastern oil business.  Bush “brought a new set of 
dominant corporations, power alignments, and overseas entanglements” to the aspect of 
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policymaking.201 Vice President, Richard Cheney, alongside National Security Advisor, 
Condaleeza Rice, were both heavily involved in executive roles of the Texas-based oil service 
corporations, Haliburton and Enron, and more importantly to the task of foreign policymaking, 
had “ties to Bahrain, Kuwait, and shadowy Saudi Arabian families.”202  
 The positive effects of globalization began to take shape in Middle Eastern society due to 
the U.S. war effort against terrorism and aggressive Middle Eastern Islamic leaders.  Once 
American military forces arrived in the Middle East to battle the jihadists beginning in 
Afghanistan in 2001, oil and American security became vital to U.S. interests and success in 
carrying out its foreign policy and war effort.  In effect, the American war effort in the Middle 
East had fueled economic prosperity for the Gulf States as well.  The GCC cooperated with the 
U.S. military following its invasion, and later victory in Iraq in 2003, because “they recognized 
that it would have enormous influence over the region’s politics and commerce after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein’s government.”203 The tremendous impact oil had on the Arab economy in the 
Middle East continued down a perplexed path during the George W. Bush years.  Although 
Saudi Arabia remained a “problematic ally” to the United States (in regards to combating al-
Qaeda’s terrorist cells and Islamic radical intelligence networks and organizations in years 
leading up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks), the 9/11 Commission204 warned that the U.S. 
government should “build a relationship beyond oil” – one that fostered a policy of “shared 
commitment to reform” and a relationship dedicated to a shared interest of their nations’ 
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peoples.205 Upon President Obama’s ascendance to the presidency, his administration would not 
have the advantage of a personal and existing relationship regarding the oil industry.  The Obama 
Administration would lack the personnel involved in the business aspect of American power-
politics, as well as prior involvement in the petroleum trade with the Gulf Arabs.  
  By the closing of Bush’s second term in office, it was ‘politics as usual’ in the Middle 
East.  Despite the Bush Administration’s somewhat successful efforts to globalize the Middle 
East, the U.S. retained a pro-Israel policy and had failed at curbing the Islamic extremist 
networks in the region.  A decade-long military campaign to eliminate Islamic enemies of Israel 
and the United States went unfinished.  The objective of the United States during the Bush 
presidency included democratizing the Middle East, which was also a “core goal of many groups 
in the [Israel] lobby.”206 In the end of his two terms in Office, Bush amplified the animosities 
that many Muslims retained toward the United States and the West.  The war effort in the Middle 
East became a doomed legacy, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda survived, and an economic 
recession hit home by 2008.   
It appeared evident to the American political elite that globalization would come sooner 
than later to the Middle East. The Bush Administration had made a sufficient effort to revise 
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East to one that was less slanted toward Israel following 9/11.  
But that attempt at removing the Israel bias ultimately failed.  Following the administration’s 
failure in effectively managing the 2006 Lebanon crisis, and Secretary of State Condoleeza 
Rice’s statement on instilling democracy and support for Israel in the region as, “the birth pangs 
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of the new Middle East,” the administration had lost more favor with their Arab alliances – 
including Saudi Arabia, where foreign minister Faisal scoffed at the American viewpoint that 
Saudi Arabia wanted “to go back to the old Middle East.”207 Political officials within the 
American government, grassroots and professional support from fundamentalist Christians and 
Jews within the United States, and the powerful Jewish Lobby had persuaded Bush and his 
government to remain true to the decades’-old Israeli favoritism.  Furthermore, the constant 
American military presence in the Middle East had bolstered the anti-American animosities held 
by Islamic radicals.  The Gaza offensive, beginning in the summer of 2006 by Israeli militants, 
had been considered and challenged by some in the U.N., including American diplomat Miguel 
d'Escoto Brockmann, as an act of genocide against the Arab occupants in 2009.  However, the 
United States continued its tremendous support for Israel even in the wake of the Gaza crisis.208 
Washington’s support for Israel continued on as the tragic events in Israel had lingered on.  
Years later in 2011, support for Israel by U.S. officials remained substantial, as Massachusetts 
Representative Edward Markey advocated that, “Israel… take decisive action in the Gaza Strip 
to protect its population living under the daily threat of rocket attacks” and to finally defeat the 
Palestinian nationalists and inhabitants.209  
The Bush Administration’s popularity among Americans was at an historic low, with 
much disfavor coming from the failed and costly Middle Eastern military conflict.  Additionally, 
oil prices were high in the midst of a national recession, while the Arab Gulf States had 
experienced an economic boom at the same time.  Once Illinois Senator Barrack Obama won the 
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presidential election in November, 2008, his administration would adopt a foreign policy that 
had continued to remain favorable to Israel to a degree, but would begin to mediate tensions 
between all the peoples of the Middle East furthermore. 
 
Obama’s Policy Surrounding Gulf Oil and Israel 
   
   Before President Obama took office, foreign policy experts from the CATO Institute 
advised his administration that, “the better option would be to chart an entirely new course,” by: 
“drawing down the American military presence in the Middle East, embrac[ing] a policy of 
constructive disengagement… by deemphasizing U.S. alliances in the Middle East, especially 
with… Israel” among other suggestions.210 Another emphasis important for globalization in the 
Middle East was the economic development surrounding the global supply and demand for 
petroleum.  If progress toward globalization was going to be accomplished in the Middle East, 
then the Obama Administration had to steer away from a conflicting foreign policy, one that had 
fostered a sincere and long term predisposition toward Israel and one that relied heavily on Gulf 
oil imports.  In the final year of George W. Bush’s presidency, Israel had received around $2.38 
billion in U.S. aid – which trumped any other Middle Eastern Arab state by more than $800 
million (In comparison, Afghanistan had received $1.058 billion in U.S. aid that same year to 
battle against jihadist terrorist sects within its nation’s mountainous lands).211  
 Rrelations with Israel gradually became overly-accepting, yet still remained favorable 
toward that nation.  Conservative segments of American society, alongside pressure by the 
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Jewish lobby, had persuaded and “discouraged” the previous “Bush Administration from 
exercising independent judgment and influence” regarding foreign policy in the Middle East.212 
When the current administration rose to power in 2009, a foreign policy in the Middle East was 
constructed that attempted to advance the mechanisms of globalization rather than one that 
sought after public support.  Key figures in Obama’s foreign policy team in 2009 included 
former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Samantha Power, and 
former National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon,  They encouraged a Middle Eastern policy that 
harbored a lesser military presence, and a more evenly-balanced diplomacy with every nation 
within the region.  Moreover, they advocated human rights and free trade on an international 
scale. 
 In the continuous and fragile crusade toward globalization, the Obama Administration 
had to revise its special relationship with Israel.  Unlike the Bush Administration, which came 
under heavy pressure by groups who favored pro-Israeli policy, foreign policy in Israel under 
President Obama would seek an alternative path.  On June 4, 2009, President Obama delivered a 
speech on U.S.-Muslim relations, entitled A New Beginning, before hundreds of Muslim peoples 
at Cairo University in Egypt.  In support of globalization, Obama desired a foreign policy with 
Muslims as one “not focused on oil and gas,” rather a new relationship that sought, “a broader 
engagement” through the implementation of a policy that sponsored economic and social 
development in the Middle East as a whole.213 This speech was labeled by the majority of the 
American journalist and academic community as an attempt to modify a constructive path 
toward globalization.  The president sought out a “fresh relationship based on mutual interest and 
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mutual respect…. [B]ased on the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be 
in competition.”214 
 For many observers, this speech signaled a new hope for the future of U.S.-Muslim 
relations and a lasting peace.  However, many listeners came to view A New Beginning as a 
diplomatic tool used to “brighten the image of the United States.”215 Moreover, Israel viewed 
Obama’s new policy in the Middle East as threatening to their current position with the United 
States and the surrounding Muslim world.  An anonymous spokeswoman for Jewish settlers in 
West Bank, in the midst of a war with the Palestinians, declared that the new American president 
was, “out of touch with reality” and ignorant to the realities between Muslims and the Western 
world.216 
 In comparison to former relationships between the United States’ government and Israel, 
the usually comfortable diplomacy between the U.S. and Israel relationship had seen better days.  
Uneased by the growing ideological rift between the two governments, Israel recently and openly 
criticized the Obama Administration’s lack of support for its national security in the Middle East.  
Groups such as AIPAC, peoples associated with the Jewish Lobby, Conservatives, and Judeo-
Christian fundamentalists have criticized the Obama Administration for its separation from the 
former and the distancing from the special bond that the United States had shared with Israel for 
past generations.  Illinois Congressman, Randy Hultgren, attacked President Obama in front of 
Congress for blaming Israel for stalemating the peace process in the Middle East during a speech 
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at the U.N. General Assembly in 2011.217 As recently as February, 2014, a serious discord was 
struck between the Israeli and U.S. government.  Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, 
and his Minister of Strategic Affairs became outraged at Secretary of State, John Kerry, when it 
was suggested by the American diplomat that Israel continue negotiations and cooperation 
toward a frame-worked Middle Eastern peace plan – all while various pro-Arab groups 
threatened a boycott of Israeli products because of Netanyahu’s policies toward the 
Palestinians.218   
In the fiscal year of 2013, the U.S. federal government granted Israel with approximately 
$3.115 billion in aid toward the ongoing peace process.219 The prospects of international unity 
have been skewed by the notion that the U.S. had supported Israel for decades.  The Obama 
Administration’s foreign policy goal in Israel currently is to establish a plan of permanent peace 
and stability between the Palestinians and Jews by an April, 2014 deadline.  Yet, violence and 
destruction continues to thrive.  President Obama and his administration aim toward 
globalization through international cooperation, however, disapproval by international groups 
and forces over U.S. involvement in Israel have carried on.  The special interest groups and the 
powerful individuals within the U.S. who devote their efforts in affirming the overwhelming 
support and unique position with Israel must understand the consequences of their actions.  The 
overdue process of harboring a slanted policy in favor of Israeli national security over the 
Palestinian cause for nationalism, and the overall violence between the two peoples must come 
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to its 66-year halt.  More pressing matters, such as the civil unrest in Egypt, nuclear development 
in Iran, the Syrian Civil War, and the Arab Spring movement of 2011 are issues that the U.S. has 
evaded but must be dealt with first and foremost in order to come to a rational solution.  Instead, 
the fact that Secretary of State John Kerry has primarily focused on the Arab and Palestinian 
conflict suggests that the Obama Administration is focused on what the Clinton Administration 
failed to do in the 1990s, which was to find a permanent peace between the Judaic and Muslim 
peoples.   
Peace, modernity, and democracy will not arrive to the Middle East if the West 
consistently aligns itself with a pro-Israeli agenda – an agenda demonized by Israel’s Muslim 
neighbors. “A country as rich and powerful as the United States can sustain flawed policies for 
quite some time, but reality cannot be ignored…. Israel’s well-being is [an American] interest – 
on moral grounds – but its continued presence in the Occupied Territories is not.”220 Today, a 
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become outdated.  Globalization has 
transformed the social landscape of Israel as of late though.  The global economy has caused 
many Israeli skilled workers and professionals to leave their homeland in search of better 
occupational opportunity, while migrant and unskilled workers into Israel in search of 
opportunity is increasing, “from which it is apparent that Israel is actually engaged in a process 
of redefining its social boundaries.”221 The pluralization of Israel’s population, a change in 
Israel’s demographic landscape, and the effects of a global economy could bring about changes 
necessary for peace to become established in Israel.    
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Throughout his two terms in office thus far, the Obama Administration has experienced 
friction over the trade centered on Middle Eastern oil.  Unlike the personnel and international 
business relationships within the Bush Administration, government officials within the ranks of 
the current administration lack the business expertise, experience, and knowledge in the oil 
diplomacy with Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi Arabia.  Moreover, hydro-fracking has 
gained much attention and popularity within the United States as of late – which would allow the 
United States to become less dependent on Gulf oil imports.  This developing reality has, to a 
minimal degree, damaged the lasting relationship with the Arab Gulf states and its ties to the 
United States.  For decades, the relationship between the U.S. and countries like Saudi Arabia 
have focused primarily on petroleum.  These newest developments within the global energy 
industry and international socioeconomic network will change, as well as challenge, the dynamic 
of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East moving forward.   
Ever since the current president took office in 2009, Obama has not had similar personnel 
in executive branch positions with prior knowledge and experience in dealing with the Middle 
Eastern oil business that Bush had.  The lack of experience and knowledge in diplomacy with the 
Persian Gulf states by the foreign policymakers and officials under President Obama has been 
evident.  As recently as February, 2014, Deputy Secretary William Burns (also a former official 
under Presidents George W. Bush and William Clinton) urged the Persian Gulf nations to 
“overcome their differences with Washington.”222 He declared that the United States would offer 
the greatest protection to the Gulf leaders who have feared an overthrow from the restless Shia 
Muslims in the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, which had begun in 2011 and have brought 
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about considerable turmoil to nations like Syria and Egypt.  The administration’s efforts to soften 
tensions with the theocratic government in Iran has not fared well with the Sunni Gulf 
governments of the Middle East as well.  Meanwhile, the Obama Administration, alongside the 
U.N., has launched a major effort at sanctions against Iran, so much so that it squeezed Iran’s 
population to elect a new leader, Hassan Rouhani, in 2013 to carry out negotiations with the 
West and the United States. 
Developments in the oil industry at home have had an important impact on U.S. energy 
policy in the Middle East.  Hydro-fracking is “the process of injecting liquid at high pressure into 
subterranean rocks, boreholes, etc., so as to force open existing fissures and extract oil or gas.”223 
This newly refined innovation that revolutionized ways of extracting oil from the earth has 
proved to have major consequences on the existing relationship between the United States and 
states like Saudi Arabia.  Moreover, Canada and Mexico have been very active in hydro-fracking 
for oil to bolster their own economies.  Most of the world’s natural oil is in the form of tar sands, 
and Alberta, Canada has contained the largest deposit of these tar sands.224 In 2012, Edward 
Morse, a former U.S. official and current economic analyst, asserted that, “North America is 
becoming the new Middle East,” regarding the prospect of becoming the world’s largest 
producer of natural oil and gas.225 The prospect of the United States not remaining so dependent 
on the Arab oil producers of the Middle East has created mixed emotions of nervousness and 
frustration among various Arab Gulf state officials.  
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Suppliers such as OPEC, which has included Saudi Arabia, have been left in a curious 
position.  Sunni Gulf nations, who depend on the generous revenue created by the oil trade in the 
global marketplace, have remained skeptical and fearful about losing their positions of power 
and influence over their nation, its economy, and political stability within the Middle Eastern 
realm – especially in the wake of the widespread Arab uprisings.  Fracking and the subsequent 
increase in the global supply of oil, along with a smaller market, could leave OPEC producers 
battling for market share and “pumping far more crude than expected.”226 Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf nations whose economy, civil stability, and political well-being depend on oil currently, 
cannot take any chances on jeopardizing their own national security interests alongside the 
revelations fracking has revealed to the United States’ economic potential.  Technological 
advances in the energy industry have not eased diplomatic tensions among Gulf governments, 
however it has definitely not been the root source of angst toward U.S. foreign policy decisions 
as of late.  In fact, reopening diplomatic talks with Iran has been the main source of angst by 
Saudi officials towards the U.S. government.  The United States, however, view the willingness 
to communicate with Iran necessary due to Iran’s determination in pursuing nuclear 
development, while maintaining its feelings of angst toward Western society. 
The Obama Administration, contrary to popular belief, has publically reinforced the 
benefits of fracking.  President Obama has claimed on numerous occasions that the oil boom 
caused by fracking has “led to cleaner power and greater energy independence” for the United 
States.227 Other members of his administration have reflected this notion as well, including EPA 
Administrator, Gina McCarthy, and former Secretary of the Department of Energy, Stephen Chu, 
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who argued that techniques currently used in fracking allowed for oil to be extracted from the 
earth with minimal to no environmental consequences.228 Fracking remains in its infancy, 
however, in weighing its environmental risks as well as implementing its full potential at home 
and abroad may take more time and investigation.229  Environmental problems associated with 
hydro-fracking, including the contamination of drinking water sources, release of trapped 
methane into waterways and the atmosphere, and a rise in fracking-related earthquakes, have 
been recently confirmed by numerous environmental scientists.230    
The United States, in recent years, has been divided on the issue of environmental safety 
and the positive economic impact fracking has proposed.  This topic of debate found its way to 
the forefront of the federal government’s overall agenda and policymaking moving forward – 
domestically and internationally.  In promotion of the passage of the American Energy Security 
Act of 2013, several members of Congress, including Senator Michael Hastings (D-IL), 
promoted fracking in the American Midwest and criticized the Obama Administration for, 
“attempting to block new energy production, keeping energy prices high and hurting middle 
class families.”231 Even though hydro-fracking has been used by major and independent oil 
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companies in the U.S. effectively in the short term, which has helped stimulate some aspects of 
the local and national economies, the Obama Administration must adopt a long term solution to 
the impact fracking has imposed on the environment – which partly explains the delay by the 
administration to delay the construction and implementation of the gigantic Keystone Pipeline 
project.   
If hydro-fracking eventually is to be encouraged by members of the U.S. government, 
studied and supported by environmental analysts (If safety measures are implemented that reduce 
fracking’s negative impact on areas surrounding wells and if environmental problems caused by 
fracking are ever solved.), and continues to build support and gain momentum within certain 
business and social arenas of American society, then the United States will eventually view 
nations like Saudi Arabia as a less influential ally regarding their position in the international 
market.  The United States would become a major oil producer for its own expanding population 
and could rely less on Middle Eastern oil imports.  This possible scenario might give the U.S. 
more leverage in Middle Eastern diplomacy, however, the U.S. would not want China and other 
foreign powers to move into the region and claim the Middle Eastern oil market for themselves.  
Moreover, the United States might come to view Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia as a lesser 
strategic political asset if the Saudi government does not encourage domestic changes of their 
own.  Abuses of civil liberty, civil rights of all of its inhabitants, censorship, and promotion of 
aspects related to globalization have been viewed with distaste by the international community 
on the Arab monarchy.  Saudi prince Alaweed bin Talal published a letter to OPEC in July, 
2013, warning Saudi Arabia’s Oil Minister, Ali al Naimi, and other Gulf government officials 
that the region’s reliance on oil revenue was in serious decline, and should implement “swift 
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measures to diversify its economy.”232 Diversifying the Saudi economy, though, is an 
undertaking that exhibits many impediments.  According to researcher Matthew Simmons, Saudi 
Arabia “has not built an economy that generates enough professional jobs for a rapidly growing 
population.”  Instead, the Saudi kingdom restricts the “freedom of women severely,” the 
“Wahhabist233 clergy enforce strict Muslim law and impose criminal punishments considered 
barbaric” by Western standards.234 The harsh enforcement of Sunni Islamic practice, strict social 
regulations of its inhabitants, and “economic contradictions” have combined in Saudi Arabia that 
encourages Muslim discontent and terrorism against the Saud family and its Western allies.235 
Perhaps this could explain one of the factors surrounding the frustrations that have formed 
recently in the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.  
The discovery of oil in Canadian tar sands and innovations in hydro-fracking has allowed 
for more of the world’s natural gas and oil supply beneath the water table to become extracted 
from the earth.  Therefore, it has increased the global supply and demand of this natural resource.  
Although oil-business people have been apoplectic over Obama’s delay of a permit for the 
Keystone Pipeline, supposedly his administration has “worked to craft regulations that keep 
production going while also protecting the public.”236 Gulf governments, such as the Saudi 
monarchy, will have to seek out a broader international market to sell their largest economic 
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asset, or diversify its economy in order to hold onto power and survive.  Furthermore, if 
globalization is to be breached in the Middle East, the Gulf governments must accommodate 
Arab social demands and diversify their own economies, which will allow them to continue 
generating sustainable revenues for their national economies and provide stability for their 
nations’ wellbeing moving forward.  Sean Foley examined that these oil producing governments, 
in light of the 2008 global recession, put an economic strain on the Gulf nations, yet, “there are 
signs that [the recession] may accelerate social and technological trends that will reduce the 
petroleum industry’s importance to the Gulf and the world economy in general.”237 The latest 
technological innovations, including the Internet and the innovations relating to computer 
technology, hybrid vehicles, solar and wind technology, and improvements to digital 
communications by the Millennial generation has spawned a tide of change across the Arabian 
Peninsula.  The increase in demand for the region’s oil by China and other developed nations 
worldwide is another factor that will heavily impact the Saudi economy in the near future.   
As the Arab governments work meticulously to increase the global prestige of their 
nations, which will place their societies into the scheme of globalization, they must fight off 
heavy opposition in the meantime.  This opposition includes Islamic extremism carried out by 
Arab Shi’ites, the Arab Spring movement of 2011, other Sunni opposition within the ranks of 
their own government, and foreign enemies like Iran – which has strongly opposed the Western 
model of globalization.  Under the cloak of Islamic fundamentalism, these abovementioned 
problems and outcomes currently plague Middle Eastern secular leaders and are preventing 
positive change from occurring in the region.    
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In the era following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, foreign policy in the 
Middle East witnessed episodes and events that have changed the entire dynamic of the 
globalization process.  Both administrations under Presidents George W. Bush and Barrack 
Obama have fought for stability, modernization, and democratic values within Middle Eastern 
society.  Yet the Middle East continues to be a region of the world riddled in constant political 
disarray, social upheaval, and violence at the hands of Islamic extremists and corrupt secular 
governments.  Former trends in U.S. foreign policy, however, have presented a problem to the 
current trends and natural developments in the Middle East. 
The United States has maintained its general diplomatic position, beginning in the late 
1940s, toward international sponsorship of the State of Israel and maintaining the oil trade with 
the Arab Gulf states.  Following 9/11, President George W. Bush realized he needed to stray 
away from the overwhelming support that the U.S. had displayed and offered Israeli national 
security for decades.  However, Bush faced strong opposition to his plan from members of his 
own government, the Jewish Lobby in Washington, and certain and various sects of the 
American public.  U.S. foreign policy in Israel quickly returned to one which resurrected a 
newfound Muslim rejection and nonalignment with U.S. policy, while displaying unusually 
strong support for any endeavor Israel found itself in thereafter.  The Obama Administration 
continued to support Israel as its closest Middle Eastern ally, although recent attempts by the 
administration to mediate and find common ground between the Muslim and Jewish peoples of 
the Middle East has aroused immense frustration by supporters and government officials of 
Israel.  If globalization is to spread its reach throughout the region, the special alliance between 
the United States and Israel must transform to a normal alliance – one similar to all other nations 
and peoples of the Middle East harbored by the United States.  Eliminating cultural bias from 
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U.S. foreign policy toward Muslims, Jews, Arabs, non-Arabs, and other cultures native to the 
Middle East alike must materialize if American-formed globalization is to take root.  
The oil-based diplomacy between the United States and the Arab-Gulf states, especially 
Saudi Arabia, has existed for decades as well.  In fact, the somewhat benign relationship the U.S. 
has shared with the al-Saud monarchy dates back to the earliest half of the twentieth century.  
Furthermore, this relationship has centered on the petroleum resources found in the deserts 
around the Arabian Peninsula and shipped off to consuming countries like the United States.  
Petroleum is a very important resource regarding the global economy, and it has dramatic 
implications for the globalization policy set forth by the U.S. and the West.  The two Bush 
Administrations’ personal ties with Saudi princes and sheikhs involved in the oil business was 
perceived by the Arabian people as an act of imperialism carried out by the impure motives of 
Western expansion on a society keen on defending its own.  Moreover, George W. Bush’s 
Second Gulf War in the aftermath of 9/11 harbored a legacy that could not be reversed.  Fighting 
a spirited war against Islamic terrorists who were enemies of the West, Saddam Hussein’s 
irresponsible regime, and Middle Eastern groups who supposedly possessed weapons of mass 
destruction, built up even more animosity toward the U.S. than ever before.  These Middle 
Eastern Muslims who held little political power and detested the Western forces alongside their 
Sunni counterparts, opposed the American military occupation and were convinced that the 
United States had moved into the Middle East to render its economic might selfishly.  America’s 
reliance on Middle Eastern oil was no mystery to the Arab Gulf regimes and companies who had 
been so willing to reap the profits of the oil trade in the past.  The damage done to American 
trust and its perceived duty in heralding in an era of modernization, peace, and democracy to the 
developing world was seen by many in the Middle East as an American-made charade.  Instead, 
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increasing America’s own political and military power, while retaining its global dominance 
economically, was seen by many Middle Eastern Muslims as the primary motive of Western 
policy in the region.   
The Obama Administration continued to rely on Middle Eastern oil imports without the 
closer ties with Gulf-Arab elites like the Bush Administration maintained following 9/11.  
Recently, hydro-fracking and its innovated transformation of the petroleum industry has caused 
the United States to tremendously increase its crude oil and gas supply, increase its exporting 
capabilities, and in doing so, is on pace to becoming a top oil and natural gas-producing nation of 
the world.  These two factors have led the United States to decrease its dependency on Middle 
Eastern oil imports, and begin to rely more heavily on its domestic supply.  The United States is 
the world’s leading producer and exporter of liquid natural gas currently.  Natural gas asserts 
only half of the carbon dioxide that coal does and is pushed by the Obama Administration for 
that reason, as well as increasing U.S. fuel independence.   
In May, 2013, the Obama Administration approved a $10 billion facility in Freeport, 
Texas, named Freeport LNG, which serves as a major exporting facility of natural gas.  Freeport 
LNG’s Chief Executive, Michael Smith, stated in defense of world economic progress, that, 
“[the United States] needs these exports for jobs, for balance of trade and for geopolitical 
reasons….”238  Taking on the task in creating peace by diplomatically working as mediators in 
developing a lasting peace between various groups within the Middle East, decreasing U.S. 
military occupancy in the region, and relying less on special interests like Saudi oil, the Obama 
Administration has altered the means by which globalization is achieved.  This has forced 
                                                 
238
 Keith Johnson and Benjamin Lefebvre, “U.S. Approves Expanded Gas Exports,” The Wall 
Street Journal, May 18, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873247670 
04578489130300876450. 
141 
 
Middle Eastern societies to change their economies in order to include themselves in a global 
system, yet these Muslim societies have remained skeptical and paranoid over the rise of 
hostility demonstrated by Iran, as well as the willingness by the U.S. to allow Iran to gain 
“unparalleled influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories” since 2003.239  
As the Gulf governments attempted to restructure their economies to fit within the structure of 
globalization, one major problem continued to thrive as the U.S. took on a more neutral position 
in confronting Middle Eastern altercations. 
 
Islamic Fundamentalism and the Prospects for Globalization  
 
It is extremely difficult to predict whether or not globalization will reach Middle Eastern 
society given the chaotic and dividing nature of Islamic fundamentalism.  Islamic 
fundamentalism, like many other religious fundamentalist trends found worldwide, is deeply 
rooted in an individual’s consciousness and psychology.  It is not fundamental, nor original 
Islamic doctrine as one may be led to believe, however, Islamic fundamentalism evolved from a 
mixture of political, religious, and social philosophies prevalent during the initial stages of the 
Cold War in the mid-twentieth century.  The Middle East, in the years prior to the buildup of the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, had been a region of the world coveted by Western powers for its 
natural resources and strategic location for carrying out a policy of containment versus the 
Soviets. It did not take long for Muslim society to resent Western influence, interference, and 
presence in their social, economic, and political systems.  Vali Nasr described Islamic 
fundamentalism as “seething with anger… anti-Americanism, and vulnerable to extremist ideas” 
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that are different from traditional Muslim lifestyles.240 With a mixture of Western animosities 
and pro-Soviet social sentiments, which were popular movements in developing nations during 
the 1950s and 1960s, Islamic fundamentalism became a popular ideology for the disenfranchised 
Middle Eastern Muslim populations.  Soviet ideals of social empowerment of the poor and 
abused, combined with an ultra-conservative translation of Islamic doctrine formed what is now 
referred to as Islamic fundamentalism.    
 In the current Muslim world, there is a growing section of the population that have fallen 
victim to this distorted religious and cultural rationale, which has too often resulted in violence, 
destruction, death, and tragedy.  Some Middle Eastern Muslims support the prospects of 
globalization, however many oppose globalization out of the fear that it will dispose of their own 
culture and traditions while indoctrinating Western political, economic, and social trends.  
Meanwhile, U.S. leaders view their own agenda to bring about globalization as one that is 
universally right, disregarding the Muslims’ claims of American imperialism and political 
corruption within the historical context of Middle Eastern society.   
As the 9/11 Commission orchestrated their official report on the outcomes and facts in 
the months following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, one thing was clearly interpreted: the 
enemy, Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, “use[d] cultural and religious allusions to the holy Qur’an 
and some of its interpreters…. [Appealing] to people disoriented by cyclonic change as they 
confront modernity and globalization.”241 The 9/11 Commission Report received much criticism 
for not stating all necessary information surrounding warnings of a grand terrorist plot, although 
a certainty was revealed in this report:  The United States government had officially declared a 
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war against the Islamic jihad and its religious doctrine that yearned to halt America’s 
globalization project in the Middle East.  Tragedy had hit home, yet the United States was more 
than willing to continue its globalization agenda.  To policymakers, Islamic extremism was not 
going to pose as an obstacle for globalization efforts.   
Following 9/11, eliminating Islamic fundamentalism became of upmost importance by 
U.S. officials in order to protect American society from this threat while successfully 
implementing their globalization policy.  Iran, the nation built upon the foundations of Islamic 
fundamentalism, has been a distant and hostile nation toward U.S. diplomacy in the region until 
recent.  The willingness by Washington to open up negotiations with Iran’s Islamic theocracy is 
an initial step in working out some form of lasting peace and possibly assimilation of Iran into 
the globalization system.  However, Islamic fundamentalism has not been exclusive to just Iran.  
Throughout the desert lands of the Middle East, pockets of Shia minorities exist within all of the 
secular nations.  Middle Eastern Shia populations, as of recent, have been more vocal and active 
in expressing their religious and social desires, which contributed immensely to the appearance 
of the Arab Spring in 2011. 
The Arab Spring movement, which begun as civil protests in Tunisia in December, 2010, 
has since resulted in social uprisings against the corrupt secular and Sunni regimes across the 
Middle East.  Egypt and Syria have been the nations to fall victim to this social uprising recently 
– as Syria continues to be riddled with warfare and tragedy in the wake of the overthrow attempt 
of Iranian-backed Bashar al-Asad’s regime.  The Arab Spring today is a byproduct of the Arab-
Muslim peoples’ resentment toward Western occupation of their lands and oppression of their 
lifestyle by corrupt elites and governments in recent years.  The Islamic backlash against U.S. 
and other Western foreign policies in the region for the previous several decades had gained 
144 
 
momentum and manifested itself into the present civil unrest that the world is currently 
witnessing.  Even in the outcome of Obama’s 2009 speech at Cairo University – where he 
promised a new and fruitful beginning with Arab Muslim culture – and the steady U.S. military 
withdrawal from Iraq, over three-quarters of the Muslim population in Jordan, Egypt, Palestinian 
territories, and even in its major Middle Eastern ally, Turkey, “held an unfavorable view of the 
United States” by the time the Arab Spring commenced.242 
It had become clear to U.S. policymakers in the Middle East that Islamic fundamentalism 
was not solely isolated to terrorist organizations and certain sects of Shia radical Muslims.  The 
United States’ irreversible military actions in both Gulf Wars, the suspicious oil policy with 
Saudi Arabia, and “America’s relationships with authoritarian regimes, and in particular their 
intelligence services… used equally against political dissenters as [well as] against terrorist 
suspects,” had culminated into a widespread hatred of U.S. policy among the Middle Eastern 
peoples.243 Even after U.S. Special Forces had captured and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan 
in May of 2011, the U.S. government understood that they still had a powerful enemy in Islamic 
extremism to defeat.  The United States has persisted in backing corrupt and unpopular Middle 
Eastern governments – Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah of Bahrain, and 
Pakistan’s recently removed Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf just to mention a few – and 
with that reality, Islamic fundamentalism remained alive and well in the Middle East.  In 
addition, bin Laden’s death was viewed as a symbol of martyrdom regarding Islam’s jihad 
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against the Western Satan.  This event further stimulated a sense by Islamic extremists to avenge 
his death through more acts of terrorism against the U.S. and its Western alliances.   
It should be of no surprise then that the majority of people residing in the Middle East 
view the United States as a foreign foe.  U.S. foreign policy, since oil’s discovery in the early 
twentieth century, has centered on America’s self-interest, rather than on the general interest of 
the Arab populous.  This fact had been realized by officials of the United States’ government in 
recent history.  Even while occupying Iraq and other parts of the Middle East in the summer of 
2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted to an audience at the University of Cairo 
that U.S. foreign policy in its target of globalization had failed.  She declared that, “[f]or sixty 
years….[T]he United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region… and 
[the United States] achieved neither.  Now, we are taking a different course.  We are supporting 
the democratic aspirations of all people.”244 Globalization has, and will, continue to be a goal of 
U.S. foreign policy in the region, but it will be extremely difficult to correct past mistakes and 
change the mindset of an entire foreign culture.  In the subsequent federal administration, 
President Obama remarked with similar sentiments similar to Rice’s.  In the aftermath of bin 
Laden’s capture and death, within the undertow of the early stages of the Arab Spring, President 
Obama offered a new course of direction in U.S. foreign policy due to the irreversible rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism and the hostility it forced upon the United States.  In a memorandum he 
published for the State Department in May of 2011, President Obama advocated the need for 
change in the way his nation directed foreign policy in the Middle East: 
Yet we must acknowledge that a strategy based solely upon the narrow pursuit of 
these interests will not fill an empty stomach or allow someone to speak their 
mind.  Moreover, failure to speak to the broader aspirations of ordinary people 
will only feed the suspicion that has festered for years that the United States 
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pursues our interests at their expense. Given that this mistrust runs both ways –- 
as Americans have been seared by hostage-taking and violent rhetoric and 
terrorist attacks that have killed thousands of our citizens -– a failure to change 
our approach threatens a deepening spiral of division between the United States 
and the Arab world.245  
 
 Indeed, foreign policymakers needed to meet a new demand by the Arab people who 
would reject any attempt of globalization through political action.  But when and how can 
globalization be instilled in a region where this system is viewed synonymously with U.S. 
corruption and imperialism?  The solution may reside in a natural course through use of free 
market principles, which capitalism enables. 
Many experts on global policy agree that the mechanisms of social mobility, which 
capitalism provides people with, may be the only way globalization plants itself in the Middle 
East.  Oppression of the Arab-Muslim masses by domestic and foreign forces for decades has 
engineered the present episode of Islamic extremism.  Additionally, “[t]he bulge in their 
populations of unemployed and underemployed young men has proved a fertile ground for 
extremism and terrorism and raises larger questions about the future of the region.”246 The 
growth of a free market in the Muslim world could aid in solving this complex problem.  
Removing the government restrictions and guidelines forced upon the Muslim business 
community and middle class by various Arab regimes, per se, would provide more opportunity 
for modernization and democracy to flourish throughout the Middle East.  From 2005 onwards, 
Iran’s business community, with its fruitful economic relationship with neighboring robust 
business-savvy cities like Dubai and Abu Dhabi across the Persian Gulf, has begun to 
demonstrate their discontent with Hassan Rouhani’s pro-nationalist government.  Iran’s powerful 
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theocracy have restricted the privatization of business activities since the 1980s.  Although a 
Shia Islamic state, Iranian entrepreneurs and other capitalists have come to disfavor their 
government for its condemnation on Iran’s growing middle class and their “constraints 
imposed… on the capitalist private sector.”247 
Global economic powerhouses in the Middle East, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have triumphed 
in paving the way toward globalization in the Middle East.  These two cities’ “capitalist 
renaissance” and their mass growth of wealth have not been threatened by corrupted secular 
leadership, but rather can attribute their economic success to “enlightened leadership” that has 
allowed the natural forces of capitalism and its free market to dictate the UAE’s wealth and 
prosperity.248 Oil wealth, however, has also contributed greatly to the UAE’s economic triumph.  
Furthermore, “Dubai’s boom has been driven primarily by large conglomerates that are 
government financed but not government run.”249 Perhaps if other Middle Eastern peoples come 
to realize that they can freely partake in capitalist activities while remaining devout Muslims, 
globalization may become a rampant force in the region that will replace fundamentalism in 
years to come.  Nations like Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia could also champion positive 
economic reform like the UAE has since the early 1990s.  If the Middle East’s secular leadership 
allows for more social freedom or their people, as well as integrating their devout Muslim faith 
with a modern economic-techno-political model, then globalization in the Middle East may take 
form. 
If globalization is to come to the Middle East, and for Islamic fundamentalism to be 
defeated, it will have to occur naturally and self-imposed by Muslim society.  The establishment 
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of globalization cannot be imposed upon the Middle East by U.S. foreign policy nor any other 
foreign policy for that matter. “Genuine and enduring democracy is nurtured best in conditions 
that gradually foster spontaneous change and do not combine compulsion with haste.”250 U.S. 
officials and proponents of globalization must let the natural forces of capitalism, civil reform, 
and democratic-representative government take precedence, and not interfere with imposing its 
desired will on Middle Eastern society.  Following the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11th, the 
9/11 Commission suggested that U.S. foreign policy should focus its primary concerns toward 
the promotion of individual educational and economic opportunities.  Instead of implementing 
democratic values forcefully into the Middle East by U.S. officials and policymakers, the United 
States should define its global role in “moral leadership,” abiding by the “rule of law” in 
judgment of global outcomes and circumstances.251 
Efforts to completely withdraw U.S. influence from the region, on a substantial level, is 
yet to be seen.  In 2005, Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister since 1975, 
testified to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations that he disagreed with President Bush’s 
assumptions, that “tyrannical governments in the Middle East were the source of Muslim 
extremism.” Rather, in the Saudi prince’s opinion, “the Arab-Israeli conflict was the root cause 
of Middle Eastern extremism and terrorism.”252 A year later in 2006, a Gulf Arab intellectual, 
Jamal al-Suwaidi, published a series of articles articulating the conflict globalization posed on 
the Arab states.  As a staunch nationalist living in the UAE, he lamented that, “Emirati culture 
might soon vanish in a society comprising people who are neither Arabs nor Sunni Muslims.”253 
The U.S. government must rely on trustworthy and factual evidence in creating an effective 
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foreign policy that implements stability and peace in the Middle East.  The government and its 
policymakers cannot rely on personal and administrative assumptions and a strict American 
perspective in formulating a foreign policy of globalization. 
Iran remains one of the major opponents to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  This 
nation, led by a Shia theocracy who manages the country as an Islamic republic, has openly 
detested U.S. influence and society in general.  In his controversial visit to Columbia University 
in September of 2007, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad referred to U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East numerously in his speech.  In Ahmadinejad’s defense of Islamic 
fundamentalism and the “God-given gift of science,” he condemned the “Big [global] powers,” 
such as the United States, for its “monopoly over science” and knowledge, which does “not want 
to see the progress of other nations.”254 The following day, he made similar remarks at the U.N. 
General Assembly in New York City.  His case for modern-day Iran was established for the 
global powers.  Basically, he condemned the most apparent factors in U.S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East – for its continued support for the Israeli cause over the Palestinian cause, and 
reinstatement of the American imperialist notion that, “In [the United States’] view, human 
rights are tantamount to profits for [U.S.] companies and friends.”255  
Today, the relationship between the United States and Iran remains in poor condition.  
Nevertheless, there is a willingness by the U.S. government to initiate, at least, the beginning of 
the diplomatic process needed to rebuild a friendly alliance with Iran.  Islamic fundamentalism, 
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which runs rampant throughout Iran’s society, will prevent modernization and U.S. interests to 
do so in the foreseeable future.  The State Department recently classified the Iranian theocracy as 
a government that, “has not recognized Israel’s right to exist, has hindered the Middle East peace 
process by arming militants, including Hamas, Hizballah, and [the] Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and 
continues to play a disruptive role in sustaining violence in the region, particularly Syria.”256 If a 
lasting peace is to be established between the United States and Iran, the underlying psychology 
of Islamic fundamentalism must be eliminated from those who hold executive power and 
influence in Iran.   
The Islamic Republic of Iran has had, at least, a 35 year legacy in the Middle East, and 
currently this nation is wealthy and large enough to develop nuclear technology, and possibly 
weaponry.  Unfortunately, Iran has long supported Shia populations and Islamic radicals in its 
eastern neighboring countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Afghanistan and Iran have had a 
bitter relationship as of late, while the relationship between Iran and Pakistan has come into 
conflict, too, as of late.  The reason being is that there has been multiple reported national 
security breaches between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and sects of Islamic 
terrorist groups throughout all three nations who are unified under the ideal of a jihad against 
secular power and the West.  In May, 2012, Afghan authorities arrested two suspected terrorists 
who confessed that, “[Iran’s] Revolutionary Guards recruit young people for terrorist activities in 
Afghanistan and try to revive the Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan led by… Taliban groups.”257 
Meanwhile, “given Pakistan's cultural shifts and the financial lure of the Gulf Arabs, a return to 
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the close relations of prior days [with Iran] is unlikely.”258 With the increasing hostility between 
these three ruling governments, an alliance between Iran’s regime and Islamic extremist groups 
residing within Pakistan or Afghanistan is a reality needed to be considered by the U.S. and the 
international community.  If Iran does engineer nuclear technology in the future, and if Iran 
continues to back Islamic extremists, then the idea of Islamic radicals harboring nuclear weapons 
could become a terrifying reality for the world community to endure.  In order to ease the 
tensions and differences held by the majority of Iranians - and the Shia population, in general, 
around the Middle East - toward Western motives of globalization, U.S. policymakers must 
make admirable efforts to stray away from its exclusive and nationalistic interests in the 
unconditional support for Israel’s regional policy.  Also, the United States must reconsider its 
reliance on Middle Eastern oil supplies from governments who are viewed in an unfavorable 
light by parts of their populations.  
The United States will continue to push for globalization in the Middle East.  Yet, the 
directive of U.S. foreign policy in the region has varied considerably.  Its former and present 
entanglement with Gulf oil, its containment of Shia Islam and other Islamic fundamentalism 
within the Middle East, and its overwhelming support for Israel has hurt the U.S. cause for 
globalization.  The current widespread Arab Spring movement and persistent Islamic terrorism, 
moreover, has deterred the U.S. from interfering with Middle Eastern affairs in recent times.  
The change of directive in policy in response to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, especially in 
the aftermath of the Benghazi incident of 2012, has raised much concern over the legitimacy of a 
policy of globalization exclusive to U.S. policymakers and prospectors.  U.S. officials must take 
the backseat, while leaders of the Arab world direct their own path toward globalization.  Arab 
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intellectual, George Tarabishi, argued the case for globalization during a roundtable discussion 
for the Ministry of Affairs of Bahrain in October, 2000.  In support of globalization, Tarabishi 
advocated:  
In the large global village that the world is on the verge of becoming, the Arab 
world – which is more divided than ever – is in need of becoming first a regional 
singular village…. At a time when Arab culture, like the other cultures of the 
world, has no option but to engage with [globalization], then it would appear that 
this engagement, in the Arab case, will be conflictual rather than cooperative.259  
 
The reality for the Middle East is that in order to become participating members of a global 
order, their internal religious conflicts must be first managed and then resolved.  Middle Eastern 
society could increase their standard of living, intellectualism, and peace if they decide to 
relinquish their steadfast belief in Shariah Law. 
The 9/11 tragedy created a distorted the U.S. public opinion of Middle Eastern culture 
and society.  More specifically, neoconservatives, religious fundamentalist groups, and various 
right-wing groups “argue that America’s goal should be to reorder the Middle East, using 
America’s power in the name of democracy to subordinate the Arab states to its will, to eliminate 
Islamic radicalism, and to make the region safe for Israel.”260 The political Left, similarly, holds 
onto similar beliefs, especially in regards to combating Islamic fundamentalism.  However, the 
Left is not as concerned with advancing global corporate capitalism as the Right is.  The Obama 
Administration has been adamant in defending its “firm belief that America’s interests are not 
hostile to people’s hopes,” while supporting a “policy of the United States to promote reform 
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across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.”261 Both, American conservative and 
liberal ideologies in defeating Islamic fundamentalism, have major flaws in their foundations.   
In order for Islamic fundamentalism to become a nonfactor involved in globalization 
efforts, two major revisions to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East must take place:  First, U.S. 
policymakers must withdraw national self-interests from its mission in the Arab Middle East.  
American interests in big business, especially around the oil trade, and their special treatment of 
Israel must discontinue if globalization is to become established as a viable system.  Arab, 
Persian, and Palestinian resentment toward the American-Israeli relationship and America’s 
interests in Gulf oil have resulted in much of the anti-American attitudes held by Middle Eastern 
Muslims for decades.  Eliminating these two factors from U.S. policy might reverse the negative 
attitudes against the United States over time.  More importantly, the proposition that 
globalization will replace the popularity of Islamic fundamentalism may become a possibility. 
The United States must allow for free-market capitalism to naturally replace the 
popularity of Islamic fundamentalism in a Middle Eastern context.  Economic freedom, which 
allow for social mobility, the economic abundance of goods and services, and free trade, are a 
few examples of the pros that globalization has to offer.  The inclusion of U.S. social customs 
and norms in Middle Eastern globalization, however, might not be as welcomed.  For example, a 
sexualized and romanticized consumer culture, equality for women, and the dominance of a 
wealthy international business elite are factors that will encounter strong opposition by Middle 
Eastern Muslims.  With a rebellious climate growing across the Middle East – especially in the 
wake of the latest Arab Spring – an Islamic form of organic capitalism provides the means to 
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revising the distorted logic behind Islamic fundamentalism.  A Lebanese journalist recently 
compared the causes surrounding the Arab Spring of 2011 and the European revolutions of 1848 
as very similar.  He indicated that alongside political corruption committed by Arab secular 
regimes, “poverty, rising food prices, inflation, human rights violation, and high unemployment” 
were key issues and problems that many young Arabs wanted resolved, just as many Europeans 
desired in the mid-nineteenth century.262  
In the case of Iran - which holds much political, religious, and military clout throughout 
the region – capitalism holds the key in changing the attitudes of all Arab Muslims concerning 
globalization.  According to Vali Nasr, “Iran is today a tired [government] with a failing 
economy, and under pressure from a restless population.  The ruling clerics may opt to continue 
down the path of confrontation with the West, but they also have incentives to improve relations, 
and that is especially so due to economic realities.”263 Arab Muslims across the entire Middle 
East must first come to embrace capitalism and formulate a method to synchronize it within the 
framework of Islam.  Recently, this transition has taken place and has increased Muslims’ social 
mobility by increasing their standard of living within their nations’ often corrupt power structure.  
Economic freedom could then give way to social freedom. “Gradually… the Muslim countries 
one by one will likely make their individual adaptations of the precepts of Islam to increasingly 
modern politics based on more participatory social mobilization.”264 Once Arab Muslims come 
to realize, as individuals, that capitalism can provide for a better life, perhaps globalization will 
work effectively in the Middle East. 
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There are other factors to consider as well that bring Middle Eastern globalization into 
debate.  First, Islamic intellectualism, like Islamic fundamentalism, is on the rise in the Middle 
East.  Young adult Muslims have taken to the streets to protest the norm of traditional Muslim 
culture. “Institutions like Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which is the oldest university in the 
world, the Muslim World League in Mecca, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
headquartered in Jeddah are the examples of the contemporary, intellectual, educational, and 
diplomatic forces in the resurgence of Islam.”265 These institutions have been increasing in 
popularity and interest by the Middle Eastern youth and young adults looking for placement 
within a rapidly growing and global socioeconomic landscape.  Moreover, the rise of Islamic 
academia and intellectualism has sought to teach the true and peaceful nature of Islam, “free 
from extremism and violence.”266 Former state-sponsored Islamic schools across the Middle East 
have been replaced by “trailblazing” schools funded by “market-driven, private sector 
initiatives.”267  
Many young adults and teenagers across the Middle East have grown restless over their 
stagnant society.  In a region where there is limited social mobility, and an isolated, state-
controlled economy to work in, scores of Muslims have become aware of their circumstance and 
have openly voiced the need for change.  The 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States 
triggered a debate within the U.N. over why Arab-Muslims resented the West.  A 2002 United 
Nation’s Human Development Program (UNDP) report underscored that the origins of Western 
resentment were identified by corrupted Arab “authoritarian rule and its perpetrators.” Moreover, 
the study indicated that, “authoritarian rulers know only too well that their survival depends on 
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the continued backwardness and acute economic underdevelopment of their societies,” while the 
rest of the world became “enlightened with the spread of the information revolution.”268 The 
younger members of Islamic society have come to see an Islamic-explicit policy of globalization 
as opportunity and hope for their nations’ future and cause.  Furthermore, the Internet and the 
recent advances in digital technology and social networking has opened the way for writers, such 
as Rajaa al-Sanea, “to express their views freely without fear of government retribution.”269 The 
opportunity in today’s world for ideas and communication to operate at a much faster and 
abundant rate has aided the rise of Islamic intellectualism.  Moreover, these young Muslims have 
been able to adapt to a peaceful and progressive version of Islam, compatible to the modes 
globalization could bring to the Middle East. 
Another encouraging prospect for globalization to become implemented in Middle 
Eastern society is the increasing power of the international community, which has accepted 
globalization as a possible vehicle for peace, equality, and modernization.  Countries such as 
China, with its increasing interest in Saudi petroleum, have become rising players in Middle 
Eastern affairs.  Since the early 1990s, there were “only a handful of countries that explicitly 
rejected participation” in world trade.  By the end of the decade, the value of world trade doubled 
to about $8 trillion – a $3.5 trillion increase from the international trade activities of the 1980s.270 
Today, as nations such as Brazil, India, China and Russia continue to make strides toward global 
prominence and prestige, the Middle East will have to decide whether or not it collectively 
wishes to reform its society and take the path toward globalization.   
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It is very important that the international community coordinates their efforts cordially to 
bring about the modes of positive change to the Middle East.  Perhaps the international 
community should do nothing in order to allow for organic globalization to take shape across the 
region’s landscape.  Zbigniew Brzezinski, on the other hand, advocated globalization reform 
through a collective effort by Middle Eastern peoples and other international forces: 
The war on Middle Eastern terrorism will bring the actual elimination of terrorist 
organizations only when they lose their social appeal and therefore their 
recruitment ability, and when their financial backing dries up.  This victory is 
likely to be apparent only retroactively.  Proliferation will be brought under 
control when suspect national efforts are either subjected to effective international 
controls or halted by the duress of outside force.  The active involvement of 
America will be critical to both outcomes, but achieving them will be much easier 
if American initiatives command genuine international support.271 
 
Globalization could also come to the Middle East without emphasizing the need to – by 
excluding globalization measures from within U.S. foreign policy.  However, upon the Obama 
Administration’s re-election victory in 2012, critics of the administration, such as the Iranian 
government, have argued that its continued use of drone warfare in the Middle East, and U.S. 
avoidance of the Syrian Civil War involvement have indicated that the U.S. continues to push its 
own national interests through a unilateral globalization policy.  These critics, which includes the 
Iranian people, suggest that the Obama Administration should pursue a concrete human rights 
agenda and allow Muslims a “greater freedom of expression” on a global level.272 As the United 
States continues on a path toward a greater unified world, a decision must be agreed upon by 
policymakers on what specific globalization policy should be emphasized and implemented, 
even if it means implementing nothing at all.   
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Chapter 4 
………………………………………………. 
A Fork in the Road: Globalization in the Middle East 
 
For decades, the Middle East has taken center stage for the United States in carrying out 
its views and desires of a world doctrine.  This doctrine, which remains an underlying aim within 
American foreign policy - created overwhelmingly by elite businessmen and politicians - 
consisted of an objective to bring about global unity within a political and socioeconomic 
structure, or globalization.  The diplomatic means by which the United States plans to institute 
globalization worldwide, and particularly in the Middle East, is more evident today than ever 
before.   
In her 2007 article, “America and the World,” renowned historian Emily Rosenberg 
explained the course of history regarding American diplomacy.  Her analysis indicated that, 
since the emergence of the Wisconsin school of historical scholarship of the late 1950s, most 
historians agreed that, “economic expansion in search of new markets la[id] at the core of the 
American experience.”273 Likewise, historians Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams, 
“suggested that the United States had long been an outward-looking empire driven by economic 
interests, which used the state to push an open door order that brought militarism, repression, and 
war.”274 Rosenberg saw close similarities between the American notion of Manifest Destiny on 
the domestic front, and its implementation in U.S. foreign policy.  Policymakers in the U.S. 
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endorsed this idea of American expansionism, and inserted its cause into foreign policy decades 
prior to the beginning of the Cold War in 1945. 
 Globalization, which has emerged today as a system modeled after Western culture and 
society, is becoming an even more momentous force behind the constructs of United States’ 
foreign policy.  Various Middle Eastern and American elite -- those driving the direction of 
global economics and politics -- exist as the major proponents behind efforts to push the world 
into a globalized society in the image of American expansionism.  Moreover, leaders in China, 
Japan, Europe, and in other nations around the developed world have tended to support elements 
of globalization to serve their nations’ best interests.  The major opponents of globalization seem 
to consist of groups of Western and Middle Eastern societies who perceive danger or harm from 
such a development.  Moreover, religious fundamentalists, including those of Islamic, Judaic, 
and Christian backgrounds, and defenders of traditional, cultural, ethnical, and statist trends of 
thinking, constitute the major opponents of an American effort to globalize developing regions of 
the world.  Globalization, according to Rosenberg, has “offered new terms and paradigms for 
conceptualizing complex state and non-state relationships” beginning in the post-Cold War days 
of the 1990s.275 The legacy of globalization remains yet to be seen.  As the United States 
promotes its vision of a global society, efforts by various political and social reformers to reduce 
and eventually diminish the numerous religious conflicts, cultural ideologies, political strife, and 
nationalist interests are essential to this endeavor. 
 Following the conclusion of the Second World War, the U.S. has witnessed, as well as 
coordinated, two trends of foreign policy in the Middle East.  Beginning at the start of the Cold 
War in 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated a diplomatic battle on the world 
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stage.  The Cold War trend (1945-1991) of U.S. foreign policy aimed to create an international 
security shield for the Third World and Eastern European nations against Soviet indoctrination.  
The endgame of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union was to demonstrate to the rest of the world 
the society that should serve as a path toward the future.  Therefore, the United States’ objective 
was to prevent the Soviet Union from the global economic system and dissolve any communist 
uprisings in order to isolate the Soviet Union from increasing its political might around the 
world.  The oil trade between the Arab Gulf states and the U.S., the U.S. alliance and steadfast 
support for Israel’s welfare, and the overall containment of the spread of Soviet doctrine were 
crucial factors of U.S. policy needed for winning the Cold War and protecting Islamic society 
from communism.   
The U.S. and Soviet Union would, at various times throughout the duration of the Cold 
War, flex their potential military might, win over as many secular allies as possible, and aspire to 
dominate the world’s political-economic system.  The Third World or Developing nations – 
including regions around the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeastern Asia - became a 
diplomatic battleground for the two superpowers over strategic resources and political alliances 
vital to Cold War victory.  Middle Eastern petroleum resources and the United States’ unique 
alliance with Israel were vital to U.S. policymakers in keeping Soviet expansion at bay while 
solidifying a U.S. presence in the region.  Once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the U.N.-
American coalition had militarily pressured Saddam Hussein’s army out of Kuwait, the United 
States proved itself the dominant world power.  The elite American political-economic 
establishment embarked on its journey to instill a doctrine of democratic-representative 
government, modernization, and capitalism within Middle Eastern society, and likewise, the 
remainder of the developing world.   
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By the dawn of the 1990s, the United States had transformed the underlying direction of 
its foreign policy.  As declared by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in the 
final days of the Cold War, the world was about to embark on a new path toward a singular 
political, economic, and social system.  For U.S. policymakers, the policy of containment 
regarding the prevention of the spread of Soviet influence was dissolved and replaced with a 
policy of globalization.  Globalization’s prospects included the unilateral support and designation 
of a unified socioeconomic system for the entire world, being governed by one global political 
coalition orchestrating its power within its unilateral paradigm.  This transformation of policy 
direction championed in the second trend of U.S. foreign policy: The Globalization trend (1991-
present).  The plan pioneered by U.S. policymakers to spread its doctrine of globalization to the 
Muslim world of the Middle East would prove to be a cumbersome task.  From this point 
forward, the United States carried out a globalization policy that defended Western social, 
political, and economic norms that toppled those of Soviet Russia.  At its initial stages, instilling 
a system of globalization within Muslim culture was met with heavy resistance from Islamic 
fundamentalists and Arab nationalists.  Shia populations across the region, Palestinians’ devout 
dedication to reclaiming its homeland from its U.S.-supported Israeli rivals, the powerful 
theocratic government of Iran, and particular Sunni regimes – like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq -- that 
displayed animosities toward the West, continuously acted in defiance of U.S. diplomatic actions 
and goals.   
The al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States in September, 2001 reinforced Muslim 
hatred of Western expansion in the Middle East.  The calamity of 9/11 also established the battle 
lines between globalization efforts spearheaded by the U.S. and Western governments against the 
portion of Middle Eastern society that wished to remain isolated from perceived outside threats 
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to their traditional culture.  Federal administrations under George W. Bush and Barrack Obama 
created and managed foreign policies in the Middle East that presented conflicting or similar 
means and measures in bringing about desired changes to the Muslim world.  Defeating Islamic 
terrorism and hostile Islamic regimes was one side of the American policy equation, while 
instilling democratic reform and lasting peace between Muslims, Jews, and non-Muslims alike 
became the principle elements of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.   
Meanwhile, Presidents George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush sought to protect 
and enhance big business relationships between U.S. political-economic entities and their Arab 
counterparts involved in the petroleum industry, to help solidify the U.S. presence and 
undertaking in the Middle East.  The Bush Administration’s military crusade against Islamic 
extremism and uncooperative Middle Eastern governments - alongside imperialistic ties with 
Saudi oil and the unparalleled U.S. support for Israel - left a lasting legacy of bitterness and 
divide between the collective social framework of the Muslim peoples and underlying motives of 
American foreign policy.  Once the Obama Administration took to power and began to manage 
foreign policy in the Middle East, curbing Islamic fundamentalism and extremism remained an 
essential undertaking, yet implementing a solid policy of globalization in a more turbulent world 
remained a gigantic task.  Obama’s lack of business interests and personnel in the Gulf oil trade 
paradox, combined with new oil extraction techniques in hydro-fracking in North America 
distanced the imperialistic relationship between the United States and the Middle East.  
Moreover, the Obama Administration’s desire to reconcile with Iran and the Muslim world as a 
whole in seeking out a strategy to curb Islamic fundamentalism and extremism in return for a 
culturally evolved globalist doctrine has been the staple of Obama’s diplomacy thus far.  
Although policymakers have sought to bring about permanent peace and pose as mediators 
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between opposing forces within Middle Eastern society, it remains yet to be seen whether or not 
globalization will become a viable reality across the entire Middle East.  Additionally, what type 
of globalization, will breach Middle Eastern society has become a topic of debate.  
President Obama has recently decided not to have the U.S. intervene in the Syrian Civil 
War in 2013, and has not seriously engaged Russian President Vladimir Putin on his invasion of 
Ukraine in early 2014.  Instead, the Obama Administration has decided to increase the exporting 
of natural gas and has focused on economic and environmental issues at home.  These 
developments have indicated a change in U.S. foreign policy directive.  Each nation or ethnic 
group around the globe will have to come to terms with globalization.  China has reminded the 
world there are numerous ways to approach capitalism and modernity.  They have, thus far, 
emphasized a state-directed economy from the top downward, but have allowed entrepreneurs to 
get wealthy and take advantage of the mechanisms of capitalism, all while clamping down on 
political dissent.  Turkey has been able to maintain its democratic republic and has gained 
favorable international reputation, all while remaining an Islamic state that contains numerous 
and different ethnic groups.  Iran, meanwhile, is a theocratic republic that views globalization as 
a Middle East entirely under the strict rule of Shia Islam.  Indeed, many varieties of globalization 
exist within the Middle East, so to gauge what form of globalization will prosper and function in 
the region’s future, including Western policy, will present an enigma to U.S. policymakers.   
BRIC nations and other developed countries around the globe will have to coordinate 
their efforts together, accordingly, in order to effectively indoctrinate globalization into regions 
of the developing world.  On the other hand, the Middle East could enter a stage in its natural 
development where each society allows for globalization to organically present itself.  As 
countries, like China per se, increase its international power, they must be willing and rational 
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enough to participate in transcending a benign policy of globalization onto the developing 
peoples and nations of the world.  The United States cannot afford to take on the task of 
globalization in the Middle East alone.  Furthermore, the Muslims of Middle Eastern society, as 
a whole, must come to recognize how the potential of a global network of democracy and 
commerce could provide for and benefit the region.  Yet, globalization could also threaten the 
traditional religious and cultural patterns of the various groups of people residing in the Middle 
East.  Writing on the topic of globalization, Lebanese independent writer and elite businessman, 
Mohammad S. Moussalli, emphasized the importance of a meticulous and responsible method of 
implementing globalization in the Middle East.  He declared that, “if globalization is introduced 
with significant educational, social, and economic support that could make Arab countries 
flourish alongside foreign cultures, then it may turn into a universal culture in which Arabs may 
come under its umbrella as equals.”276 
United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East remains an unfinished episode.  The 
current Arab Spring uprisings have raised many questions concerning the impact of globalization 
across the entire Middle Eastern region since 2011.  Furthermore, the current uprisings indicated 
to the world that the region has yet to experience, encounter, and accept or decline the full 
reforms of globalization.  These uprisings might prove to be the evolutionary initial steps of 
globalization, however, as Muslims across the region have become resistant to their corrupt 
governments.  Middle Eastern Muslims will ultimately have the responsibility in deciding 
whether or not they want to partake in a global community or remain isolated from the ever-
changing world society.  In a social climate where religion reigns superior in everyday life, 
Muslims, on an individual level, must consider how globalization will impact their own societies.  
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U.S. policymakers and officials could work tediously in promoting and sponsoring globalization 
in the Muslim world, however, the Arab world must accept this proposition in sum, as well as 
consider other forms of globalization not explicit to U.S. goals.  
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